93 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Joseph Levine [82]Joseph M. Levine [9]Joseph R. Levine [2]
See also
Joseph Levine
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  1. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
  2. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Oxford University Press USA.
    In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   174 citations  
  3. On Leaving Out What It's Like.Joseph Levine - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays. MIT Press. pp. 543--557.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  4.  23
    Consciousness Reconsidered.Joseph Levine & Owen Flanagan - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):353.
  5. Demonstrative Thought.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.
    In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  6. Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  7. Conscious Awareness and Representation.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 173--198.
  8. Reduction with Autonomy.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105.
  9. On the Phenomenology of Thought.Joseph Levine - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.
  10. Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind.Joseph Levine - 1998 - Noûs 32 (4):449-480.
    Materialism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental. Anti-materialists asser t that, on the contrary, mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena. Among the weapons in the arsenal of anti-materialists, one of the most potent has been the conceivability argument. When I conceive of the mental, it seems utterly unlike the physical. Anti-materialists insist that from (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  11. The Modal Status of Materialism.Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.
    Argument that Lewis and others are wrong that physicalism is if true then contingently true.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  12.  21
    Objectivism-Subjectivim: A False Dilemma?Joseph Levine - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-43.
  13.  31
    Raw Feeling.Joseph Levine & Robert Kirk - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):94.
    Kirk’s aim in this book is to bridge what he calls “the intelligibility gap,” expressed in the question, “How could complex patterns of neural firing amount to this?”. He defends a position that he describes as “broadly functionalist,” which consists of several theses. I will briefly review them.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  14.  10
    The Foundations of Knowing.Joseph Levine - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):462.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  15. Materialism and Qualia.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
  16. Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing.Joseph Levine - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
    In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: physicalism about the non‐mental world, consistency with what is known from color science, and transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral reflectance, subjectivism, dispositionalism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all three constraints. By (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  17. Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet.Joseph Levine - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
  18. Experience and Representation.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  19. Out of the Closet: A Qualophile Confronts Qualophobia.Joseph Levine - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):107-126.
  20.  43
    Reduction with Autonomy.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):83-105.
  21. The Q Factor: Modal Rationalism Versus Modal Autonomism.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.
    Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  22.  83
    Modality, Semantics, and Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):775-784.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23.  61
    Cool Red.Joseph Levine - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
  24.  32
    Two Kinds of Access.Joseph Levine - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):514-515.
    I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  25.  45
    Qualia: Intrinsic, Relational, or What?Joseph Levine - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 277--292.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  26.  53
    Recent Work on Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404.
    This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  27. Phenomenal Experience: A Cartesian Theater Revival.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.
  28. On What It is Like to Grasp a Concept.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:38-43.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29.  29
    Phenomenal Access: A Moving Target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
    Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30. The Nomic and the Robust.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
  31. Intellectual History as History.Joseph M. Levine - 2005 - Journal of the History of Ideas 66 (2):189-200.
  32. Demonstrating in Mentalese.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
  33.  20
    Are Qualia Just Representations?Joseph Levine - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):101-13.
  34. Knowing What It's Like.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
  35. Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
  36.  46
    Philosophy as Massage: Seeking Cognitive Relief for Conscious Tension.Joseph Levine - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):159-178.
  37.  81
    Intentional Chemistry.Joseph Levine - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1):103-134.
    This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to defend molecularism against traditional Quinean arguments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38.  10
    Giambattista Vico and the Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Moderns.Joseph M. Levine - 1991 - Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (1):55.
  39.  13
    Holism: A Consumer Update.Joseph Levine (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40.  98
    Demonstrative Concepts.Joseph Levine - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):328-336.
    Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41.  31
    The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 2009 - In Harold Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  63
    Are Qualia Just Representations? A Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Ten Problems of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):101-113.
  43. Comments on Melnyk's A Physicalist Manifesto.Joseph Levine - manuscript
  44.  64
    Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory[REVIEW]Joseph Levine - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
  45.  32
    The Nature of Psychological Explanation by Robert Cummins: A Critical Notice.Joseph Levine - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):249-274.
  46.  10
    Holism: A Consumer Update.Joseph Levine - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:103-134.
    This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to defend molecularism against traditional Quinean arguments (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47.  26
    Swampjoe: Mind or Simulation?Joseph Levine - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):86-91.
  48.  11
    “Giambattista Vico and the Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Moderns.”.Joseph Levine - 1991 - New Vico Studies 9:118-119.
  49.  50
    Thoughts on Sensory Representation: A Commentary on Austen Clark's a Theory of Sentience.Joseph Levine - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):541-551.
  50.  82
    Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature Scott Sturgeon.Joseph Levine - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):629-634.
1 — 50 / 93