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Joshua Rasmussen [22]Joshua L. Rasmussen [2]
  1. How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
    Arguments for substance dualism—the theory that we are at least partly non-material beings—abound. Many such arguments begin with our capacity to engage in conscious thought and end with dualism. Such are familiar. But there is another route to dualism. It begins with our moral value and ends with dualism. In this article, we develop and assess the prospects for this new style of argument. We show that, though one extant version of the argument does not succeed, there may yet be (...)
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  2.  92
    Presentists May Say Goodbye to A-Properties.Joshua Rasmussen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):270-276.
    Philosophers of time say that if presentism is true (i.e. if reality is comprised solely of presently existing things), then a complete description of reality must contain tensed terms, such as ‘was’, ‘presently is’ and ‘will be’. I counter this viewpoint by explaining how the presentist may de-tense our talk about times. I argue, furthermore, that, since the A-theory of time denies the success of any such de-tensing strategy, presentism is not a version of the A-theory – contrary to the (...)
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  3. No Pairing Problem.Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke van Horn - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum (...)
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  4. On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument for Atheism.Daniel Howard-Snyder, Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew Cullison - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):198-204.
    Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that God is supposed to be omniscient, yet nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on is false. (...)
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  5. Why is There Anything?Joshua Rasmussen & Christopher Gregory Weaver - forthcoming - In Jerry L. Walls Trent Dougherty (ed.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project. Oxford University Press.
    We argue that there exists a necessary causally potent being. We then argue that that being is God.
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  6.  79
    From States of Affairs to a Necessary Being.Joshua Rasmussen - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):183 - 200.
    I develop new paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being. These paths assume a metaphysical framework in which there are abstract states of affairs that can obtain or fail to obtain. One path begins with the following causal principle: necessarily, any contingent concrete object possibly has a cause. I mark out steps from that principle to a more complex causal principle and from there to the existence of a concrete necessary being. I offer a couple alternative causal principles (...)
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  7. From a Necessary Being to God.Joshua Rasmussen - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (1):1-13.
    Not a lot of work on theistic arguments has been devoted to drawing connections between a necessary being and theistic properties. In this paper, I identify novel paths from a necessary being to certain theistic properties: volition, infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite goodness. The steps in those paths are an outline for future work on what William Rowe (The Cosmological Argument, 1975, p. 6) has called “stage II” of the cosmological argument.
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  8. Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Joshua Rasmussen - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    The correspondence theory of truth is a precise and innovative account of how the truth of a proposition depends upon that proposition's connection to a piece of reality. Joshua Rasmussen refines and defends the correspondence theory of truth, proposing new accounts of facts, propositions, and the correspondence between them. With these theories in hand, he then offers original solutions to the toughest objections facing correspondence theorists. Addressing the Problem of Funny Facts, Liar Paradoxes, and traditional epistemological questions concerning how our (...)
     
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  9. Problems with Plurals.Joshua Rasmussen & Alexander R. Pruss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
     
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  10.  13
    Could God Fail to Exist?Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (3):159--177.
    I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Hume’s conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments, including Swinburne’s neo-Humean argument and the subtraction argument. I show that such arguments face a ”parity’ problem, since the very reasoning that gets them off the ground also launches parallel arguments for an (...)
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  11.  5
    Tyron Goldschmidt : The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Routledge 2013.Joshua Rasmussen - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):235-240.
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  12.  52
    On the Value of Freedom To Do Evil.Joshua Rasmussen - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):418-428.
    Theists typically think the freedom to choose between right and wrong is a great good . Yet, they also typically think that the very best being—God—and inhabitants of the very best place—heaven—lack this kind of freedom. The question arises: if freedom to choose evil is so good, then why is it absent from the best being and the best place? I discuss articulations of this question in the literature and point out drawbacks of answers that have been proposed. I then (...)
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  13.  10
    Could God Fail to Exist?Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (3):159.
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  14.  26
    How Truth Relates to Reality.Joshua Rasmussen - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):167-180.
    Many people think that truth somehow depends upon the way things are. Yet, it has proven difficult to precisely explain the nature of this dependence. The most common view is that truth depends upon the way things are by corresponding to things. But this account relocates the difficulty: one now wonders what correspondence is. It is worth emphasizing that the question of how truth relates to reality is not only a question for correspondence theorists; theorists of all stripes may wonder (...)
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  15.  62
    A New Argument for a Necessary Being.Joshua Rasmussen - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):351 - 356.
    I present a new argument for the thesis that there is a necessarily existing, causally powerful entity?a necessary being. The outline of the argument is this: (i) necessarily, every beginning of a certain sort S (which I'll specify) can have a cause; (ii) a beginning to the existence of all non-necessarily existing things would be of sort S; (iii) such a beginning can obtain; (iv) such a beginning cannot be caused unless there is a necessary being; therefore, (v) there is (...)
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  16.  61
    Tenseless Times.Joshua Rasmussen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3221-3227.
    I develop a new theory of times. I show how to analyze times as tenselessly describable “abstract” entities. Some philosophers make use of ersatz times, which are abstract entities such as maximal states of affairs that bear earlier than and later than relations to one another. Although these times are normally thought to exemplify A-properties that cannot be expressed in a purely tenseless language, I explain how a tenseless theory can accommodate abstract times. I do this by defending Rasmussen’s tenseless (...)
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  17.  68
    Cosmological Arguments From Contingency.Joshua Rasmussen - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):806-819.
  18.  62
    Time Without Creation?Alexander Pruss & Joshua Rasmussen - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (4):401-411.
    We introduce three arguments for the thesis that time cannot exist prior to an original creation event. In the first argument, we seek to show that if time doesn’t depend upon creation, then time is infinite in the backwards direction, which is incompatible with arguments for a finite past. In the second and third arguments, we allow for the possibility of backwards-infinite time but argue that God could not have a sufficiently good reason to refrain from creating for infinitely many (...)
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  19.  55
    Continuity as a Guide to Possibility.Joshua Rasmussen - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):525-538.
    I propose a new guide for assessing claims about what is possible. I offer examples of modal claims that are, in a certain intuitive respect, ?continuous? with one another. I then put forward a general, defeasible principle of modal continuity that can account for our intuitions about those examples. According to this principle, statements that differ by a mere quantitative term don't normally differ with respect to being possibly true. I offer a precise statement of the principle, and then I (...)
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  20.  12
    About Aboutness.Joshua Rasmussen - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).
  21.  35
    Explaining Counterfactuals of Freedom.Alexander R. Pruss & Joshua L. Rasmussen - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):1-6.
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  22.  23
    Building Thoughts From Dust: A Cantorian Puzzle.Joshua Rasmussen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):393-404.
    I bring to light a set-theoretic reason to think that there are more mental properties than shapes, sizes, masses, and other characteristically “physical” properties. I make use of a couple counting principles. One principle, backed by a Cantorian-style argument, is that pluralities outnumber particulars: that is, there is a distinct plurality of particulars for each particular, but not vice versa. The other is a principle by which we may coherently identify distinct mental properties in terms of arbitrary pluralities of physical (...)
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  23.  20
    From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence.Joshua Rasmussen - 2013 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):19-30.
    I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing propositions. The crux of the argument marks out a pathway to the conclusion that necessary truths cannot themselves be necessarily true unless they necessarily exist. I motivate the steps in the argument and then address several standard objections, including one that makes use of the distinction between ‘truth in’ and ‘truth at’. The purpose of the argument is to generate deeper insights into the nature of propositions and the logic of (...)
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  24.  6
    Explaining Counterfactuals of Freedom.Alexander R. Pruss & Joshua L. Rasmussen - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):193-198.
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