21 found
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  1. The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.
    The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...)
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  2. (1 other version)Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
    In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...)
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  3. In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion.Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno & Fabrice Teroni - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.
    Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of (...)
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  4. Emotion, perception and perspective.Julien A. Deonna - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
    Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...)
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  5. Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122.
    According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...)
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  6.  78
    Being moved.Florian Cova & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):447-466.
    In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...)
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  7. Getting Bodily Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (1):55-63.
    We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand (...)
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  8.  50
    (1 other version)In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 15-31.
    Why think that emotions are kinds of evaluations? This chapter puts forward an original account of emotions as evaluations apt to circumvent some of the chief difficulties with which alternative approaches find themselves confronted. We shall proceed by first introducing the idea that emotions are evaluations (sec. I). Next, two well-known approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are in and of themselves unemotional but are alleged to become emotional when directed towards evaluative contents are (...)
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  9. From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the (...)
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  10. Differentiating Shame from Guilt.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400..
    How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...)
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  11.  54
    On the Good that Moves Us.Julien A. Deonna - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):190-204.
    In this article, I provide a detailed characterization of being moved, which I claim is a distinct emotion. Being moved is the experience of being struck by the goodness of some specific positive value being exemplified. I start by expounding this account. Next, I discuss three issues that have emerged in the literature regarding it. These concern respectively the valence of being moved, the scope of the values that may constitute its particular objects, and the cognitive sophistication required for experiencing (...)
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  12. The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion.Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not (...)
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  13. Is Shame a Social Emotion?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2011 - In Anita Konzelman-Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans-Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Self Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer. pp. 193-212.
    In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which "others" play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion (...)
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  14. What Role for Emotions in Well-being?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):123-142.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
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  15. Shame's Guilt Disproved.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - Critical Quarterly 50 (4):65-72.
    The contemporary consensus on shame is pessimistic. Three main reasons, all connected with the alleged fact that, in shame, you allow yourself to become the victim of external pressures, appear to motivate this conclusion. First, shame is said to be the emotion of social sanction: when you feel shame, you submit to the judgements of others. Second, shame is supposed to be triggered by the way you look in the eyes of others. Thirdly, and as a result, shame allegedly motivates (...)
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  16. The Self of Shame.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2009 - In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins. pp. 33-50.
    The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” (...)
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  17.  71
    Affective intentionality and practical rationality.Christine Clavien, Julien A. Deonna & Ivo Wallimann - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):311–322.
    ‘Emotions are Janus-faced,’ writes de Sousa. ‘This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truth of emotions, one of which is about the self, and the other about conditions in the world’. Emotions, it is claimed, disclose facts about how the world is and about who we are. The articles in this volume all focus on one, the other, or both of these aspects of emotions – How do they contribute to provide reasons for (...)
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  18.  18
    Petit Traité des Valeurs.Julien A. Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.) - 2018 - [Genève, Switzerland]: Edition d’Ithaque.
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  19. Sympathy and empathy.Julien A. Deonna - 2005 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. macmillan reference. pp. 9--344.
     
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  20.  4
    Is Shame a Social Emotion.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2011 - In Anita Konzelman-Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans-Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Self Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer.
    In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion (...)
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  21.  31
    L'intentionnalité des émotions: Du corps aux valeurs.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2009 - Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 47 (144):25-41.