Results for 'Joshua Greene & Cohen'

7 found
Order:
  1.  82
    Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.
  2. Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction Between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
  3.  49
    Conflict Monitoring in Cognition-Emotion Competition.Samuel M. McClure, Matthew M. Botvinick, Nick Yeung, Joshua D. Greene & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2007 - In James J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation. Guilford Press.
  4. For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything.Joshua Greene & Cohen & Jonathan - 2006 - In Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough (eds.), Law and the Brain. Oxford University Press.
  5. Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It?Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - 2015 - Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  30
    Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.
  7.  38
    Good Night and Good Luck - In Search of a Neuroscience Challenge to Criminal Justice.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (1):1-31.
    This article clarifies what a neuroscience challenge to criminal justice must look like by sketching the basic structure of the argument, gradually filling out the details and illustrating the conditions that must be met for the challenge to work. In the process of doing so it explores influential work by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, and Stephen Morse respectively, arguing that the former should not be understood to present a version of the challenge, and that the latter's (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark