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Joseph Vukov [7]Joseph Michael Vukov [4]Joseph M. Vukov [2]
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Joseph Vukov
Loyola University, Chicago
  1.  28
    When Does Consciousness Matter? Lessons From the Minimally Conscious State.Joseph Vukov - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):5-15.
    Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) fall into a different diagnostic category than patients in the more familiar vegetative states (VS). Not only are MCS patients conscious in some sense, they have a higher chance for recovery than VS patients. Because of these differences, we ostensibly have reason to provide MCS patients with care that goes beyond what we provide to patients with some VS patients. But how to justify this differential treatment? I argue we can’t justify it solely (...)
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  2.  60
    Personhood and Natural Kinds: Why Cognitive Status Need Not Affect Moral Status.Joseph Vukov - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (3):261-277.
    Lockean accounts of personhood propose that an individual is a person just in case that individual is characterized by some advanced cognitive capacity. On these accounts, human beings with severe cognitive impairment are not persons. Some accept this result—I do not. In this paper, I therefore advance and defend an account of personhood that secures personhood for human beings who are cognitively impaired. On the account for which I argue, an individual is a person just in case that individual belongs (...)
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  3.  25
    Three Kinds of Agency and Closed Loop Neural Devices.Joseph M. Vukov - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2):90-91.
    Goering and colleagues (2017) acknowledge closed-loop neural devices have the potential to undermine agency. Indeed, the authors observe that “the agent using the device may . . . sometimes doubt whether she is the author of her action, given that the device may operate in ways that are not transparent to her” (65). Still, the authors ultimately argue that closed-loop neural devices may be construed as supporting agency, especially when we view agency from a relational perspective. The reason? We often (...)
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  4.  2
    From Knowing to Understanding: Revisiting Consent.Kit Rempala, Marley Hornewer, Joseph Vukov, Rohan Meda & Sarah Khan - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (5):33-35.
    Dickert et al. (2020) effectively address how factors such as time limitations, stress, and illness severity in acute conditions warrant a deeper evaluation of how current consent processes serve patients. While data suggests that patients “prefer to be asked for permission upfront rather than waiving consent” (2), consent forms themselves “are frequently long and technical, follow rigid templates, and contain language that appears to prioritize institutional protection” (1). Such findings elucidate patients’ valuation of personal agency over settling for the “benefit (...)
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  5.  7
    Organ Donation and Declaration of Death: Combined Neurologic and Cardiopulmonary Standards.Stephen E. Doran & Joseph Michael Vukov - forthcoming - The Linacre Quarterly 86.
    Prolonged survival after the declaration of death by neurologic criteria creates ambiguity regarding the validity of this methodology. This ambiguity has perpetuated the debate among secular and nondissenting Catholic authors who question whether the neurologic standards are sufficient for the declaration of death of organ donors. Cardiopulmonary criteria are being increasingly used for organ donors who do not meet brain death standards. However, cardiopulmonary criteria are plagued by conflict of interest issues, arbitrary standards for candidacy, and the lack of standardized (...)
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  6.  3
    From Epistemic Trespassing to Transdisciplinary Cooperation: The Role of Expertise in the Identification of Usual Care.Joseph Michael Vukov, Kit Rempala, Molly Klug & Marley Hornewer - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (1):52-54.
    According to Macklin & Natanson (2019), one reason unusual practices can be misidentified as usual care is that “instead of using pertinent, accurate information describing usual care, investigators may rely on the opinion of ‘experts’ in the field, whose information may be out of date or otherwise inaccurate." We find Macklin & Natanson’s insights about misattributed expertise crucial, and suggest their discussion can be elucidated further by characterizing it in the context of Ballantyne (2018)’s recent exploration of what he calls (...)
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  7.  31
    Enduring Questions and the Ethics of Memory Blunting.Joseph Vukov - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):227-246.
    Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival (...)
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  8.  2
    From Solo Decision Maker to Multi-Stakeholder Process: A Defense and Recommendations.David Ozar, Joseph Vukov, Kit Rempala & Rohan Meda - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (2):53-55.
    Berger (2019) argues effectively that “representativeness is more aptly understood as a variable that is multidimensional and continuous based on relational moral authority,” and also makes some useful suggestions about how taking this observation seriously might require changes in current patterns of practice regarding surrogates. But the essay raises additional important questions about how the Best Interest Standard (BIS) should be used among unrepresented patients and other patients as well because many surrogates besides those who “have no actionable knowledge of (...)
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  9.  25
    Why Narrative Identity Matters: Preserving Authenticity in Neurosurgical Interventions.Joseph M. Vukov - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 8 (3):186-88.
    Jecker & Ko (2017) argue that numerical identity is not the only aspect of identity that matters to patients faced with certain neurosurgical interventions. Put differently: surviving an intervention in the numerical sense—being numerically the same person before and after the intervention—is not enough. It also matters whether an intervention preserves a patient’s narrative identity, that is, whether an intervention allows the patient’s “inner story” to continue. I agree with the authors’ conclusion. I believe, however, that further work can be (...)
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  10. Rationally Navigating Subjective Preferences in Memory Modification.Joseph Michael Vukov - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies (MMTs) has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when (if ever) is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? The question is crucial. Unless those who condone the use of MMTs offer guidance for navigating among various interventions, their account risks becoming a moral endorsement that says little about what one faced with the option of using (...)
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  11.  15
    Is Neuroscience Relevant to Our Moral Responsibility Practices?Joseph Vukov - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (2):61-82.
    Some psychologists and philosophers have argued that neuroscience is importantly relevant to our moral responsibility practices, especially to our practices of praise and blame. For consider: on an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience presents us with a mechanistic account of human action. Furthermore, in uential studies – most notoriously, Libet et al. (1983) – seem to show that the brain decides to do things (so to speak) before we consciously make a decision. In light of these ndings, then – or so (...)
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  12.  30
    Consciousness Empowered.Joseph Vukov - 2016 - Dissertation, Fordham University
    Understanding the difference between conscious and unconscious states is important for making sense of human cognition. Consider: your perception of these words is currently conscious while the feeling of the floor beneath your left foot presumably is not. But what does the difference between these states consist in? Contemporary philosophers disagree about how to answer this kind of question. Extrinsic theorists claim states are conscious because of how they are related to other states, entities, or processes. Intrinsic theorists deny this (...)
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  13. BCI-Mediated Action, Blame, and Responsibility.Joseph Michael Vukov & Kit Rempala - forthcoming - American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 11.
    Rainey et al. (forthcoming) discuss the complications that arise with assigning responsibility for brain computer interface (BCI)-mediated actions. Because BCI-mediated actions can differ from non-BCI-mediated actions in terms of control and foreseeability, the authors suggest that our ethical and legal evaluation of these actions may differ in important ways. While we take no issue with the authors’ discussion or conclusion, we also recognize the difficulty of grappling with the relationship between control, foreseeability, and moral responsibility practices, even without the additional (...)
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