A. M. Turing has bequeathed us a conceptulary including 'Turing, or Turing-Church, thesis', 'Turing machine', 'universal Turing machine', 'Turing test' and 'Turing structures', plus other unnamed achievements. These include a proof that any formal language adequate to express arithmetic contains undecidable formulas, as well as achievements in computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematics, biology, and cognitive science. Here it is argued that these achievements hang together and have prospered well in the 50 years since Turing's death.
As is well known, Alan Turing drew a line, embodied in the "Turing test," between intellectual and physical abilities, and hence between cognitive and natural sciences. Less familiarly, he proposed that one way to produce a "passer" would be to educate a "child machine," equating the experimenter's improvements in the initial structure of the child machine with genetic mutations, while supposing that the experimenter might achieve improvements more expeditiously than natural selection. On the other hand, in his foundational "On the (...) chemical basis of morphogenesis," Turing insisted that biological explanation clearly confine itself to purely physical and chemical means, eschewing vitalist and teleological talk entirely and hewing to D'Arcy Thompson's line that "evolutionary 'explanations,'" are historical and narrative in character, employing the same intentional and teleological vocabulary we use in doing human history, and hence, while perhaps on occasion of heuristic value, are not part of biology as a natural science. To apply Turing's program to recent issues, the attempt to give foundations to the social and cognitive sciences in the "real science" of evolutionary biology (as opposed to Turing's biology) is neither to give foundations, nor to achieve the unification of the social/cognitive sciences and the natural sciences. (shrink)
Nature's experiments in isolation—the wild boy of Aveyron, Genie, their name is hardly legion—are by their nature illusive. Helen Keller, blind and deaf from her 18th month and isolated from language until well into her sixth year, presents a unique case in that every stage in her development was carefully recorded and she herself, graduate of Radcliffe College and author of 14 books, gave several careful and insightful accounts of her linguistic development and her cognitive and sensory situation. Perhaps because (...) she is masked, and enshrined, in William Gibson's mythic and false Miracle worker, cognitive scientists have yet to come to terms with this richly enlightening, albeit anecdotal, resource. (shrink)
This spare book amply maintains the distinction of the Bradford Book series. In chapter 1 Cummins argues that the familiar deductive-nomological notion of scientific explanation only covers transitional theories and fails to give an account of explanation through property or system analysis that is pervasive in both the physical and psychological sciences. This inadequacy of the D-N view is supposed particularly injurious in the unrobust and infant science of psychology. Explanation through analysis ranges from decidedly morphological to the decidedly systemic, (...) and from the interpretive to the descriptive. Explanation through analysis is typically an interactive two step: one gives a revealingly helpful component-function or programmatic analysis and one hopes to find an explanatory instantiation of this analysis. Psychological explanation is importantly systemic and its most challenging problem is that of finding isomorphisms between interpretive instantiations and descriptive instantiations-the hope for two-stepping isomorphisms in human psychological explanation is bio-logical, the sorts of structures that genes can determine being the likely candidates for our psychological capacities. (shrink)
Philosophers concerned with speech acts, or Wittgenstein's uses of language , mostly fix their attention on actions done by issuing just a phrase or short sentence (in the appropriate circumstances with the proper qualifications, feeling, intent, uptake, etc.). "Five red apples" is Wittgenstein's paradigm example in his Philosophical Investigations . "There's a bittern at the bottom of your garden" plays a similar role in J. L. Austin's most central and ambitious essay, "Other Minds." Indeed, as Wittgenstein points out, a single (...) word or gesture may do the job perfectly well, just as an illiterate man can make a valid contract by marking an "X" on a piece of paper. And, of course, in all relevant philosophical respects, a speech act may be written rather than spoken: in his leitmotiv example, Wittgenstein.. (shrink)
That this is one of the most distinguished books in the excellent Bradford Books cognitive science/philosophy series is suggested by the March 1983 issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in which we find a precis of the book, some twenty commentaries, and Dretske's replies. Physicalists and anti-physicalists in psychology have both stressed the importance of "top-down" strategies and have debated, prospectively, about the likelihood that we eventually will have suitable reductions, or explanatory instantiations, of psychological generations in neurophysiological terms. Dretske (...) takes the more straightforward approach, starting with an avowedly physical notion of information and then trying to show how one can make, building on this foundation, a reasonable construal of knowledge, perception, and belief. Dretske starts with the following information-theoretic specification of a signal's information content: a signal r carries the information that s is F = the conditional probability of s's being F, given r, is l. Thus, to use Dretske's humble example, "My gas gauge carries the information that I still have some gas left, if and only if the conditional probability of my having some gas left, given the reading of the gauge, is l." The parenthetical clause makes the causal character of this analysis clear: the state of the source is related by physical laws to the occurrence of the signal--the gas in the tank causes the gauge reading. Insisting on the conditional probability of l has the advantage of preserving the properties of certainty, transitivity, and addition that we associate with knowledge. If the gas gauge does carry the information that my tank has gas, then my tank must have gas. If my statement that my gauge indicates gas carries the information that it does so indicate, then information flows intact from signal to signal. And finally, if the signal carries the information that s is F, and also carries the information that s is G, then it carries, at the same level of probability assigned each, the information that s is F and G. Now we can, eventually, say that K knows that s is F = K's belief that s is F is caused by the information that s is F. The "eventually" part is important, for what is most instructive and provoking about this book is the way in which Dretske lays out the steps in constructing viable construals of knowledge, perception, and belief out of the root notion of information.--Justin Leiber, The University of Houston. (shrink)
Professor Leiber's exuberant but incisive book illuminates the inquiry's beginnings in Plato, in the physiology and psychology of Descartes, in the formal work of Russell and Gödel, and in Wittgenstein's critique of folk psychology.
In his short life, Alan Turing (1912-1954) made foundational contributions to philosophy, mathematics, biology, artificial intelligence, and computer science. He, as much as anyone, invented the digital electronic computer. From September, 1939 much of his work on computation was war-driven and brutally practical. He developed high speed computing devices needed to decipher German Enigma Machine messages to and from U-boats, countering the most serious threat by far to Britain's survival during World War Two. Yet few people have an image of (...) him. (shrink)
Democritus was born at Abdera, about 460 BCE, although according to some 490. His father was from a noble family and of great wealth, and contributed largely towards the entertainment of the army of Xerxes on his return to Asia. As a reward for this service the Persian monarch gave and other Abderites presents and left among them several Magi. Democritus, according to Diogenes Laertius, was instructed by these Magi in astronomy and theology. After the death of his father he (...) traveled in search of wisdom, and devoted his inheritance to this purpose, amounting to one hundred talents. He is said to have visited Egypt, Ethiopia, Persia, and India. Whether, in the course of his travels, he visited Athens or studied under Anaxagoras is uncertain. During some part of his life he was instructed in Pythagoreanism, and was a disciple of Leucippus. After several years of traveling, Democritus returned to Abdera, with no means of subsistence. His brother Damosis, however, took him in. According to the law of Abdera, whoever wasted his patrimony would be deprived of the rites of burial. Democritus, hoping to avoid this disgrace, gave public lectures. Petronius relates that he was acquainted with the virtues of herbs, plants, and stones, and that he spent his life in making experiments upon natural bodies. He acquired fame with his knowledge of natural phenomena, and predicted changes in the weather. He used this ability to make people believe that he could predict future events. They not only viewed him as something more than mortal, but even proposed to put him in control of their public affairs. He preferred a contemplative to an active life, and therefore declined these public honors and passed the remainder of his days in solitude. (shrink)
In part because he is known through his Meditations, a short pamphlet he wrote, rightly in fear, to conciliate (unsuccessfully) with the church, and because his rationalism is misconstrued when interpreted empirically, Descartes is subject to a variety of misunderstandings. It does not help that he is dogged by a canard invented in the late 1600s and revived by the animal rights movement, a canard that was designed to denigrate the then burgeoning mechanistic new science, discovered cruelly cutting up living (...) animals, while laughingly insisting the writhing animals feel no pain. Descartes maintained that, physically speaking, humans as well as animals are machines, but he also clearly maintained that animals feel pain and hunger, have sensory experiences, etc. As a more abstract level, 20th Century analytic empiricism revivified the attack on rationalist views. But the last half century has seen strong support (though largely unacknowledged) for Descartes’ views about cognition and perception. (shrink)
Pace Atran, (1) folk physics, (2) folk biology, and (3) folk psychology rest on informationally encapsulated modules that emerge before language: a gifted austic person who can see objects and animals perfectly well can nonetheless be incommunicatively mind blind.
Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â â€œIâ€™ve written a story!â€ My eighty year old fatherâ€™s rich, booming voice fired up the phone line, briefly burning through the fuzzy enunciation that stemmed from a minor stroke of three years back. It hadnâ€™t been the stroke but rather his growing blindness that had slowed his production. Through dictation heâ€™d still kept up his short monthly magazine column (in one of the last and most gravely scatological of these (...) heâ€™d inadvertently shamed my Enlightenment scholarship by writing â€œI thought everyone knew that Frederick the Great and Voltaire corresponded about their bowel movementsâ€). He sounded happier and more alive than Iâ€™d heard him in years, though the sketch heâ€™d written, from a catâ€™s viewpoint, is spectrally peopled under aliases by his Shakespearian actor parents, and a spunky Lesbian witch who lightheartedly inducts my mother into her coven through ritualized sexual intercourse, which scandalizes my grandmother and titillates my father, who confesses along the way to alcoholism, habitual premature ejaculation, voyeurism, and unassuageable jealousy of his illustrious father, whose death in 1949 aroused only â€œa cold prideâ€ (unlike the wrench I know he felt when his wife and his mother died in the late 1960s). The sketch resolves with his dead fatherâ€™s body intoning Hamletâ€™s lines about what a piece of work is man, ending with â€œA paragon of animals,â€ which the felineÂ observer coolly concludes must surely refer to cats. Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â That phone call was my last conversation with my father. A month before he had, quixotically, married a woman heâ€™d known for two decades, on his part decidedlyÂ nonexclusively, a few days after she got a diagnosis of inoperable lung cancer. Now, in deference to her fear of flying, they took off on a tiring train and car trip from San Francisco to a convention inÂ London, Ontario, where my exhausted father began his slide into incontinence, depression, and dementia.. (shrink)
I was first struck by the influence of Fritz’ writing on himself in the summer of 1968. My wife Leslie and I were living in Buffalo. I hadn’t seen my father in a couple of years. Fritz was driving in from Los Angeles to do a science fiction workshop at Clarion College in nearby Pennsylvania. We were to see him at Clarion and then he was to visit us in Buffalo. I had just finished reading Fritz’ A Specter Is Haunting (...) Texas, then serialized in Galaxy Magazine. (shrink)
Westermarck proposed that humans have an incest avoidance instinct, triggered by frequent intimate contact with family members during the first several years of life. Westermarck reasons that familial incest will tend to produce less fit offspring, those humans without instinctive incest avoidance would hence have tended to die off and those with the avoidance instinct would have produced more viable offspring, and hence familial incest would be, as indeed it is, universally and instinctively avoided . Victorian Westermarck claimed this as (...) a human adaptation. Evolutionary psychologists have generalized these claims to Pleistocene humans and their ancestors, to primates, and indeed to animals generally. Yet there is surprisingly little evidence for these claims of universal instinctive avoidance. Considerable inbreeding appears among large, territorial primates and may have been so with early humans and with their ancestors. While there is little reliable non-anecdotal evidence about incestuous behavior or the lack of it among humans, what little there is does not fit well with the Westermarck thesis. (shrink)
"Born in London in 1806, son of James Mill , philosopher, economist and senior official in the East India Company. Mill gave a vivid and moving account of his life, and especially of his extraordinary education, in the..
This is an excellent book for philosophers, and others concerned with natural language and cognition, who have not kept up with post-Aspects work in syntax, in particular with the Extended Standard Theory work on government and binding that relates to anaphora and quantification. It is a direct challenge to those who think that there must be a reasonably clearcut semantic level of description for sentences in natural language, one which is crucial for explaining how we learn, understand, and use natural (...) language. Hornstein argues that the properties of quantification such as relative quantifier scope and pronoun binding in natural language are best explained in purely syntactic terms. "Not only are the explanations best construed syntactically but, more important, the distinctions and concepts needed to articulate them cut against the semantic distinctions one would naturally make". This syntactic theory will, of course, be supplemented in a full theory of language use by pragmatic theories that will assign meaning, force, reference, etc., in particular contexts, given all sorts of real world knowledge. But what we won't have will be a compositional, context insensitive level of semantic description in which true, denotation, object, model, etc., loom large. Though Hornstein is a philosopher, his arguments derive from a linguist's familiarity with recent syntactical work; however, the general line is consonant with Stich's From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, in which Stich argues beliefs are so context and intrepretive-stance relative that they cannot be grist for a scientific psychology, which must rather limit itself to syntactical characterizations of sentences in cognition. (shrink)
Though Mr. Lin purports to attack “Chomsky's view of language” and to defend the “common sense view of language”, he in fact attacks “views” that are basic and common to linguists, psycholinguists, and developmental psychologists. Indeed, though he cites W. V. O. Quine, L. Wittgenstein, and J. L. Austin in his support, they all sharply part company from his views, Austin particularly. Lin's views are not common sense but a set of scholarly and philological prejudices that linguistics disparaged from its (...) inception as an organized science a hundred years ago. Professor [of Philosophy]: I will explain to you the secrets of language in all its wealth and complexity. (shrink)
Though Mr. Lin purports to attack "Chomsky's view of language" and to defend the "common sense view of language", he in fact attacks "views" that are basic and common to linguists, psycholinguists, and developmental psychologists. Indeed, though he cites W. V. O. Quine, L. Wittgenstein, and J. L. Austin in his support, they all sharply part company from his views, Austin particularly. Lin's views are not common sense but a set of scholarly and philological prejudices that linguistics disparaged from its (...) inception as an organized science a hundred years ago. (shrink)
The Wild Child, who lives through much of childhood without exposure to language or culture, is exceedingly rare. I examine three of the most famous and most well authenticated cases: Helen Keller, who was isolated from eighteen months until her seventh year; ‘Victor’, the wild boy of the forest near Aveyron, whom Itard studied; and ‘Genie,’ who was isolated from language from age two until the middle of her thirteenth year. Attention is paid both to the development of these individuals (...) and to the conduct and misconceptions of those who examined and trained them. Various morals are drawn, which might also have application to research on non-human primates. (shrink)
Paradoxes are many things. Artificial intelligence views them as viruses of the brain, strange replicators that unexpectedly exploit design possibilities. For the child, they are intellectual cartwheels, an everyday delight. For mathematicians and logicians, they reveal skeletons in the closet of reason. For philosophers and dramatists, they capture the contradictions of experience. The historian of ideas sees that they come in successive waves, surging through Classical Greece, the Renaissance and the twentieth century. Professor Leiber's user-'friendly guide to paradoxes provides an (...) up-to-date survey of an ancient and perennial source of puzzlement. Book jacket. (shrink)