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Joulia Smortchkova
University Of Oxford
  1. Metacognitive Development and Conceptual Change in Children.Joulia Smortchkova & Nicholas Shea - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    There has been little investigation to date of the way metacognition is involved in conceptual change. It has been recognised that analytic metacognition is important to the way older children (c. 8-12 years) acquire more sophisticated scientific and mathematical concepts at school. But there has been barely any examination of the role of metacognition in earlier stages of concept acquisition, at the ages that have been the major focus of the developmental psychology of concepts. The growing evidence that even young (...)
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  2.  89
    Representational Kinds.Joulia Smortchkova & Michael Murez - forthcoming - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dolega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What are Mental Representations? New York, État de New York, États-Unis:
    Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting type of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive (...)
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  3.  86
    After-Effects and the Reach of Perceptual Content.Joulia Smortchkova - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    In this paper, I discuss the use of after-effects as a criterion for showing that we can perceive high-level properties. According to this criterion, if a high-level property (for example, an emotional expression) is susceptible to after-effects, this suggests that the property can be perceived, rather than cognized. The defenders of the criterion claim that, since after-effects are also present for low-level, uncontroversially perceptual properties (such as orientation), we can safely infer that high-level after-effects are perceptual as well. The critics (...)
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  4. Seeing Goal-Directedness: A Case for Social Perception.Joulia Smortchkova - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):855-879.
    This article focuses on social perception, an area of research that lies at the interface between the philosophy of perception and the scientific investigation of human social cognition. Some philosophers and psychologists appeal to resonance mechanisms to show that intentional and goal-directed actions can be perceived. Against these approaches, I show that there is a class of simple goal-directed actions, whose perception does not rely on resonance. I discuss the role of the superior temporal sulcus as the possible neural correlate (...)
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  5. Singular Thought: Object‐Files, Person‐Files, and the Sortal PERSON.Michael Murez & Joulia Smortchkova - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):632-646.
    In philosophy, “singular thought” refers to our capacity to represent entities as individuals, rather than as possessors of properties. Philosophers who defend singularism argue that perception allows us to mentally latch onto objects and persons directly, without conceptualizing them as being of a certain sort. Singularists assume that singular thought forms a unified psychological kind, regardless of the nature of the individuals represented. Empirical findings on the special psychological role of persons as opposed to inanimates threaten singularism. They raise the (...)
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  6. Encapsulated Social Perception of Emotional Expressions.Joulia Smortchkova - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:38-47.
    In this paper I argue that the detection of emotional expressions is, in its early stages, informationally encapsulated. I clarify and defend such a view via the appeal to data from social perception on the visual processing of faces, bodies, facial and bodily expressions. Encapsulated social perception might exist alongside processes that are cognitively penetrated, and that have to do with recognition and categorization, and play a central evolutionary function in preparing early and rapid responses to the emotional stimuli.
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  7.  46
    Seeing Emotions Without Mindreading Them.Joulia Smortchkova - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):525-543.
    According to direct perception approaches we directly see others’ emotions, and by seeing emotions we immediately ascribe them to others. Direct perception is explicitly presented as an alternative account of mindreading, but it also contains an implicit thesis about the extent of the reach of perception. In this paper emotion perception is defended: siding with the direct perception approach I claim that we can simply see emotions and not just low level features of the facial and bodily displays, but contra (...)
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  8.  70
    The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought: A Psychological Perspective.Michael Murez, Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 107-142.
    We argue that the most ambitious version of the mental files theory of singular thought, according to which mental files are a wide-ranging psychological natural kind underlying all and only singular thinking, is unsupported by the available psychological data. Nevertheless, critical examination of the theory from a psychological perspective opens up promising avenues for research, especially concerning the relationship between our perceptual capacity to individuate and track basic individuals, and our higher level capacities for singular thought.
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  9.  8
    Représentation mentale (Version Académique).Joulia Smortchkova - 2020 - L'Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    En première approximation, on peut caractériser une « représentation mentale » comme une entité mentale avec des caractéristiques sémantiques : quand je crois que le chat est sur la table, mon état mental a un contenu représentationnel (il représente le chat comme étant sur la table) et des conditions de satisfaction (ou vérité) qui font que mon état représente correctement ce à propos de quoi est la représentation (ma croyance est vraie si le chat est effectivement sur la table, et (...)
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  10.  16
    From the “Coding Metaphor” to a Theory of Representation.Jonathan Birch & Joulia Smortchkova - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Brette highlights a conceptual problem in contemporary neuroscience: Loose talk of “coding” sometimes leads to a conflation of the distinction between representing and merely detecting a property. The solution is to replace casual talk of “coding” with an explicit, demanding set of conditions for neural representation. Various theories of this general type can be found in the philosophical literature.
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  11.  15
    Review of Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates by Carrie Figdor. [REVIEW]Joulia Smortchkova - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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  12.  1
    Mentale Repräsentationen - Grundlagentexte.Tobias Schlicht & Joulia Smortchkova - 2018 - Berlin: Suhrkamp.
    Der Begriff der mentalen Repräsentation spielt eine zentrale Rolle in Theorien über geistige Phänomene und Mechanismen der Informationsverarbeitung. Philosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler diskutieren lebhaft darüber, wie es uns beziehungsweise unserem Gehirn gelingt, die Welt zu repräsentieren, und was mentale Repräsentationen genau sind. Der Band versammelt die zentralen Texte der Debatte – von Ned Block und Fred Dretske bis zu Jerry Fodor und Ruth Millikan – erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung. Ein Grundlagenwerk zur Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognitionswissenschaft.
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  13. What Are Mental Representations?Joulia Smortchkova, Tobias Schlicht & Krzysztof Dolega - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    Mental representation is one of core theoretical constructs within cognitive science and, together with the introduction of the computer as a model for the mind, is responsible for enabling the ‘cognitive turn’ in psychology and associated fields. Conceiving of cognitive processes, such as perception, motor control, and reasoning, as processes that consist in the manipulation of contentful vehicles representing the world has allowed us to refine our explanations of behavior and has led to tremendous empirical advancements. Despite the central role (...)
     
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