Following Kit Fine (2007), we can say that the de jure pair represent the referent as the same while the second one does not do so. There are roughly three ways of capturing this difference. One could say that de jure coreference between two expression occurrences happen because (a) the occurrences have identical meanings, (b) they have identical syntactic properties, or (c) they enter into a semantic relation not grounded in identity of meaning or syntax. In what follows, (...) I give some reason to think that de jure coreference is not a transitive relation. As a consequence, we can rule out (a) and (b) just on these grounds alone (since identity is a transitive relation). (c) then looks promising. I argue that this gives further support for a relationist semantics along the lines of what Kit Fine has proposed. (shrink)

De facto objections to theism purport to show that theism is false, whereas de jure objections to theism claim that, whether or not theism is true, belief in God is irrational. Divine hiddenness – the fact that there are people who non-resistantly lack belief in God – is sometimes used as an argument against theism. In this article I will show that accepting the argument from divine hiddenness carries a high cost: it eliminates all de jure objections to (...) theism. So atheists can either have de jure objections to theism or the objection from divine hiddenness, but they cannot have both. (shrink)

Recent work has brought to prominence the idea that some utterances contain occurrences of noun phrases that not only corefer, but do so in a particularly guaranteed or explicit way—call such occurrences ‘de jure coreferential’. Studies of de jure coreference have considered both the characteristics of the relation, and its explanation. Pinillos (154(2):301–324, 2011) argues that de jure coreference is non-transitive, and uses this as part of his argument for a new semantic primitive explaining de jure (...) coreference. In this paper, I draw attention to a neglected distinction between de jure coreference and another kind of coreference with which it might easily be confused. I then consider Pinillos’s claim that de jure coreference is non-transitive, and conclude that even using Pinillos’s definition of de jure coreference, it is far from straightforward that he has demonstrated the non-transitivity of de jure coreference. I question whether Pinillos’s characterisation of de jure coreference is adequate, and offer a plausible alternative characterisation. I show that on this new characterisation, there is no evidence that the relation is non-transitive. (shrink)

I answer Alvin Plantinga's challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection' concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justification for believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic justification in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. I defend philosophical interest in the SEO against objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga's criteria for a proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, (...) and the relevance of ‘impulsional evidence’. I argue that no result from Plantinga-style Reformed epistemology precludes the reasons I offer in favour of giving the SEO its due philosophical attention. (shrink)

Most discussions of Kripke's Naming and Necessity focus either on Kripke's so-called "historical theory of reference" or his thesis that names are rigid designators. But in response to problems of the rigidity thesis Kripke later points out that his thesis about proper names is a stronger one: proper names are de jure rigid. This sets the agenda for my paper. Certain problems raised for Kripke's view show that the notion of de jure rigidity is in need of clarification. (...) I will try to clarify the notion of de jure rigidity by analyzing characterizations of it given in the literature. I will argue in particular that Kripke can count descriptive names as de jure rigid and that the concept of de jure rigidity should not be explained with recourse to the concept of a semantical rule. The second part of the paper is a critical discussion of arguments intended to show that proper names are not de jure rigid. I will show that these arguments are unconvincing by using Dummett's distinction between assertoric content and ingredient sense. (shrink)

What formulas are tense-logically valid depends on the structure of time, for example on whether it has a beginning. Logicians have investigated what formulas correspond to what physical hypotheses about time. Analogously, we can investigate what formulas of modal logic correspond to what metaphysical hypotheses about necessity. It is widely held that physical hypotheses about time may be contingent. If so, tense-logical validity may be contingent. In contrast, validity in modal logic is typically taken to be non-contingent, as reflected by (...) the general acceptance of the so-called “rule of necessitation.” But as has been argued by various authors in recent years, metaphysical hypotheses may likewise be contingent. If, in particular, hypotheses about the extent of possibility are contingent, we should expect modal-logical validity to be contingent too. Let “contingentism” be the view that everything that is not ruled out by logic is possible. I shall investigate what the right system of modal logic is, if contingentism is true. Given plausible assumptions, the system contains the McKinsey principle, and is thus not even contained in S5. It also contains simple and elegant iteration principles for the contingency operator: something is contingent if and only if it is contingently contingent. (shrink)

Recently, Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb have brought Madhva's epistemological framework into active dialogue with Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology and have argued that individuals within Madhva's tradition cannot make full use of Plantinga's epistemology, according to which, Christian belief resists de jure objections and can also have warrant. While I do not contest this specific claim, I demonstrate that an analysis of Madhva's epistemological framework reveals that this framework has its own resources through which it can resist de (...) class='Hi'>jure objections. I address various objections to the rationality of Mādhvic belief and conclude that there are no de jure objections to Mādhvic belief that are independent of de facto objections. (shrink)

“ De jure and De facto Rigidity in the General Terms for Natural Kinds”. This paper will argue that one of rigidity’s central problems in general terms for natural kinds, is consequence of not distinguishing between de jure rigid terms and de facto rigid terms on these cases. The paper claims that necessary identity sentences defended by Kripke in Naming and Necessity consider the term’s occurrence to designate a same kind (kinds which share the transworld relation of being (...) one same kind) through two rigidity terms, a de jure one, and a de facto one. This allows to explain the problems that arise from the notion of rigidity in the case of general terms for natural kinds, since it maintains the causal connection requirements, while at the same time it enunciates the identity criterion between these kinds, through the essential property(ies) of the abovementioned kind. (shrink)

In its early development philosophy of science did not allow the possibility of a relativistic approach with regard to explanation of external phenomena. Relativism was seen as justified exclusively with regard to internal phenomena, for example, in the realm of moral and aesthetic judgment. In the realm of moral judgment, external realism functions as a necessary hypothesis, according to which our moral judgment and moral decisions have a real effect in the external world, for which we can be held responsible. (...) A paradigm shift in the theory of science, inaugurated by Th. S. Kuhn, led to the rise of relativism with regard to judgment in the realm of external phenomena and specifically with regard to the validity of scientific theories. Critics of relativism do not take into account that it is not enough to point out the logical inconsistency of relativism. Most arguments for scientific justification of external realism are doomed to failure, because they do not take into account the role of the judgmental subject. In this article I will show that the role of “second nature” is significant not only for the constitution of moral realism, but also for the implementation of scientific naturalism. (shrink)

As an alternative to speculative realism, this book claims that realism is not a stance that became impossible with Kant but instead represents a concomitant phenomenon of modern reason, however obscure. The realist stance can be claimed only at the precarious pinnacle of the dialectic of totalization and release, where the overarching activity of the subject switches into a mode of de-totalizing release of the world from the constraints of consciousness and language.

In this paper we discuss the application of a new machine learning approach – Argument Based Machine Learning – to the legal domain. An experiment using a dataset which has also been used in previous experiments with other learning techniques is described, and comparison with previous experiments made. We also tested this method for its robustness to noise in learning data. Argumentation based machine learning is particularly suited to the legal domain as it makes use of the justifications of decisions (...) which are available. Importantly, where a large number of decided cases are available, it provides a way of identifying which need to be considered. Using this technique, only decisions which will have an influence on the rules being learned are examined. (shrink)

Hegels Theorie des äußeren Staatsrechts in seinen "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts" weist ausdrücklich Kants Idee eines Völkerbundes in der Schrift "Zum ewigen Frieden" als unrealistisch zurück; es gebe "keinen Prätor, höchstens Schiedsrichter und Vermittler zwischen Staaten, und auch diese nur zufälligerweise." Beide Konzepte – die Unausweichlichkeit auch gewaltsamer Konfrontationen der Staaten bei Hegel, die Möglichkeit ihrer rechtlichen Integration bei Kant – bilden den Gegenstand dieses Buchs. In den Beiträgen des Bandes geht es nicht nur um die Rekonstruktion der Theorien (...) Hegels und Kants, sondern auch um ihr Weiterdenken unter den heutigen Bedingungen der Globalisierung und asymmetrischer Kriege. Mit Beiträgen von: Samir Arnautovic, Andreas Arndt, Werner Becker, Hans-Georg Bensch, Paul Cruysberghs, Kazimir Drilo, Walter Jaeschke, Jean-François Kervegan, Heinz Kimmerle, Igor Mikecin, Vladimir Milisavljevic, Zvonko Posavec, Vahidin Preljevic, Andrzej Przylebski, Davor Rodin, Leo Šešerko und Jure Zovko. (shrink)

De jure coreference in a discourse is typically understood as explicit coreference that speakers are required to recognize in order to count as having correctly understood the discourse. For example, in an utterance of the sentence ‘Tom went to the market because he needed soy milk’, the two underlined terms are typically coreferential in a way that appreciating their coreference is required to fully understand the utterance. Often, de jure coreference is understood as an equivalence relation, so in (...) particular it is thought of as a transitive relation. However, Pinillos (Philos Stud 154(2):301–324, 2011) provides examples that apparently challenge the transitivity of de jure coreference. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, while it is inconclusive whether the relevant terms in Pinillos’s examples satisfy his third condition, it is much clearer that they fail to satisfy his first two conditions. Given that Pinillos’s conditions capture important characteristics of de jure coreference, his examples do not successfully show the non-transitivity of de jure coreference. Second, I present an alternative account of his examples, one that shows which representation the anaphoric pronoun in an example of the sort that he presents is de jure coreferential with. (shrink)

The article attempts to reconstruct the logical space within which, at the beginning of Hegel?s Logic,?being? and?nothing? are entitled to emerge and receive their names. In German Idealism, the concept of?being? is linked to the form of a proposition; Fichte grounds a new truth-value on the absolute thesis of the?thetical judgement?. And the article?s first thesis claims that Hegel couldn?t have placed?being? at the beginning of this great system, if the ground of its logical space had not been laid out (...) by precisely those shifts of German Idealism that posited the ontological function of the judgement. At the same time, the abstract negation, the absence of a relation and sufficient reason between?being? and?nothing?, reveals a structure of an irreducibly dual beginning. The logical background of this original duality could be constituted by the invention of the?transcendental inter-subjectivity? in German Idealism, manifested, for instance, in Hegel?s life-and-death struggle of two self-consciousnesses. The second thesis therefore suggests that?being? and?nothing? are elements of the logical space, established in concreto in a social situation of two subjects one of whom poses an affirmative statement and the other negates it abstractly. From here, one could draw out the coordinates of a sphere by the name of?public? whose structure is defined by the invalidation of two basic laws of thought, the law of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. The article shows how only the statements capable of absorbing negation, of sustaining a co-existence of affirmation and its symmetrical, abstract negation, can climb the ladder of public perceptibility and social impact. nema. (shrink)

A common view among nontheists combines the de jure objection that theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection that theism is false. Following Plantinga, we can call this a “proper” de jure objection—a de jure objection that does not depend on any de facto objection. In his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has produced a general argument against all proper de jure objections. Here I first show that this argument is logically fallacious (it (...) makes subtle probabilistic fallacies disguised by scope ambiguities), and proceed to lay the groundwork for the construction of actual proper de jure objections. (shrink)

In the mental files framework, mental files contain pieces of information. Then, how can we explain the fact that multiple pieces of information are stored in a single mental file? This fact can be called ‘co-filing’. Recanati recommends an account of co-filing as a way to avoid the circularity that can occur when one attempts to explain co-filing in terms of the fact that pieces of information are taken to be about the same object. I argue that his account is (...) far from being satisfactory and that co-filing needs to be regarded as a primitive fact. In other words, co-filing is not what needs to be explained within the mental files framework. The right question to be dealt with is what we can explain based on co-filing. (shrink)

The article challenges the first premise of?speculative realism?, according to which, with Kant, the contact with the outside world was lost. Instead, it will be shown that the possibility of realism received its major impulse from two grand figures of German Idealism, from Kant as a precursor of the Romantic period and from Hegel as its, albeit critical, philosophical culmination. Based on three possible relations of knowledge to its outside, three ontologies will be distinguished, the ontology of immediacy, stretching from (...) rationalists to the last empiricists, Kant?s ontology of totalization, and, finally, Hegel?s?ontology of release? or?de-totalization?. As opposed to Descartes?s thing being constantly doubted in its existence, as opposed to Malebranche?s occasion being invariably induced by God, as opposed to Leibniz?s monad being an immediate embodiment of an idea, as opposed to Berkeley?s object vanishing when not perceived, and as opposed to Hume?s world lacking necessity, Kant philosophically warranted a world that does not have to be perpetually verified and can, hence, exist devoid of ideas produced by God and outside the constancy of the human gaze. Kant secured the normal and necessary existence of the world behind our backs and procured us with the common-sense normality of the world, but it was only Hegel?s absolute subjectivism that granted us the first glimpses into the radical meaninglesness of the facticity. It was not until Hegel?s logic of indifference of the notion to its immediate content that an egress of the circle of Kant?s totalization was made possible. nema. (shrink)

Context: Perceptual presence is the experience wherein veridical objects are experienced as belonging to an observer-independent world. Problem: Experimental investigations of perceptual presence ….

Among other virtues, Mental Files Theory provides a straightforward explanation of de jure coreference, i.e. identity of referent guaranteed by meaning alone: de jure coreference holds between terms when these are associated with the same mental file from which they inherit their reference. In this paper, I discuss an objection that Angel Pinillos raises against Mental Files Theory and other similar theories: the theory predicts that de jure coreference should be transitive, just like identity. Yet there are (...) cases, involving ‘slash-terms’, in which transitivity fails, or so it seems. In his book Mental Files, Recanati replies that the mental files theorist can accommodate Pinillos’ exceptions by offering a refined model of merging files, the ‘partial merging’ model. While agreeing with Recanati on the need for such a model, I contend that, pace Recanati and Pinillos, de jure coreference is transitive even in the presence of slash-terms. I will first show that paradoxical consequences ensue if slash-terms are said to de jure corefer with several basic terms at once. Then, building on two different accounts Recanati gives of referential confusion, I will show that on both views, de jure coreference cannot hold because of the behaviour of confused slash-terms. I will conclude that, in Mental Files Theory, a slash-term can, at most, de jure corefer with only one basic term per context. (shrink)

Concept and interpretation are key philosophical terms that have played a major part in shaping modern thinking from the beginning of the modern age through post-modernity. The papers in this volume examine the historical dimensions of concept and interpretation as an approach, method, and thinking process, and also inquire critically about their relevance today, thereby taking general inventory of thinking in the modern age.

At the heart of Hegel s Aesthetics is the idea of the beautiful as unity. This unity turns fragile once the mind's self-awareness becomes conceptual and extends beyond sensory illusion. Focusing the philosophy of art on the idea of the beautiful raises a set of systematic problems, which are discussed with regard to Hegel s Aesthetics, its historical contexts, and its reception.".

In seiner Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes hat Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel die Grundlagen einer Anthropologie und Psychologie entwickelt, die den Menschen im Blick auf Vernunft und Freiheit bestimmt. Was auf den ersten Blick hoffnungslos antiquiert zu sein scheint, gewinnt Brisanz und Aktualität dadurch, dass Hegel seine Auffassung in eindringlichen Auseinandersetzungen mit scheinbar widersprechenden Phänomenen begründet und den subjektiven Geist im Zusammenhang seiner natürlichen, gesellschaftlichen sowie geschichtlichen Bestimmtheit reflektiert. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes gehen auf eine Tagung zurück, welche von der (...) Hegel-Gesellschaft Zadar in Verbindung mit der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft e.V. vom 23. bis 27. Februar 2011 an der Universität Zadar organisiert wurde. Auf der Grundlage einer historischen und systematischen Rekonstruktion der Hegelschen Anthropologie und Psychologie wird Hegels Konzept auch im Blick auf aktuelle philosophische Problematiken diskutiert, um Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes in ihrer thematischen Vielfalt für die gegenwärtigen Diskussionen zu erschließen. (shrink)

Staat und Kultur treten erst zu Hegels Lebzeiten in ein Verhaltnis, das spater mit dem Begriff Kulturstaat bezeichnet werden wird. Auch gebraucht Hegel den Terminus Kultur, den Herder gerade erst im modernen Sinne gepragt hatte, so gut wie nicht. Dennoch gehort Hegel zweifellos zu denjenigen Denkern, die das Verhaltnis von Staat und Kultur der Sache nach verhandelt und neu bestimmt haben. Grundlage hierfur ist sein Begriff des Geistes, der alle Merkmale des modernen Kulturbegriffs in sich schliesst: die Umformung der Natur, (...) die Gesellschaftlichkeit und die Geschichtlichkeit. Der Staat ist zentrales Element des geistigen Prozesses und daher selbst Bestandteil von Kultur, aber nach Hegel auch deren elementare Voraussetzung. Hierdurch ist das Verhaltnis von Staat und Kultur bei Hegel hoch komplex gestaltet und mitunter im Einzelnen auch schwer zu bestimmen und spannungsreich.". (shrink)

Schlegels Theorie des Verstehens nimmt Grundgedanken der modernen philosophischen Hermeneutik vorweg. Entwickelt hat Schlegel seine 'hermeneutische Kritik' im Anschluss an die Textkritik und Hermeneutik der damaligen Altertumswissenschaft (F. A. Wolf). Mit seiner 'hermeneutischen Kritik' werden der kunstlerische Schaffensprozess und der Existenzvollzug des Menschen sowie die positive Rolle des Nichtverstehens thematisiert - Aspekte, die nicht ohne Nachwirkung auf die postromantische Entwicklung der Hermeneutik geblieben sind.

In this essay, I first analyze the extension of hermeneutical interpretation in the Heideggerian sense to products of contemporary technology which are components of our “lifeworld”. Products of technology, such as airplanes, laptops, cellular phones, washing machines, or vacuum cleaners might be compared with what Heidegger calls the “Ready-to-hand” with regard to utilitarian objects such as a hammer, planer, needle and door handle in Being and Time. Our life with our equipment, which represents the “Ready-to-hand” in Heidegger's sense of the (...) word, is determined by temporalization which cannot be separated and isolated from the wholeness of things in the world. In the second part of my paper, I explore the positive achievement of material hermeneutics with regard to its extension to technoscience and the discussion of how such hermeneutics can contribute to the preservation of our threatened lifeworld, but also to explore the possibilities of how technical inventions, medical innovations could improve our way of life. (shrink)