15 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Jussi Jylkkä [14]Jussi Wiljami Jylkkä [1]
See also
Jussi Jylkkä
University of Turku
  1.  58
    Consciousness as a Concrete Physical Phenomenon.Jussi Jylkkä & Henry Railo - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74:102779.
    The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Theories of Natural Kind Term Reference and Empirical Psychology.Jussi Wiljami Jylkkä - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):153-169.
    In this paper, I argue that the causal and description theories of natural kind term reference involve certain psychological elements. My main goal is to refine these theories with the help of empirical psychology of concepts, and to argue that the refinement process ultimately leads to the dissolution of boundaries between the two kinds of theories. However, neither the refined theories nor any other existing theories provide an adequate answer to the question of what makes natural kind terms rigid. To (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  3.  23
    Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism: Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers’ Language Use.Jussi Jylkkä, Henry Railo & Jussi Haukioja - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):37-60.
  4. Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers' Language Use.Jussi Jylkka, Henry Railo & Jussi Haukioja - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39 (1):105-110.
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby’s et al. (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5.  13
    Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers’ Language Use.Jussi Jylkkä & Jussi Haukioja - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:105-110.
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby’s et al. study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and the hybrid (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Concepts and Reference: Defending a Dual Theory of Natural Kind Concepts.Jussi Jylkkä - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Turku
    In this thesis I argue that the psychological study of concepts and categorisation, and the philosophical study of reference are deeply intertwined. I propose that semantic intuitions are a variety of categorisation judgements, determined by concepts, and that because of this, concepts determine reference. I defend a dual theory of natural kind concepts, according to which natural kind concepts have distinct semantic cores and non-semantic identification procedures. Drawing on psychological essentialism, I suggest that the cores consist of externalistic placeholder essence (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7.  49
    Hybrid Extensional Prototype Compositionality.Jussi Jylkkä - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):41-56.
    It has been argued that prototypes cannot compose, and that for this reason concepts cannot be prototypes (Osherson and Smith in Cognition 9:35–58, 1981; Fodor and Lepore in Cognition 58:253–270, 1996; Connolly et al. in Cognition 103:1–22, 2007). In this paper I examine the intensional and extensional approaches to prototype compositionality, arguing that neither succeeds in their present formulations. I then propose a hybrid extensional theory of prototype compositionality, according to which the extension of a complex concept is determined as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  2
    Beginning of the Pandemic: COVID-19-Elicited Anxiety as a Predictor of Working Memory Performance.Daniel Fellman, Liisa Ritakallio, Otto Waris, Jussi Jylkkä & Matti Laine - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Increasing evidence indicates that the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic is associated with adverse psychological effects, including heightened levels of anxiety. This study examined whether COVID-19-related anxiety levels during the early stage of the pandemic predicted demanding working memory updating performance. Altogether, 201 healthy adults mostly from North America and the British Isles were recruited to this study via the crowdsourcing site www.prolific.co. The results showed that higher levels of COVID-19-related anxiety during the first weeks of the pandemic outbreak were associated (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  16
    Reports From Twin Earth: Both Deep Structure and Appearance Determine the Reference of Natural Kind Terms.Jussi Haukioja, Mons Nyquist & Jussi Jylkkä - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  4
    Incidental Disgust Does Not Cause Moral Condemnation of Neutral Actions.Jussi Jylkkä, Johanna Härkönen & Jukka Hyönä - forthcoming - Tandf: Cognition and Emotion:1-14.
  11.  3
    Incidental Disgust Does Not Cause Moral Condemnation of Neutral Actions.Jussi Jylkkä, Johanna Härkönen & Jukka Hyönä - 2021 - Cognition and Emotion 35 (1):96-109.
  12.  40
    Mind as an Intrinsic Property of Matter.Jussi Jylkkä - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):15-37.
    This paper argues that the epistemic gap in philosophy of mind stems from the fact that our awareness of our subjective experiences is categorically different from our knowledge of external phenomena. Our knowledge of external objects is always mediated through empirical observation or theoretical descriptions, and does not afford us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of the thing referred to, whereas our awareness of our experiences is immediate and affords us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of our experiences. Finally, it (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  76
    Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument.Jussi Jylkkä - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):647-663.
    The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers’ variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist has to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  19
    Why Fodor’s Theory of Concepts Fails.Jussi Jylkkä - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:97-104.
    Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological mechanisms which guide us in applying concepts to objects do not determine reference; instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanism mediating the property – concept tokening relations, but argues that it is purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Why Fodor’s Theory of Concepts Fails.Jussi Jylkkä - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
    Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark