Foucault's intellectual indebtedness to Nietzsche is apparent in his writing, yet the precise nature, extent, and nuances of that debt are seldom explored. Foucault himself seems sometimes to claim that his approach is essentially Nietzschean, and sometimes to insist that he amounts to a radical break with Nietzsche. This volume is the first of its kind, presenting the relationship between these two thinkers on elements of contemporary culture that they shared interests in, including the nature of life in the modern (...) world, philosophy as a way of life, and the ways in which we ought to read and write about other philosophers. The contributing authors are leading figures in Foucault and Nietzsche studies, and their contributions reflect the diversity of approaches possible in coming to terms with the Foucault-Nietzsche relationship. Specific points of comparison include Foucault and Nietzsche's differing understandings of the Death of God; art and aesthetics; power; writing and authorship; politics and society; the history of ideas; genealogy and archaeology; and the evolution of knowledge. (shrink)

Authorship is a complicated subject in Kierkegaard's work, which he surely recognized, given his late attempts to explain himself in On My Work as an Author. From the use of multiple pseudonyms and antonyms, to contributions across a spectrum of media and genres, issues of authorship abound. Why did Kierkegaard write in the ways he did? Before we assess Kierkegaard's famous thoughts on faith or love, or the relationship between 'the aesthetic,' 'the ethical,' and 'the religious,' we must approach how (...) he expressed them. Given the multi-authored nature of his works, can we find a view or voice that is definitively Kierkegaard's own? Can entries in his unpublished journals and notebooks tell us what Kierkegaard himself thought? How should contemporary readers understand inconsistencies or contradictions between differently named authors? We cannot make definitive claims about Kierkegaard's work as a thinker without understanding Kierkegaard's work as an author. This collection, by leading contemporary Kierkegaard scholars, is the first to systematically examine the divisive question and practice of authorship in Kierkegaard from philosophical, literary and theological perspectives. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche—and Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault—in light of Foucault’s frequent treatment of Nietzsche as a certain kind of philologist. Running contrary to most contemporary readings of Nietzsche, which depict him as abandoning philology for philosophy relatively early on, I argue that Foucault understands Nietzsche’s distinctive philosophical style as indicative of a persistently philological approach to traditionally philosophical questions—and that this is a productive and valuable reading of Nietzsche, as well as a model for (...) how we might start to think of Foucault, as well. Philology, for both thinkers, both promises and threatens the present with the future, calling for a simultaneously powerful and self-aware response on the part of the reader. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that despite their philosophical differences, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard share a philosophical method or style rooted in the irony of Socrates. Such irony, when used to distance the author of a written work from its reader, effects the same sort of relationship between the author and the truth as was characteristic of Socrates. Thus, by way of writing in a certain, artful way, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are able to pull away from their readers, depriving themselves (...) of all authority and leaving the question of what is true in what they write ultimately up to the consideration, discernment and interpretation of the reader. As such, I conclude, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are akin as two different instances of the Socratic midwife or maieutician. (shrink)

In a small portion of The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin engages in a critique of Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy. He argues that Nietzsche’s account divests individuals of significance in the tragic worldview. The corrective to Nietzsche’s view, according to Benjamin, is a reflective, historical approach to the Greek social and literary phenomenon of tragic poetry. I argue that Benjamin’s approach to tragedy and to The Birth of Tragedy is inherently flawed. The paper (...) has threesections: (1) a presentation of Benjamin’s critique of Nietzsche in The Origin of German Tragic Drama; (2) a refutation of that critique on the basis of a reading of The Birth of Tragedy; and (3) a rejection of Benjamin’s theory of tragedy on the basis of Nietzsche’sinsights into the relation to human significance of both tragedy and the science of history. (shrink)

The first collection of its kind, The Continental Philosophy of Film Reader is the essential anthology of writings by continental philosophers on cinema, representing the last century of film-making and thinking about film, as well as all of the major schools of Continental thought: phenomenology and existentialism, Marxism and critical theory, semiotics and hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and postmodernism. Included here are not only the classic texts in continental philosophy of film, from Benjamin's “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical (...) Reproduction” to extracts of Deleuze's Cinema and Barthes's Mythologies, but also the earliest works of Continental philosophy of film, from thinkers such as Georg Lukács, and little-read gems by philosophical giants such as Sartre and Beauvoir. The book demonstrates both the philosophical significance of these thinkers' ideas about film, as well their influence on filmmakers in Europe and across the globe. In addition, however, this wide-ranging collection also teaches us how important film is to the last century of European philosophical thought. Almost every major continental European thinker of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has had something to say-sometimes, quite a lot to say-about cinema: as an art form, as a social or political phenomenon, as a linguistic device and conveyor of information, as a projection of our fears and desires, as a site for oppression and resistance, or as a model on the basis of which some of us, at least, learn how to live. Purpose built for classroom use, with pedagogical features introducing and contextualizing the extracts, this reader is an indispensable tool for students and researchers in philosophy of film, film studies and the history of cinema. (shrink)

Kierkegaard scholars have made much of Kierkegaard’s posthumously published The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and the work does seem to provide a key to interpreting Kierkegaard’s infamous authorial difficulties – not the least of which is the meaning of pseudonymity in his work. Considerations of the book’s authorship itself are, however, exceptionally rare. In this article, I open an inquiry into issues of authorship that arise within the work, both in terms of what The Point (...) of View has to say about the Kierkegaardian authorship, and also in terms of how (and by whom) the book is itself authored. I propose that The Point of View brings authorship to the fore as a philosophical issue and, contrary to the consensus view, I argue that – despite the fact that the book was clearly written by Søren Kierkegaard – the book’s author cannot be identified. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to show that, although traditional notions of genderand sex break down in cyberspace, a revised Beauvoirian understanding ofsexual secondariness is applicable and useful in coming to terms with thepossible ethical and philosophical ramifications of this relatively newcommunication medium. To this end, I argue that persons who enter intocommunication in online chat rooms necessarily deny the bodily aspectsof their own identity. In so doing, these persons make themselvesinessential, or secondary, in Beauvior's sense. For Beauvoir, this isa (...) denial of one's own freedom, and thus commmunication in cyberspacebecomes an instance of self-oppression. Yet, if self-oppression canbe avoided, the self-oppressor is morally responsible for her or hisown oppression. Ultimately, I argue, cyberspatial communication is aninstance of such self-oppression. (shrink)