Results for 'Justin D���Arms'

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  1. VIII. The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion : Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson.Justin D'arms - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:127-145.
    Sentimentalist theories in ethics treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities. While the precise nature of this dependence varies, the general idea is that evaluative concepts are to be understood by way of more basic emotional reactions. Part of the task of distinguishing between the concepts that sentimentalism proposes to explicate, then, is to identify a suitably wide range of associated emotions. In this paper, we attempt to deal with an important obstacle to such views, which arises (...)
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  2.  73
    Reply to Justin D'Arms and Lori Watson.Michael Slote - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):148-155.
    Justin D'Arms says that moral disapproval is more closely tied to anger than to the “empathic chill” effect I emphasized in Moral Sentimentalism, but I argue that anger is in several ways inappropriate or unsatisfactory as a basis for understanding disapproval. I go on to explain briefly why I think we need not share D'Arms's worries about the possibility of nonveridical empathy but then focus on what he says about the reference-fixing theory of moral terminology defended in Moral Sentimentalism. (...)
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  3. The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one's rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  4. Sentiment and Value.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (4):722-748.
  5. Reply to Justin D’Arms.Peter A. Railton - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):481-490.
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  6.  35
    The Moralistic Fallacy: On the “Appropriateness” of Emotions.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  7. Sensibility Theory and Projectivism.Justin D'Arms & Dan Jacobson - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 186--218.
    This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists, and the advocates of sensibility theory. Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral (...)
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  8. Two Arguments for Sentimentalism.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
    ‘Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its rivals have (...)
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  9. Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice.Justin D'Arms, Robert Batterman & Krzyzstof Górny - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):76-102.
    Game theoretic explanations of the evolution of human behavior have become increasingly widespread. At their best, they allow us to abstract from misleading particulars in order to better recognize and appreciate broad patterns in the phenomena of human social life. We discuss this explanatory strategy, contrasting it with the particularist methodology of contemporary evolutionary psychology. We introduce some guidelines for the assessment of evolutionary game theoretic explanations of human behavior: such explanations should be representative, robust, and flexible. Distinguishing these features (...)
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  10.  15
    Reply to Justin D’Arms. [REVIEW]Peter A. Railton - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):481 - 490.
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  11. Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics.Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.) - forthcoming
  12.  18
    Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9.
    The literature on the wrong kind of reason problem largely assumes that such reasons pose only a theoretical problem for certain theories of value rather than a practical problem. Since the normative force of the canonical examples is obvious, the only difficulty is to identify what reasons of the right and wrong kind have in common without circularity. This chapter argues that in addition to the obvious WKRs on which the literature focuses, there are also more interesting WKRs that do (...)
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  13. Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 1994 - Ethics 104 (4):739-763.
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  14. Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments.Justin D’Arms - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.
    “Sentiment” is a term of art, intended to refer to object-directed, irruptive states, that occur in relatively transient bouts involving positive or negative affect, and that typically involve a distinctive motivational profile. Not all the states normally called “emotions” are sentiments in the sense just characterized. And all the terms for sentiments are sometimes used in English to refer to longer lasting attitudes. But this discussion is concerned with boutish affective states, not standing attitudes. That poses some challenges that will (...)
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  15. Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2014 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-244.
     
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  16. Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism.Justin D'arms - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):134-141.
    This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role it accords to empathy. (...)
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  17. Regret and Irrational Action.Justin D. Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  18. Envy in the Philosophical Tradition.Justin D'Arms & Allison Kerr - 2008 - In Richard Kim (ed.), Envy, Theory and Research. Oxford University Press. pp. 39-59.
     
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  19.  62
    Envy.Justin D'Arms - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  20.  25
    Challenges for the Dynamic Functional Model of Jealousy.Justin D’Arms - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (4):288-289.
    This comment on Chung and Harris presses for a clearer account of the motivational role of jealousy within the dynamic functional model of jealousy. It also calls into question the inclusion of “elaborated” jealousy within the emotion itself. It argues that differentiating emotional motivation from motivation toward the same goal that an emotion has requires additional resources.
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  21. Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2010 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. pp. 585--613.
     
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  22. Could Emotion Development Really Be the Acquisition of Emotion Concepts?Justin D'Arms & Richard Samuels - 2019 - Developmental Psychology 55 (9):2015-2019.
    Emotion development research centrally concerns capacities to produce emotions and to think about them. We distinguish these enterprises and consider a novel account of how they might be related. On one recent account, the capacity to have emotions of various kinds comes by way of the acquisition of emotion concepts. This account relies on a constructionist theory of emotions and an embodied theory of emotion concepts. We explicate these elements, then raise a challenge for the approach. It appears to be (...)
     
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  23.  9
    Sex, Fairness, and the Theory of Games.Justin D'Arms - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (12):615-627.
  24.  48
    Sex, Fairness, and the Theory of Games.Justin D'Arms - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (12):615-627.
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  25.  62
    When Evolutionary Game Theory Explains Morality, What Does It Explain?Justin D'arms - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):296-299.
    Evolutionary attempts to explain morality tend to say very little about what morality is. If evolutionary game theory aspires not merely to solve the ‘problem of altruism', but to explain human morality or justice in particular, it requires an appropriate conception of that subject matter. This paper argues that one plausible conception of morality (a sanction-based conception) creates some important constraints on the kinds of evolutionary explanations that can shed light on morality. Game theoretic approaches must either meet these constraints, (...)
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  26. Prinz’s Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW]Justin D’Arms - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
  27. Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value.Daniel Jacobson & Justin D'Arms - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:99-126.
    According to Cicero, “all emotions spring from the roots of error: they should not be pruned or clipped here and there, but yanked out” (Cicero 2002: 60). The Stoic enthusiasm for the extirpation of emotion is radical in two respects, both of which can be expressed with the claim that emotional responses are never appropriate. First, the Stoics held that emotions are incompatible with virtue , since the virtuous man will retain his equanimity whatever his fate. Grief is always vicious, (...)
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  28.  9
    Prinz’s Theory of Emotion.Justin D’Arms - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
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  29.  6
    Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume examines the implications of developments in the science of ethics for philosophical theorizing about moral psychology and human agency. These ten new essays in empirically informed philosophy illuminate such topics as responsibility, the self, and the role in morality of mental states such as desire, emotion, and moral judgement.
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  30.  28
    Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character:Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Justin D'Arms - 1999 - Ethics 109 (3):645-648.
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  31.  80
    Relationality, Relativism, and Realism About Moral Value.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):433-448.
    Among the many virtues of Facts, Values and Norms, is the articulation of an especially subtle and detailed form of naturalistic value realism. The theory aspires to vindicate the objective purport of value discourse while granting, indeed insisting, that value is subjective in important respects. Evaluative thought and inquiry are understood to be continuous with empirical inquiry in the human sciences, so that ethical and evaluative conclusions can ultimately be defended on a posteriori grounds. Railton argues that talk of what (...)
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  32. Bennett Helm, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Pp. X + 261.Justin D'arms - 2004 - Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.
  33.  46
    Emotions, Values, and Agency, by Christine Tappolet: New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, Pp. Xvi + 228, £40. [REVIEW]Justin D'Arms - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):417-417.
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  34.  34
    Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 9: September 2004–June 2005.Justin D’Arms, Julia Driver, Anthony Ellis, Francisco Gonzales, George W. Harris, Aleksandar Jokic, Leonard Kahn, Phillip Montague, G. Di Muzio & Gerald Press - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3):581.
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  35.  34
    Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics: August 2005–July 2006.Justin D'Arms, Robert Francesscotti, I. Haji, Susan Hurley, Leonard Kahn, Brian Kierland, K. Lippert-Rasmussen, Douglas Portmore, Betsy Postow & Bernard Rollin - 2006 - The Journal of Ethics 10 (4):507.
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  36. Velleman on Reacting and Valuing.Justin D'Arms - 2014 - Abstracta 8 (S7):23-29.
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  37.  34
    Review: Relationality, Relativism, and Realism About Moral Value. [REVIEW]Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):433 - 448.
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  38.  49
    Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 8: September 2003–August 2004.Justin D’Arms, Jovan Babic, Eric Cavallero, Ruth Chang, Kai Draper, A. E. Fuchs, Ann Garry, Ishtiyaque Haji, George W. Harris & Richard G. Hensen - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (473):473-473.
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  39.  15
    Prinz’s Theory of Emotion.Justin D’Arms - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
  40. Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value.Daniel Jacobson & Justin D'Arms - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press.
     
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  41. Envy in the Philosophical Tradition.Alison Duncan Kerr & Justin D'Arms - 2008 - In Richard Smith (ed.), Envy: Theory and Research. Oxford, UK:
     
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  42. Sentiment, Intention, and Disagreement: Replies to Blair & D'Arms.Shaun Nichols - manuscript
    I am most grateful to James Blair and Justin D’Arms for commenting on my work. I would be hard put to name two other moral psychologists whose reactions I’d be so keen to hear. There is a striking asymmetry in their commentaries. Blair prefers a minimalist story about moral judgment, maintaining that the appeal to rules is unnecessary. D’Arms, by contrast, maintains that the account I offer is overly simple and that children lack moral concepts despite their partial facility (...)
     
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  43. Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions.Reid D. Blackman - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):67-90.
    Most philosophers of emotion endorse a compound account of the emotions: emotions are wholes made of parts; or, as I prefer to put it, emotions are mental states that supervene on other (mental) states. The goal of this paper is to ascertain how the intentionality of these subvening members relates to the intentionality of the emotions. Towards this end, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the problems with the account Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson offer of the intentionality (...)
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  44.  58
    Jokes Can Fail to Be Funny Because They Are Immoral: The Incompatibility of Emotions.Dong An & Kaiyuan Chen - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):374-396.
    Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have argued that to evaluate the funniness of a joke based on the consideration of whether it is morally appropriate to feel amused commits the “moralistic fallacy.” We offer a new and empirically informed reply. We argue that there is a way to take morality into consideration without committing this fallacy, that is, it is legitimate to say that for some people, witty but immoral jokes can fail to be funny because they are immoral. (...)
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  45.  83
    Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification.Justin D. Barnard - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):311-330.
    Christian Protestants typically affirm both the essential moral perfection of heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith. Yet these two commitments generatean apparently self-destructive dilemma—one I call the dilemma of sanctification. The prima facie puzzle can be resolved in at least three ways. In this paper, I articulate the dilemma of sanctification in some detail and offer an argument against a widely-held Protestant solution I call provisionism. This constitutes indirect support for the solution I find most promising, namely, a doctrine (...)
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  46. Spinoza on Being Sui Iuris and the Republican Conception of Liberty.Justin D. Steinberg - 2008 - History of European Ideas 34 (3):239-249.
    Spinoza's use of the phrase “sui iuris” in the Tractatus Politicus gives rise to the following paradox. On the one hand, one is said to be sui iuris to the extent that one is rational; and to the extent that one is rational, one will steadfastly obey the laws of the state. However, Spinoza also states that to the extent that one adheres to the laws of the state, one is not sui iuris, but rather stands under the power [sub (...)
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  47.  5
    Philosophy and the Study of Capitalism.Justin D. Evans - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism.
    Sociologists, economists, historians, anthropologists, political theorists, and literary critics have all turned their attention to the study of capitalism. But philosophers remain much less engage...
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  48.  2
    Philosophy and the Study of Capitalism.Justin D. Evans - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism:019145372110728.
    Sociologists, economists, historians, anthropologists, political theorists, and literary critics have all turned their attention to the study of capitalism. But philosophers remain much less engaged. Why is this? And what could philosophy bring to the study of capitalism? Could it help in the development of a general theory? My main argument here is that philosophy does have an important role to play in the study of capitalism, particularly if we want to develop a general theory. Philosophers must describe something that (...)
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  49.  15
    Expectancy Bias Mediates the Link Between Social Anxiety and Memory Bias for Social Evaluation.Justin D. Caouette, Sarah K. Ruiz, Clinton C. Lee, Zainab Anbari, Roberta A. Schriber & Amanda E. Guyer - 2015 - Cognition and Emotion 29 (5):945-953.
  50. Applying the Contemplative Technopedagogy Framework: Insights for Teaching Ethics Using TV Series.Justin D. Shanks, Germán Scalzo & María Teresa Nicolás-Gavilán - 2021 - Journal of Business Ethics Education 18:143-158.
    Digital media and technology are nearly ubiquitious in contemporary higher education, As such, researchers and educators are keen to identify best practices and understand impacts. Digital media and technology present opportunities to cultivate interactive, creative teaching-learning communities. However, inclusion of digital media and technology in a course does not necessarily cultivate creative engagement or deep reflection among students. This manuscript studies how a contemplative approach to teaching with digital media, specifically TV series, can lead to more effective and engaging in (...)
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