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Joseph Vukov [5]Joseph M. Vukov [2]
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Joseph Michael Vukov
Loyola University, Chicago
  1.  16
    When Does Consciousness Matter? Lessons From the Minimally Conscious State.Joseph Vukov - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):5-15.
    Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) fall into a different diagnostic category than patients in the more familiar vegetative states (VS). Not only are MCS patients conscious in some sense, they have a higher chance for recovery than VS patients. Because of these differences, we ostensibly have reason to provide MCS patients with care that goes beyond what we provide to patients with some VS patients. But how to justify this differential treatment? I argue we can’t justify it solely (...)
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  2.  30
    Personhood and Natural Kinds: Why Cognitive Status Need Not Affect Moral Status.Joseph Vukov - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (3):261-277.
    Lockean accounts of personhood propose that an individual is a person just in case that individual is characterized by some advanced cognitive capacity. On these accounts, human beings with severe cognitive impairment are not persons. Some accept this result—I do not. In this paper, I therefore advance and defend an account of personhood that secures personhood for human beings who are cognitively impaired. On the account for which I argue, an individual is a person just in case that individual belongs (...)
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  3.  12
    Enduring Questions and the Ethics of Memory Blunting.Joseph Vukov - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):227-246.
    Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival (...)
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  4.  11
    Why Narrative Identity Matters: Preserving Authenticity in Neurosurgical Interventions.Joseph M. Vukov - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 8 (3):186-88.
    Jecker & Ko (2017) argue that numerical identity is not the only aspect of identity that matters to patients faced with certain neurosurgical interventions. Put differently: surviving an intervention in the numerical sense—being numerically the same person before and after the intervention—is not enough. It also matters whether an intervention preserves a patient’s narrative identity, that is, whether an intervention allows the patient’s “inner story” to continue. I agree with the authors’ conclusion. I believe, however, that further work can be (...)
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  5.  13
    Three Kinds of Agency and Closed Loop Neural Devices.Joseph M. Vukov - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2):90-91.
    Goering and colleagues (2017) acknowledge closed-loop neural devices have the potential to undermine agency. Indeed, the authors observe that “the agent using the device may . . . sometimes doubt whether she is the author of her action, given that the device may operate in ways that are not transparent to her” (65). Still, the authors ultimately argue that closed-loop neural devices may be construed as supporting agency, especially when we view agency from a relational perspective. The reason? We often (...)
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  6.  6
    Is Neuroscience Relevant to Our Moral Responsibility Practices?Joseph Vukov - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (2):61-82.
    Some psychologists and philosophers have argued that neuroscience is importantly relevant to our moral responsibility practices, especially to our practices of praise and blame. For consider: on an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience presents us with a mechanistic account of human action. Furthermore, in uential studies – most notoriously, Libet et al. (1983) – seem to show that the brain decides to do things (so to speak) before we consciously make a decision. In light of these ndings, then – or so (...)
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  7.  11
    Consciousness Empowered.Joseph Vukov - 2016 - Dissertation, Fordham University
    Understanding the difference between conscious and unconscious states is important for making sense of human cognition. Consider: your perception of these words is currently conscious while the feeling of the floor beneath your left foot presumably is not. But what does the difference between these states consist in? Contemporary philosophers disagree about how to answer this kind of question. Extrinsic theorists claim states are conscious because of how they are related to other states, entities, or processes. Intrinsic theorists deny this (...)
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