8 found
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Joseph G. Moore [7]Joseph Gwyer Moore [1]
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Joseph Moore
Amherst College
  1.  91
    Saving Substitutivity in Simple Sentences.Joseph G. Moore - 1999 - Analysis 59 (2):91–105.
  2.  96
    Propositions, Numbers, and the Problem of Arbitrary Identification.Joseph G. Moore - 1999 - Synthese 120 (2):229-263.
    Those inclined to believe in the existence of propositions as traditionally conceived might seek to reduce them to some other type of entity. However, parsimonious propositionalists of this type are confronted with a choice of competing candidates – for example, sets of possible worlds, and various neo-Russellian and neo-Fregean constructions. It is argued that this choice is an arbitrary one, and that it closely resembles the type of problematic choice that, as Benacerraf pointed out, bedevils the attempt to reduce numbers (...)
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  3.  98
    Misdisquotation and Substitutivity: When Not to Infer Belief From Assent.Joseph G. Moore - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):335-365.
    In 'A Puzzle about Belief' Saul Kripke appeals to a principle of disquotation that allows us to infer a person's beliefs from the sentences to which she assents (in certain conditions). Kripke relies on this principle in constructing some famous puzzle cases, which he uses to defend the Millian view that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. The examples are meant to undermine the anti-Millian objection, grounded in traditional Frege-cases, that truth-value is (...)
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  4.  99
    Did Clinton Lie?Joseph G. Moore - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):250–254.
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  5.  77
    Artistic Expression Goes Green.Joseph G. Moore - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (1):89-103.
    The paper is a critical discussion of the rich and insightful final chapter of Mitchell Green’s Self-Expression . There, Green seeks to elucidate the compelling, but inchoate intuition that when we’re fully and most expertly expressing ourselves, we can ‘push out’ from within not just our inner representations, but also the ways that we feel. I question, first, whether this type of ‘qualitative expression’ is really distinct from the other expressive forms that Green explores, and also whether it’s genuinely ‘expressive’. (...)
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  6. A Modal Argument Against Vague Objects.Joseph G. Moore - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-17.
    There has been much discussion of whether there could be objects A and B that are “individuatively vague” in the following way: object A and object B neither determinately stand in the relation of identity to one another, nor do they determinately fail to stand in this relation. If there are objects of this type, then we would have a genuine case of metaphysical vagueness, or “vagueness-in-the-world.” The possibility of vague objects in this sense strikes many as incoherent. The possibility’s (...)
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  7. A Defense of Propositions.Joseph Gwyer Moore - 1994 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The dissertation is a defense of realism about propositions . According to the propositionlist, there is a realm of entities that simultaneously serve as inter-subjectively shareable "objects" or "contents" of assertion and belief, as units of information more generally, as fundamental bearers of truth-values, and as entities capable of having certain modal, logical and epistemological properties. ;In chapter one, I flesh out a traditional concept of proposition, and I sketch a general argument in favor of propositionalism. ;In chapter two, I (...)
     
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  8.  13
    Do You Really Hate Tom Brady? Pretense and Emotion in Sport.Joseph G. Moore - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2):244-260.
    ABSTRACTAs sports fans, we often experience what seem to be strong garden-variety emotions—everything from joy and euphoria to anger, dread and despair. In self-description, in physiology and even in phenomenology, these reactions to sporting events present themselves as genuine emotions. But we don’t act on these ‘sporting emotions’ in the ways one might expect. This is because these reactions are not genuine emotions. Or so I argue. Johan Huizinga suggested that play has a pretend ‘set aside’ ‘extra-ordinary’ character. And Kendall (...)
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