Two different but closely related issues in current cognitive science will be considered in this essay. One is the controversial and extensively discussed question of how connectionist and symbolic representations of knowledge are related to each other. The other concerns the notion of connectionist learning and its relevance for the understanding of the distinction between propositional and nonpropositional knowledge. More specifically, I shall give an overview of a result in Rantala and Vadén establishing a limiting case correspondence between symbolic (...) and connectionist representations and, on the other hand, study the problem, preliminarily investigated in Rantala, of how propositional knowledge may arise from nonpropositional knowledge. I shall also try to point out that on some more or less plausible assumptions, often made by cognitive scientists, these results may have some significance when we try to comprehend the nature of human knowledge representation. Some of these assumptions are rather hypothethical and debatable for the time being and they will become justified in the future only if there will be more progress in the empirical and theoretical research on the brain and on artificial networks. The assumptions concern, besides some questions of the behavior of neural networks, such things as the relevance of pattern recognition for modelling human cognition, in particular, knowledge acquisition, and the relation between emergence and reduction. (shrink)
One way to obtain a comprehensive semantics for various systems of modal logic is to use a general notion of non-normal world. In the present article, a general notion of modal system is considered together with a semantic framework provided by such a general notion of non-normal world. Methodologically, the main purpose of this paper is to provide a logical framework for the study of various modalities, notably prepositional attitudes. Some specific systems are studied together with semantics using non-normal worlds (...) of different kinds. (shrink)
We revive the idea that a deductive-nomological explanation of a scientific theory by its successor may be defensible, even in those common and troublesome cases where the theories concerned are mutually incompatible; and limiting, approximating and counterfactual assumptions may be required in order to define a logical relation between them. Our solution is based on a general characterization of limiting relations between physical theories using the method of nonstandard analysis.
The doctrines of scientific realism have enjoyed a close and enduring, if not always harmonious, association with Tarski's semantic conception of truth and theories of formal semantics generally. From its inception Tarski's theory received unqualified support from some realists, like Karl Popper, who saw it as legitimizing the use of semantic notions in epistemology and the philosophy of science.
This essay is an attempt to consider dynamic aspects of scientific theorising from a formal perspective. Our emphasis will be on the aims and methods for constructing formal models of theory dynamics which will be conceived from a general or 'theoretical' rather than 'applied' standpoint.
In this paper we give the gist of our reconstructed notion of (limiting case) correspondence. Our notion is very general, so that it should be applicable to all the cases in which a correspondence has been said to exist in actual science.
A systematic attempt to understand cognitive characteristics of translation by bringing its logical, pragmatic, and hermeneutic features together and examining a number of scientific, logical (philosophical and formal),and philosophical applications. The notion of translation investigated here is called explanatory since it is not a translation in the standard, meaning-saving sense but aims to provide an explanation for the meaning change in exact terms.
Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...) the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)
Though formal metascience has made rapid advances over the past few decades, it has seldom been seen to contribute much to the rational reconstruction of scientic development; for the most part, logical concepts have found application in the synchronic analysis of scientic theories. It should be important, therefore, to consider to what extent diachronic or dynamic aspects of scientic theorizing may also be captured within the connes of a formal metascientic framework, and what tools are best suited for constructing a (...) general model of theory dynamics. (shrink)
We present data from 122 nations showing that Baumard's argument on the ecological predictors of life history strategies and innovation is incomplete. Our analyses indicate that wealth, parasite stress, and cold climate impose orthogonal effects on life histories, innovation, and industrialization. Baumard also overlooks the historical exploitation of other nations which significantly enlarged the “pooled energy budget” available to England.
The principal aim of this essay is to discuss some logical features of the so-called Classical model of cognitive architecture as it is advocated by J. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn in their much discussed article 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis'. It is pointed out that their structural assumptions have consequences of a logical kind which call into question the view that the Classical architecture (in their sense) can be employed to model human cognition. It seems that the consequences (...) have escaped Fodor and Pylyshyn's notice, or else they have failed to appreciate them, since some of their claims evidently conflict with them. It is also investigated whether the human mind can be characterized as being logical in some weaker sense of logic. Furthermore, it is argued that J. H. Fetzer's view that it is a semiotic system is more realistic than the Classical model, but the distinction he suggests between human cognition and other kinds may be problematic. (shrink)
ABSTRACTThis article sheds light on the period of revolutionary turbulence by demonstrating how the concept of revolution was introduced in the Finnish print culture through foreign news reports during the early nineteenth century. The examination draws on the use of multilingual digital newspaper collections provided by the National Library of Finland. By combining key word searches to a close reading of newspaper texts, the article explores the ways in which different revolutionary movements were present in the Finnish newspapers during the (...) early decades of the nineteenth century. The article proposes that the role of foreign news flow was crucial in the process of shaping the understanding of revolution in Finland. (shrink)
It used to be a common view in the philosophy of science as well as among the scientists themselves that scientic change has been and will be continuos. Even in the most radical changes of theories the growth of knowledge was claimed to be cumulative. Thus, for instance, physicists may say that in radical, revolutionary changes of theories there obtains, however, some kind of correspondence between the old and new theories; the old theory can be regarded at least as a (...) limiting case of the new one. Thus, for instance, classical particle mechanics is a limiting case of both relativistic particle mechanics and quantum mechanics. Some philosophers, as, e.g., Stegmuller , go even further when they claim that there always obtains a reductive correlation in scientic change. The old theory can be reduced to the new one in some specic, or perhaps only intuitive, sense of reduction. However, in the light of what physicists say about correspondence and logicians about reduction, it seems obvious that correspondence should be distinguished from reduction and that one may claim the existence of the former relation, rather than the latter, in the scientic changes. We are not ready to say here what a correspondence relation would exactly consist of, but we will discuss what we think ought to be at least required in comparison with reduction and the related notion of interpre- tation. A detailed case study seems to sustain our views correspondence. (shrink)
This is an interdisciplinary study of what is cognitively going on when we interpret, respresent, or evaluate cultural entities, works of art included. In addition, the role of interpretation in experience and in cultural objects is elucidated from a cognitive point of view. The book relies on theories of action, perception, possible worlds, modalities, intentionality. cognition, and brain research, and it contains anumber of case studies. The book ptovides some new insights into some much-discussed problems related to interpretation.
The book studies philosophical and mathematical-logical problems of modal notions. Its starting points are possible worlds semantics and Kripke models, and it also concentrates on proof-theoretic methods.
In this essay Juho Ritola develops a justificationist approach to social epistemology, which holds that normatively satisfactory social processes pertaining to the acquisition, storage, dissemination, and use of knowledge must be evidence-based processes that include appropriate reflective attitudes by the relevant agents and, consequently, the relevant institutions. This implies that the teaching of critical thinking and reasoning in general should strive to bring about such attitudes in students. Ritola begins by sketching a justificationist approach and defending it on a (...) general level against the criticism posed by Alvin Goldman. He then defends it on the level of individual reasoners against the argument set out by Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout. Based on empirical evidence, Bishop and Trout argue that the kind of reflection advocated by a justificationist approach to reasoning leads to worse outcomes than the use of various statistical prediction rules. Ritola, in contrast, maintains that one cannot and should not replace critical reflection on evidence by a mechanical application of rules. Instead, he asserts, statistical prediction rules and empirical evidence regarding our reasoning performance are part of the total evidence that we should reflect on in our critical reasoning. (shrink)
This paper investigates how unsupervised machine learning methods might make hermeneutic interpretive text analysis more objective in the social sciences. Through a close examination of the uses of topic modeling—a popular unsupervised approach in the social sciences—it argues that the primary way in which unsupervised learning supports interpretation is by allowing interpreters to discover unanticipated information in larger and more diverse corpora and by improving the transparency of the interpretive process. This view highlights that unsupervised modeling does not eliminate the (...) researchers’ judgments from the process of producing evidence for social scientific theories. The paper shows this by distinguishing between two prevalent attitudes toward topic modeling, i.e., topic realism and topic instrumentalism. Under neither can modeling provide social scientific evidence without the researchers’ interpretive engagement with the original text materials. Thus the unsupervised text analysis cannot improve the objectivity of interpretation by alleviating the problem of underdetermination in interpretive debate. The paper argues that the sense in which unsupervised methods can improve objectivity is by providing researchers with the resources to justify to others that their interpretations are correct. This kind of objectivity seeks to reduce suspicions in collective debate that interpretations are the products of arbitrary processes influenced by the researchers’ idiosyncratic decisions or starting points. The paper discusses this view in relation to alternative approaches to formalizing interpretation and identifies several limitations on what unsupervised learning can be expected to achieve in terms of supporting interpretive work. (shrink)
Among the many possible approaches to dealing with logical omniscience, I consider here awareness and impossible worlds structures. The former approach, pioneered by Fagin and Halpern, distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge, and avoids logical omniscience with respect to explicit knowledge. The latter, developed by Rantala and by Hintikka, allows for the existence of logically impossible worlds to which the agents are taken to have access; since such worlds need not behave consistently, the agents’ knowledge is fallible relative to (...) logical omniscience. The two approaches are known to be equally expressive in propositional systems interpreted over Kripke semantics. In this paper I show that the two approaches are equally expressive in propositional systems interpreted over Montague-Scott (neighborhood) semantics. Furthermore, I provide predicate systems of both awareness and impossible worlds structures interpreted on neighborhood semantics and prove the two systems to be equally expressive. (shrink)
Published originally in: Patoluoto, I., Saarinen, E., Stenman, P.,. Vexing Questions, An Urnful of Essays in Honour of Veikko Rantala on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Reports from the Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, 3, pp. 12–18.
The ethics of hastened death are complex. Studies on physicians’ opinions about assisted dying exist, but changes in physicians’ attitudes towards hastened death in clinical decision-making and the background factors explaining this remain unclear. The aim of this study was to explore the changes in these attitudes among Finnish physicians. A questionnaire including hypothetical patient scenarios was sent to 1182 and 1258 Finnish physicians in 1999 and 2015, respectively. Two scenarios of patients with advanced cancer were presented: one requesting an (...) increase in his morphine dose to a potentially lethal level and another suffering a cardiac arrest. Physicians’ attitudes towards assisted death, life values and other background factors were queried as well. The response rate was 56%. The morphine dose was increased by 25% and 34% of the physicians in 1999 and 2015, respectively. Oncologists approved the increase most infrequently without a significant change between the study years. Oncological specialty, faith in God, female gender and younger age were independent factors associated with the reluctance to increase the morphine dose. Euthanasia, but not assisted suicide, was considered less reprehensible in 2015. In both years, most physicians withheld cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Finnish physicians accepted the risk of hastening death more often in 2015 than in 1999. The physicians’ specialty and many other background factors influenced this acceptance. They also regarded euthanasia as less reprehensible now than they did 16 years ago. (shrink)
The essay starts by presenting two accounts of begging the question, John Biro's epistemic account and David Sanford's doxastic account. After briefly comparing these accounts, the essay will study an argument suspected of begging the question and subsequently apply the epistemic and doxastic accounts to this test case. It is found that the accounts of Biro and Sanford do not analyse the test case adequately, therefore a new account is developed using the idea of a knowledge-base.