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  1.  2
    Defining Knowledge in Terms of Belief: The Modal Logic Perspective: Defining Knowledge in Terms of Belief.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):469-487.
    The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief, which has played an important role in epistemology for the last 50 years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definability, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility. It is shown that if knowledge satisfies any set of axioms contained in S5, then it cannot be explicitly defined in (...)
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  2. Reasoning About Uncertainty.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2004 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (3):427-429.
     
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  3.  2
    Reasoning About Uncertainty.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2007 - Studia Logica 85 (3):411-412.
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  4.  3
    Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. [REVIEW]Joseph Y. Halpern - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):277-281.
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    Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):277-281.
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  6.  1
    On Definability in Multimodal Logic: On Definability in Multimodal Logic.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):451-468.
    Three notions of definability in multimodal logic are considered. Two are analogous to the notions of explicit definability and implicit definability introduced by Beth in the context of first-order logic. However, while by Beth’s theorem the two types of definability are equivalent for first-order logic, such an equivalence does not hold for multimodal logics. A third notion of definability, reducibility, is introduced; it is shown that in multimodal logics, explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility. (...)
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