13 found
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  1. Sentiment and Value.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (4):722-748.
  2.  17
    The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  3. Two Arguments for Sentimentalism.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
    ‘Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its rivals have (...)
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  4. Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2014 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-244.
     
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  5.  17
    Challenges for the Dynamic Functional Model of Jealousy.Justin D’Arms - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (4):288-289.
    This comment on Chung and Harris presses for a clearer account of the motivational role of jealousy within the dynamic functional model of jealousy. It also calls into question the inclusion of “elaborated” jealousy within the emotion itself. It argues that differentiating emotional motivation from motivation toward the same goal that an emotion has requires additional resources.
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  6.  98
    Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments.Justin D’Arms - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.
    “Sentiment” is a term of art, intended to refer to object-directed, irruptive states, that occur in relatively transient bouts involving positive or negative affect, and that typically involve a distinctive motivational profile. Not all the states normally called “emotions” are sentiments in the sense just characterized. And all the terms for sentiments are sometimes used in English to refer to longer lasting attitudes. But this discussion is concerned with boutish affective states, not standing attitudes. That poses some challenges that will (...)
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  7. Prinz’s Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW]Justin D’Arms - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
  8.  8
    Prinz’s Theory of Emotion.Justin D’Arms - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
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  9.  77
    Relationality, Relativism, and Realism About Moral Value.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):433-448.
    Among the many virtues of Facts, Values and Norms, is the articulation of an especially subtle and detailed form of naturalistic value realism. The theory aspires to vindicate the objective purport of value discourse while granting, indeed insisting, that value is subjective in important respects. Evaluative thought and inquiry are understood to be continuous with empirical inquiry in the human sciences, so that ethical and evaluative conclusions can ultimately be defended on a posteriori grounds. Railton argues that talk of what (...)
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  10.  44
    Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 8: September 2003–August 2004.Justin D’Arms, Jovan Babic, Eric Cavallero, Ruth Chang, Kai Draper, A. E. Fuchs, Ann Garry, Ishtiyaque Haji, George W. Harris & Richard G. Hensen - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (473):473-473.
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  11.  31
    Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 9: September 2004–June 2005.Justin D’Arms, Julia Driver, Anthony Ellis, Francisco Gonzales, George W. Harris, Aleksandar Jokic, Leonard Kahn, Phillip Montague, G. Di Muzio & Gerald Press - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3):581.
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  12.  31
    Review: Relationality, Relativism, and Realism About Moral Value. [REVIEW]Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):433 - 448.
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    Prinz’s Theory of Emotion.Justin D’Arms - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
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