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Joseph Levine [90]Joseph M. Levine [9]Joseph R. Levine [2]
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Joseph Levine
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  1. Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
  2. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
  3. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.
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  4. On Leaving Out What It's Like.Joseph Levine - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays. MIT Press. pp. 543--557.
     
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  5.  37
    Consciousness Reconsidered.Joseph Levine & Owen Flanagan - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):353.
  6. On Leaving Out What It’s Like.Joseph Levine - 1993 - In Martin Ed Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), On Leaving Out What It’s Like. Blackwell. pp. 121-136.
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  7. The modal status of materialism.Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.
    Argument that Lewis and others are wrong that physicalism is if true then contingently true.
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  8. Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  9. Demonstrative thought.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.
    In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the (...)
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  10. Conscious awareness and representation.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 173--198.
  11. On the Phenomenology of Thought.Joseph Levine - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.
  12. Conceivability and the metaphysics of mind.Joseph Levine - 1998 - Noûs 32 (4):449-480.
    Materialism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental. Anti-materialists asser t that, on the contrary, mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena. Among the weapons in the arsenal of anti-materialists, one of the most potent has been the conceivability argument. When I conceive of the mental, it seems utterly unlike the physical. Anti-materialists insist that from (...)
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  13.  47
    Raw Feeling.Joseph Levine & Robert Kirk - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):94.
    Kirk’s aim in this book is to bridge what he calls “the intelligibility gap,” expressed in the question, “How could complex patterns of neural firing amount to this?”. He defends a position that he describes as “broadly functionalist,” which consists of several theses. I will briefly review them.
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  14. Reduction with autonomy.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105.
  15.  29
    Objectivism-subjectivim: A false dilemma?Joseph Levine - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-43.
  16.  16
    The Foundations of Knowing.Joseph Levine - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):462.
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  17. Experience and representation.Joseph Levine - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  18. Materialism and Qualia.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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    Reduction with Autonomy.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):83-105.
  20. Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing.Joseph Levine - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
    In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: physicalism about the non‐mental world, consistency with what is known from color science, and transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral reflectance, subjectivism, dispositionalism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all three constraints. By (...)
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  21. Out of the Closet.Joseph Levine - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):107-126.
  22.  79
    Cool red.Joseph Levine - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
  23. Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet.Joseph Levine - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
  24. The Q factor: Modal rationalism versus modal autonomism.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.
    Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. (...)
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  25. Modality, semantics, and consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):775-784.
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  26.  41
    Two kinds of access.Joseph Levine - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):514-515.
    I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state.
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  27.  64
    Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what?Joseph Levine - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 277--292.
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  28.  77
    Recent work on consciousness.Joseph Levine - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404.
    This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made.
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  29.  29
    Perceptual Experience: Christopher Hill.Joseph Levine - forthcoming - Analysis.
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  30. The nomic and the robust.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  31.  29
    Are qualia just representations?Joseph Levine - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):101-13.
  32.  23
    The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Acquaintance.Joseph Levine - 2021 - ProtoSociology 38:15-34.
    Phenomenal consciousness comprises both qualitative character and subjectivity. The former provides the proprietary contents of conscious experiences – determining what they are like – and the latter is that feature that renders those contents “for the subject”, so there is something it is like at all. I have developed a theory of consciousness as “acquaintance” which I dub the “Cartesian Theater” model, on which there is a fundamental psycho-physical law that takes the output of cognitive and perceptual systems as input (...)
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  33. A Quasi-Sartrean Theory of Subjective Awareness.Joseph Levine - 2015 - In Sofia Miguens, Clara Bravo Morando & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
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  34.  17
    Giambattista Vico and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns.Joseph M. Levine - 1991 - Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (1):55.
  35.  37
    Phenomenal access: A moving target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
    Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
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  36. Phenomenal experience: A cartesian theater revival.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.
  37. Knowing what it's like.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
  38. On what it is like to grasp a concept.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:38-43.
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  39.  12
    Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and Modality.Joseph Levine - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Joseph Levine draws together a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive approach to philosophy of mind. He defends a materialist view of the mind against various challenges, and offers illuminating studies of consciousness, phenomenal concepts, mental representation, demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology.
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  40.  62
    Demonstrating in mentalese.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
  41. Intellectual History as History.Joseph M. Levine - 2005 - Journal of the History of Ideas 66 (2):189-200.
    The history of ideas is an interdisciplinary field that began as an offshoot of the history of philosophy and was transformed by notions of perspective and cultural context drawn from the tradition of historical studies. The result is the practice of intellectual history, which has been carried out between the poles of inquiry commonly known as internalist and externalist, corresponding to mental phenomena and collective behavior in cultural surroundings. These are not opposed but rather complementary methods, and intellectual history may (...)
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  42.  75
    Are Qualia Just Representations? A Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Ten Problems of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):101-113.
  43. Absent and inverted qualia revisited.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
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    Philosophy as Massage.Joseph Levine - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):159-178.
  45. Demonstrative Concepts.Joseph Levine - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):328-336.
    Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
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  46. Leonard’s System: Why Doesn’t It Work?Joseph Levine - 2009 - In Andrew Kania (ed.), Memento. New York, USA: Routledge.
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  47.  15
    Holism: A Consumer Update.Joseph Levine (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  48.  85
    Intentional Chemistry.Joseph Levine - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1):103-134.
    This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to defend molecularism against traditional Quinean arguments (...)
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  49.  14
    Holism: A Consumer Update.Joseph Levine - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:103-134.
    This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to defend molecularism against traditional Quinean arguments (...)
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  50.  29
    Swampjoe: Mind or simulation?Joseph Levine - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):86-91.
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