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  1.  27
    Epistemology of Causal Inference in Pharmacology: Towards a Framework for the Assessment of Harms.Juergen Landes, Barbara Osimani & Roland Poellinger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):3-49.
    Philosophical discussions on causal inference in medicine are stuck in dyadic camps, each defending one kind of evidence or method rather than another as best support for causal hypotheses. Whereas Evidence Based Medicine advocates the use of Randomised Controlled Trials and systematic reviews of RCTs as gold standard, philosophers of science emphasise the importance of mechanisms and their distinctive informational contribution to causal inference and assessment. Some have suggested the adoption of a pluralistic approach to causal inference, and an inductive (...)
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    Varieties of Error and Varieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference.Barbara Osimani & Juergen Landes - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  3.  12
    Varieties of Error and Varieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference, Forthcoming in The British Journal for Philosophy of Science.Barbara Osimani & Juergen Landes - forthcoming - British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
    According to the Variety of Evidence Thesis items of evidence from independent lines of investigation are more confirmatory, ceteris paribus, than e.g. replications of analogous studies. This thesis is known to fail Bovens and Hartmann, Claveau. How- ever, the results obtained by the former only concern instruments whose evidence is either fully random or perfectly reliable; instead in Claveau, unreliability is modelled as deterministic bias. In both cases, the unreliable instrument delivers totally irrelevant information. We present a model which formalises (...)
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    Strictly Proper Scoring Rules.Juergen Landes - unknown
    Epistemic scoring rules are the en vogue tool for justifications of the probability norm and further norms of rational belief formation. They are different in kind and application from statistical scoring rules from which they arose. In the first part of the paper I argue that statistical scoring rules, properly understood, are in principle better suited to justify the probability norm than their epistemic brethren. Furthermore, I give a justification of the probability norm applying statistical scoring rules. In the second (...)
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