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Joshua Gert [87]Joshua Noah Gert [1]
  1.  40
    Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action.Joshua Gert - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It (...)
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  2. Normative strength and the balance of reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.
  3.  31
    Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-Pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception.Joshua Gert - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Joshua Gert presents an original account of color properties, and of our perception of them. He employs a general philosophical strategy - neo-pragmatism - which challenges an assumption made by virtually all other theories of color: he argues that colors are primitive properties of objects, irreducible to physical or dispositional properties.
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  4.  39
    Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.
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  5. Value and parity.Joshua Gert - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):492-510.
  6.  59
    What Colors Could Not Be.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (3):128-155.
  7. Brute Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):145-146.
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  8. Brute rationality.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):417–446.
  9.  41
    Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Joshua Gert offers an original account of normative facts and properties, those which have implications for how we ought to behave. He argues that our ability to think and talk about normative notions such as reasons and benefits is dependent on how we respond to the world around us, including how we respond to the actions of other people.
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  10.  55
    Neo‐pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions.Joshua Gert - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):454-478.
    This paper offers a neo-pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo-pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, (...)
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  11.  43
    Neopragmatist semantics.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):107-135.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  12.  36
    Information-Theoretic Adverbialism.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):696-715.
    ABSTRACT Adverbialism is the view that to have a conscious perceptual experience is to be consciously experiencing in a certain way, and that this way is not to be understood in relational or representational terms. We might compare what it is for a conscious being to be experiencing in a certain way with what it is for a string to be vibrating in a certain way. This paper makes a new case for adverbialism by appealing to the fact that we (...)
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  13.  36
    Neopragmatist semantics.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):107-135.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  14. Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
  15. A realistic colour realism.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.
    Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green31. Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a realist about (...)
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  16.  37
    Neopragmatist semantics.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):107-135.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  17.  68
    Disgust, Moral Disgust, and Morality.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):33-54.
    This paper calls into question the idea that moral disgust is usefully regarded as a form of genuine disgust. This hypothesis is questionable even if, as some have argued, the spread of moral norms through a community makes use of signaling mechanisms that are central to core disgust. The signaling system is just one part of disgust, and may well be completely separable from it. Moreover, there is plausibly a significant difference between the cognitive scientist’s concept of an emotion and (...)
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  18.  95
    Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.
    Ruth Chang has argued for the existence of a fourth positive value relation, distinct from betterness, worseness and equality, which she calls “parity.” In an earlier article I seemed to criticize Chang's suggestion by offering an interval model for the values of items that I claimed could accommodate all the phenomena characteristic of parity. Wlodek Rabinowicz, offering his own model of value relations, endorsed one central feature of my proposal: the need to distinguish permissible preferences from required ones. But he, (...)
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  19.  24
    Disgust, Moral Disgust, and Morality.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (1):33-54.
    This paper calls into question the idea that moral disgust is usefully regarded as a form of genuine disgust. This hypothesis is questionable even if, as some have argued, the spread of moral norms through a community makes use of signaling mechanisms that are central to core disgust. The signaling system is just one part of disgust, and may well be completely separable from it. Moreover, there is plausibly a significant difference between the cognitive scientist’s concept of an emotion and (...)
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  20.  58
    Information-Theoretic Adverbialism.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):696-715.
    Adverbialism is the view that to have a conscious perceptual experience is to be consciously experiencing in a certain way, and that this way is not to be understood in relational or representational terms. We might compare what it is for a conscious being to be experiencing in a certain way with what it is for a string to be vibrating in a certain way. This paper makes a new case for adverbialism by appealing to the fact that we can (...)
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  21. Korsgaard’s Private-Reasons Argument.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):303-324.
    In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard presents and defends a neo-Kantian theory of normativity. Her initial account of reasons seems to make them dependent upon the practical identity of the agent, and upon the value the agent must place on her own humanity. This seems to make all reasons agent-relative. But Korsgaard claims that arguments similar to Wittgenstein’s private-language argument can show that reasons are in fact essentially agent-neutral. This paper explains both of Korsgaard’s Wittgensteinian arguments, and shows why (...)
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  22.  82
    Perform a Justified Option.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (2):206-217.
    In a number of recent publications, Douglas Portmore has defended consequentialism, largely on the basis of a maximizing view of practical rationality. I have criticized such maximizing views, arguing that we need to distinguish two independent dimensions of normative strength: justifying strength and requiring strength. I have also argued that this distinction helps to explain why we typically have so many rational options. Engaging with these arguments, Portmore has (a) developed his own novel maximization-friendly method of explaining the ubiquity of (...)
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  23.  68
    Practical Rationality, Morality, and Purely Justificatory Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):227 - 243.
  24. Lenman on externalism and amoralism: An interplanetary exploration.Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.
    One of us -- Alfred Mele (1996; 2003, ch. 5) -- has argued that possible instances of listlessness falsify the combination of cognitivism and various kinds of internalism about positive first-person moral ought-beliefs. If an argument recently advanced by James Lenman (1999) is successful, listlessnessis impossible and Mele's argument from listlessness therefore fails.However, we will argue that Lenman's argument is unpersuasive.
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  25.  75
    A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.Joshua Gert - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):1015-1042.
    This article uses a particular view of the basic emotions in order to develop and defend an account of paradigmatic emotion-linked evaluative properties. The view is that felt emotions are constituted by an awareness that one is about to behave in a certain way. This view provides support for a fitting-attitude account of certain evaluative properties. But the relevant sense of fittingness is not to be understood in terms of reasons. The account therefore sidesteps the well-known Wrong Kind of Reasons (...)
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  26.  50
    Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):439-459.
    In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard tried to argue against what she called the ‘privacy’ of reasons, appealing to Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language. In recent work she continues to endorse Wittgenstein's perspective on the normativity of meaning, although she now emphasizes that her own argument was only meant to be analogous to the private language argument. The purpose of the present paper is to show that the Wittgensteinian perspective is not only not useful in (...)
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  27.  78
    Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-21.
    Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.776297.
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  28.  84
    Expressivism and language learning.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Ethics 112 (2):292-314.
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  29.  45
    Quality spaces: Mental and physical.Joshua Gert - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):525-544.
    Perceptual-role theories of mental qualities hold that we can discover the nature of a being’s mental qualities by investigating that being’s capacity to make perceptual discriminations. Many advocates of perceptual-role theories hold that the best explanation of these capacities is that mental quality spaces are homomorphic to the spaces of the physical properties that they help to discriminate. This paper disputes this thesis on largely empirical grounds, and offers an alternative. The alternative explains interesting patterns in our perception of color (...)
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  30.  54
    Desires, reasons, and rationality.Joshua Gert - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):319 - 332.
    Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, and T. M. S canlon, among others, all hold that reasons for action are provided by facts about those actions. They also hold that the fact that an action would promote or achieve the object of an agent's desire is not one of the relevant facts, and does not provide a reason. Rather, the facts that provide reasons are typically facts about valuable states of affairs that the action is likely to bring about, or valuable properties (...)
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  31. Response-dependence and normative bedrock.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):718-742.
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  32.  14
    Response‐Dependence and Normative Bedrock.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):718-742.
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  33. Neo-sentimentalism and disgust.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3):345-352.
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  34.  98
    Breaking the law of desire.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319.
    This paper offers one formal reason why it may often be inappropriate to hold, of two conflicting desires, that the first must be weaker than, stronger than, or of the same strength as the second. The explanation of this fact does not rely on vagueness or epistemological problems in determining the strengths of desires. Nor does it make use of the problematic notion of incommensurability. Rather, the suggestion is that the motivational capacities of many desires might best be characterized by (...)
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  35. Color constancy and dispositionalism.Joshua Gert - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):183-200.
    This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of (...)
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  36. Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):611-618.
    Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally, to be performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in content and strength is a genuine possibility. But because motivating reasons (...)
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  37.  69
    Reply to Tenenbaum.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):463-476.
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  38.  61
    Neo-pragmatism, morality, and the specification problem.Joshua Gert - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):447-467.
    A defender of any view of moral language must explain how people with different moral views can be be talking to each other, rather than past each other. For expressivists this problem drastically constrains the search for the specific attitude expressed by, say, ‘immoral’. But cognitivists face a similar difficulty; they need to find a specific meaning for ‘immoral’ that underwrites genuine disagreement while accommodating the fact that different speakers have very different criteria for the use of that term. This (...)
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  39.  34
    A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):353-378.
    One strategy for providing an analysis of practical rationality is to start with the notion of a practical reason as primitive. Then it will be quite tempting to think that the rationality of an action can be defined rather simply in terms of ‘the balance of reasons’. But just as, for many philosophical purposes, it is extremely useful to identify the meaning of a word in terms of the systematic contribution the word makes to the meanings of whole sentences, this (...)
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  40.  38
    Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action.Joshua Gert - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (1):1-23.
    Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith's view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is (...)
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  41.  19
    Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action.Joshua Gert - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (1):1-23.
    Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is (...)
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  42.  86
    Color constancy and the color/value analogy.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):58-87.
    This article explains and defends the existence of value constancy, understood on the model of color constancy. Color constancy involves a phenomenal distinction between the transient color appearances of objects and the unchanging colors that those objects appear to have. The existence of value constancy allows advocates of response-dependent accounts of value to reject the question “What is the uniquely appropriate attitude to have toward this evaluative property?” as containing a false uniqueness assumption. Rejecting this assumption allows response-dependent accounts of (...)
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  43.  42
    Minimalism's continued creep: Subject matter.Joshua Gert - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    The problem of creeping minimalism is the problem of drawing a principled distinction between expressivists and non-expressivists. Explanationism is a popular strategy for solving the problem, but two of its forms—ontological explanationism and representational explanationism—have fatal problems. Christine Tiefensee and Matthew Simpson have recently, and independently, endorsed a third form: subject matter explanationism. But this form also fails. At bottom, the problem is that it does not note the existence of non-reductive expressivist views, just as earlier forms of explanationism did (...)
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  44.  99
    Internalism and different kinds of reasons.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (1):53–72.
  45.  66
    Skepticism about Practical Reasons Internalism.Joshua Gert - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):59-77.
  46. Vague terms, indexicals, and vague indexicals.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):437 - 445.
    Jason Stanley has criticized a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox that treats vagueness as a kind of indexicality. His objection rests on a feature of indexicals that seems plausible: that their reference remains fixed in verb phrase ellipsis. But the force of Stanley’s criticism depends on the undefended assumption that vague terms, if they are a special sort of indexical, must function in the same way that more paradigmatic indexicals do. This paper argues that there can be more than (...)
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  47.  53
    Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):171-183.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers. The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy (...)
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  48.  87
    Avoiding the conditional fallacy.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):88-95.
    Over-simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection (...)
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  49.  52
    Moral supervenience and distinctness: comments on Dreier.Joshua Gert - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1409-1416.
    Jamie Dreier has argued that the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral requires explanation, and that attempts by the non-naturalist to provide it, or to sidestep the issue, have so far failed. These comments on Dreier first examine the notion of distinctness at work in the idea that non-natural properties are distinct from natural ones, pointing out that distinctness cannot be understood in modal terms if supervenience is to be respected. It then suggests that Dreier’s implicit commitment to the (...)
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  50.  15
    Transparency, representationalism, and visual noise.Joshua Gert - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6615-6629.
    Those who endorse the twin theses of transparency and representationalism with regard to visual experience hold that the qualities we are aware of in such experience are, all of them, apparently possessed by external objects. They hold, therefore, that we are not introspectively aware of any qualities of visual experience itself. In this paper I argue that attention to visual noise—also known as ‘eigenlicht’ or ‘eigengrau’—puts pressure on both of these theses, though in different ways. Phenomenally, visual noise does not (...)
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