In a major contribution to Hegel scholarship, Professor Flay has written two books in one.

I shall suggest in this paper that this "inverted world" is exactly that: an absurd position. This is not to say that it is to be ignored or condemned as "fantastic," but rather that its importance and intelligibility lay in its very absurdity, in its appearance as an unintelligible inversion of what previously was taken to constitute the intelligibility of the world of appearance. More precisely, I shall suggest that this inverted world is a misunderstanding and perversion of the conclusion (...) to which we should have been brought at this point in the Phenomenology. It is Hegel's intention, underscored by the conditional rather than indicative construction of this section, that we see this misunderstanding as a misunderstanding. When on the other hand the inversion is correctly understood, it brings to the phenomenological "we" undergoing the Bildungsprozess of the Phenomenology of Spirit the explicit realization that consciousness is not merely finite intentionality, but as such is infinite. Consciousness is self-consciousness, consciousness limited by nothing but itself. (shrink)

The question of the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics is a continuing one. In the last few decades the idea that Hegel even has a metaphysics has been challenged. Recently Stephen Houlgate has responded to this latter idea and tried to show not only that Hegel has a metaphysics, but of what sort it is. In my view Houlgate is right about Hegel having a metaphysics and also right generally about what sort of metaphysics it is. However, it seems to me (...) that he has made too weak a case for the metaphysics in his presentation of what he takes to be Hegel’s arguments, and as a consequence cannot escape a charge that Hegel might still be either a Kantian or some sort of subjective idealist. What I mean by this is that, to the extent that we are simply limited in our metaphysics to what we can think being to be, there may still be an absolute other which we simply cannot know. Houlgate has made things very clear concerning the conclusion to which we should come about the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics, but has not, in my view, made his argument leading to his conclusions quite strong enough. (shrink)

It is tempting to understand Hegel as a philosopher belonging to the tradition which began with the pre-Socratics, was set in its path definitively by Plato, and culminated with Hegel himself. Hegel’s place in that tradition cannot be denied, but it must be qualified; for with this understanding goes a claim that Hegel conceived of himself as the philosopher at “the end of history.” Hegel is understood to have articulated a system of philosophy which gave us the truth for all (...) time, future as well as past. Time is annulled, cancelled, negated and, at least in philosophy, we are faced with eternity. This interpretation of Hegel, however, leaves us with too many problems. In general, it must either ignore or deny the radically temporal aspects of Hegel, relegating them to “a young Hegel,” either identifying time and eternity or simply denying the essentiality of time for Hegel. All of these strategies, and the eternalist interpretation which necessitates them, must be rejected as onesided; for the interpretation leaves unaddressed Hegel’s rejection, in his “mature” years, of such an eternalism. Furthermore, the interpretation is based upon an unexamined presupposition that if we are going to have metaphysics, then we must have a system which either transcends or absorbs history and time. This was not a presupposition shared by Hegel, at least not in its usual sense. (shrink)

The question of the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics is a continuing one. In the last few decades the idea that Hegel even has a metaphysics has been challenged. Recently Stephen Houlgate has responded to this latter idea and tried to show not only that Hegel has a metaphysics, but of what sort it is. In my view Houlgate is right about Hegel having a metaphysics and also right generally about what sort of metaphysics it is. However, it seems to me (...) that he has made too weak a case for the metaphysics in his presentation of what he takes to be Hegel’s arguments, and as a consequence cannot escape a charge that Hegel might still be either a Kantian or some sort of subjective idealist. What I mean by this is that, to the extent that we are simply limited in our metaphysics to what we can think being to be, there may still be an absolute other which we simply cannot know. Houlgate has made things very clear concerning the conclusion to which we should come about the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics, but has not, in my view, made his argument leading to his conclusions quite strong enough. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEWS 151 excellent companion). It is an insightful account of Schelling's writing and makes a successful run at actualizing Schelling's potential contribution to contemporary debate. BRAD PRAGER CorneU University Terry Pinkard. Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii + 45 I. Cloth, $59-95. This book is a significant addition to contemporary literature on Hegel. The writing is clear and is free of confusing Hegelian language. At the same time, Pinkard penetrates to the (...) heart of important interpretative and general philosophical questions. His style makes the work accessible not only to Hegel scholars and other philosophers interested in Hegel, but also to graduate students and advanced undergraduates. The scholarship is sound, although a bit limited, referring to recent work in English and some recent, as well as classical, work in German. The volume concentrates on.. (shrink)

Historically, dialectic has had two very different referents. First, it has been used as the name for a method. But second, it has been used to name a certain kind of ontological relationship. With some thinkers, such as Hegel, the dialectical method was claimed to lead to the revelation of a dialectical ontology; with others, such as much of Plato, it did not necessarily lead us to conclude that reality was dialectically structured. In the present essay, I am interested only (...) in discussing dialectic as method. (shrink)

An edition of Hegel’s correspondence in English has been long needed, and even more so now that many English language readers who do not read German and are not schooled in the continental tradition have again taken an interest in Hegel. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler have therefore performed an invaluable task. However, one must be forewarned that this is not a complete translation of the correspondence; indeed, it is a translation that contains for the most part only Hegel’s side (...) of the correspondence. Hence, the title is accurate: Hegel’s Letters. But this does not detract from the worth of the book as it was intended; for they wished to give us not simply a translation of Hegel’s letters, but a commentary on Hegel’s mature system. The book does two things, therefore: it gives us most of Hegel’s letters in a fine, very readable translation; it attempts to further a certain interpretation of Hegel, an interpretation which Clark Butler and others have been advancing for some time. Before examining the book and its thesis, however, some things should be said about the general format of the work. (shrink)

The present volume is an attempt to understand Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, from beginning to end, as exclusively an epistemological project. The first thing of importance about Cognition, then, is that it confronts several traditional theses about the work. It is maintained by some that it is not a whole, that there are breaks in it which make no sense, that it is partly one thing and partly another.

Merold Westphal has attempted to resolve here the perennial problem of the unity of the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. He has not only confronted the thesis of Haering and others that there is no unity, but also the particular claim, stemming from Haym, that the specific failure lay in the tension between the “historical” and the “psychological.” The task is taken on in a direct manner; for although there is some discussion of the earlier Jena writings, Westphal’s strategy is (...) not to engage the Entstehungsgeschichte problem, but rather to show the unity of the historical and epistemological or psychological as emerging from the text itself. (shrink)

This long-awaited, much needed international Hegel bibliography has finally been published and, in terms of size and inclusiveness, lives up to the reputation which went before it. Although completeness is not claimed by Steinhauer, whatever is missing will be relatively little. The work is divided into two major parts, the first on Hegel’s own writings in their various editions, the second on secondary literature published between 1802 and 1975. There is a total of 12,032 entries of which 864 belong to (...) the first section and the remainder to the second. But the work is even more massive than these numbers would suggest; for in the first section, for example, each edition of the collected works counts only as one item, while in the secondary literature section volumes containing collections of essays on Hegel - e.g. each volume of Hegel-Studien and its Beihefte, each volume of Hegel-Jahrbuch, or each issue of a journal devoted to Hegel - counts as only one entry. So the 12,032 is not accurate, the actual number being even greater. As a massive checklist, this work will never be surpassed. (shrink)

This is a well-written book on a topic which has been central to Hegel studies for some time. But, in addition to the question of circularity in Hegel’s system in general—with attention focused on the circularity of knowledge in particular—there is a second theme which has recently received some needed attention. Professor Rockmore unravels for us the theme of circularity not in Hegel alone, but as it found its way through the history of philosophy to Kant, and then through several (...) contemporaries of Kant to whom scant attention is paid generally in the literature. By focusing almost completely on the latter—in particular on Kant, and then on Bardili, Reinhold, Schulze, and Maimon, in addition to Fichte and Schelling—he explains, in a way which nicely complements the recent study and translations by Henry S. Harris and George di Giovanni, the evolution of philosophy from the critical position of Kant to the absolute idealist position of Hegel. So, in a more specific way than the title itself might suggest, we have here a fine historical study of evolution of the problem of the circularity of knowledge. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEWS 151 excellent companion). It is an insightful account of Schelling's writing and makes a successful run at actualizing Schelling's potential contribution to contemporary debate. BRAD PRAGER CorneU University Terry Pinkard. Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii + 45 I. Cloth, $59-95. This book is a significant addition to contemporary literature on Hegel. The writing is clear and is free of confusing Hegelian language. At the same time, Pinkard penetrates to the (...) heart of important interpretative and general philosophical questions. His style makes the work accessible not only to Hegel scholars and other philosophers interested in Hegel, but also to graduate students and advanced undergraduates. The scholarship is sound, although a bit limited, referring to recent work in English and some recent, as well as classical, work in German. The volume concentrates on... (shrink)

An edition of Hegel’s correspondence in English has been long needed, and even more so now that many English language readers who do not read German and are not schooled in the continental tradition have again taken an interest in Hegel. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler have therefore performed an invaluable task. However, one must be forewarned that this is not a complete translation of the correspondence; indeed, it is a translation that contains for the most part only Hegel’s side (...) of the correspondence. Hence, the title is accurate: Hegel’s Letters. But this does not detract from the worth of the book as it was intended; for they wished to give us not simply a translation of Hegel’s letters, but a commentary on Hegel’s mature system. The book does two things, therefore: it gives us most of Hegel’s letters in a fine, very readable translation; it attempts to further a certain interpretation of Hegel, an interpretation which Clark Butler and others have been advancing for some time. Before examining the book and its thesis, however, some things should be said about the general format of the work. (shrink)

“The Phenomenology is a grand and passionate vision, a conceptual symphony, the recognition of a new ‘spirit’ which was coming to be and needed a sense of itself, through the auspices of philosophy. The Phenomenology is not to be compared so much to Aristotle or Kant as to Goethe’s Faust, or perhaps to Beethoven’s compositions of the same time and similar circumstances. It is great philosophy, but it is, first of all, a spiritual autobiography, a passionate confession, an enthusiastic encounter (...) with ‘destiny’”. This is one of the descriptions offered by Solomon and, as one can see, he has taken his stand on one of the major thematics which have governed the reading of Hegel’s first, great work. (shrink)