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Profile: K. Brad Wray (Aarhus University)
  1.  67
    Who has Scientific Knowledge?K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):337 – 347.
    I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of (...)
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  2. Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  3. The Epistemic Significance of Collaborative Research.Wray K. Brad - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):150-168.
    I examine the epistemic import of collaborative research in science. I develop and defend a functional explanation for its growing importance. Collaborative research is becoming more popular in the natural sciences, and to a lesser degree in the social sciences, because contemporary research in these fields frequently requires access to abundant resources, for which there is great competition. Scientists involved in collaborative research have been very successful in accessing these resources, which has in turn enabled them to realize the epistemic (...)
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  4. Collective Belief and Acceptance.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):319-33.
    Margaret Gilbert explores the phenomenon referred to in everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. She refers to this type of phenomenon as "collective belief" and calls the types of groups that are the bearers of such beliefs "plural subjects". I argue that the attitudes that groups adopt that Gilbert refers to as "collective beliefs" are not a species of belief in an important and central sense, but rather a species of acceptance. Unlike proper beliefs, a collective belief is adopted by (...)
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  5.  40
    Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties.K. Brad Wray - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):61-73.
    The pessimistic induction plays an important role in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. But there is some disagreement about the structure and aim of the argument. And a number of scholars have noted that there is more than one type of PI in the philosophical literature. I review four different versions of the PI. I aim to show that PIs have been appealed to by philosophers of science for a variety of reasons. Even some realists have appealed (...)
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  6.  58
    Selection and Predictive Success.K. Brad Wray - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (3):365-377.
    Van Fraassen believes our current best theories enable us to make accurate predictions because they have been subjected to a selection process similar to natural selection. His explanation for the predictive success of our best theories has been subjected to extensive criticism from realists. I aim to clarify the nature of van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science. Contrary to what the critics claim, the selectionist can explain why it is that we have successful theories, as well as (...)
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  7. The Argument From Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti-Realism: A Defence.K. Brad Wray - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):317 – 326.
    The anti-realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from the objections of Peter (...)
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  8. Invisible Hands and the Success of Science.K. Brad Wray - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):163-175.
    David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with an eye to realizing (...)
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  9. A Defense of Longino's Social Epistemology.K. Brad Wray - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):552.
    Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be (...)
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  10.  98
    Philosophy of Science: What Are the Key Journals in the Field?K. Brad Wray - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (3):423-430.
    By means of a citation analysis I aim to determine which scholarly journals are most important in the sub-field of philosophy of science. My analysis shows that the six most important journals in the sub-field are Philosophy of Science , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , Journal of Philosophy , Synthese , Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , and Erkenntnis . Given the data presented in this study, there is little evidence that there is such a (...)
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  11.  50
    The Epistemic Cultures of Science and WIKIPEDIA: A Comparison.K. Brad Wray - 2009 - Episteme 6 (1):38-51.
    I compare the epistemic culture of Wikipedia with the epistemic culture of science, with special attention to the culture of collaborative research in science. The two cultures differ markedly with respect to (1) the knowledge produced, (2) who produces the knowledge, and (3) the processes by which knowledge is produced. Wikipedia has created a community of inquirers that are governed by norms very different from those that govern scientists. Those who contribute to Wikipedia do not ground their claims on their (...)
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  12.  15
    COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH, DELIBERATION, AND INNOVATION.K. Brad Wray - 2014 - Episteme 11 (03):291-303.
    I evaluate the extent to which we could learn something about how we should be conducting collaborative research in science from the research on groupthink. I argue that Solomon has set us in the wrong direction, failing to recognize that the consensus in scientific specialties is not the result of deliberation. But the attention to the structure of problem-solving that has emerged in the groupthink research conducted by psychologists can help us see when deliberation could lead to problems for a (...)
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  13.  93
    Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited.K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):61-73.
    I re-examine Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. I argue that the sorts of events Kuhn regards as scientific revolutions are a diverse lot, differing in significant ways. But, I also argue that Kuhn does provide us with a principled way to distinguish revolutionary changes from non-revolutionary changes in science. Scientific revolutions are those changes in science that (1) involve taxonomic changes, (2) are precipitated by disappointment with existing practices, and (3) cannot be resolved by appealing to shared standards. I argue (...)
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  14. Epistemic Privilege and the Success of Science.K. Brad Wray - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):375-385.
    Realists and anti-realists disagree about whether contemporary scientists are epistemically privileged. Because the issue of epistemic privilege figures in arguments in support of and against theoretical knowledge in science, it is worth examining whether or not there is any basis for assuming such privilege. I show that arguments that try to explain the success of science by appeal to some sort of epistemic privilege have, so far, failed. They have failed to give us reason to believe (i) that scientists are (...)
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  15.  5
    Metascience is on the Move.K. Brad Wray & Luciano Boschiero - 2017 - Metascience 26 (2):173-174.
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  16.  70
    Assessing the Influence of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2012 - Metascience 21 (1):1-10.
  17.  15
    A Critical Introduction to Scientific Realism, by Paul Dicken. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  18.  6
    A New Philosophy of Science From the History of Arcane Natural Science.K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Foundations of Chemistry:1-5.
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  19. Science, Biases, and the Threat of Global Pessimism.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S467-.
    Philip Kitcher rejects the global pessimists' view that the conclusions reached in inquiry are determined by the interests of some segment of the population, arguing that only some inquiries, for example, inquiries into race and gender, are adversely affected by interests. I argue that the biases Kitcher believes affect such inquiries are operative in all domains, but the prevalence of such biases does not support global pessimism. I argue further that in order to address the global pessimists' concerns, the scientific (...)
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  20.  27
    Method and Continuity in Science.K. Brad Wray - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):363-375.
    Devitt has developed an interesting defense of realism against the threats posed by the Pessimistic Induction and the Argument from Unconceived Alternatives. Devitt argues that the best explanation for the success of our current theories, and the fact that they are superior to the theories they replaced, is that they were developed and tested with the aid of better methods than the methods used to develop and test the many theories that were discarded earlier in the history of science. It (...)
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  21. Kuhn's Constructionism.K. Brad Wray - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (3):311-327.
    I challenge Hacking's characterization of Kuhn's constructionism. I argue that Kuhn does not believe that nature has no joints. Rather, Kuhn believes there is no unique correct way to cut nature into kinds. I also argue that Kuhn is not an externalist. He believes that disputes in science are resolved on the basis of a consideration of the epistemic merits of the theories. Subjective factors merely ensure that competing theories are developed, and the strengths and weaknesses of the theories are (...)
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  22.  31
    Discarded Theories: The Role of Changing Interests.K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    I take another look at the history of science and offer some fresh insights into why the history of science is filled with discarded theories. I argue that the history of science is just as we should expect it to be, given the following two facts about science: theories are always only partial representations of the world, and almost inevitably scientists will be led to investigate phenomena that the accepted theory is not fit to account for. Together these facts suggest (...)
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  23.  1
    Is Science Really a Young Man's Game?K. Brad Wray - 2003 - Social Studies of Science 33:137-49.
    It has often been remarked that science is a young man's game. Thomas Kuhn, for example, claims that revolutionary changes in science are almost always initiated by either young scientists or those new to a field. I subject Kuhn's hypothesis to testing. I examine 24 revolutionary scientific figures mentioned in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to determine if young scientists are more likely to make revolutionary discoveries than older scientists. My analysis suggests that middle-aged scientists are responsible for initiating more (...)
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  24.  27
    Systematicity and the Continuity Thesis.K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    Hoyningen-Huene develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others. I argue that Hoyningen-Huene ultimately (...)
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  25.  64
    Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology.K. Brad Wray - 2011 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been enduringly influential in philosophy of science, challenging many common presuppositions about the nature of science and the growth of scientific knowledge. However, philosophers have misunderstood Kuhn's view, treating him as a relativist or social constructionist. In this book, Brad Wray argues that Kuhn provides a useful framework for developing an epistemology of science that takes account of the constructive role that social factors play in scientific inquiry. He examines the core concepts of Structure (...)
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  26.  11
    Rethinking Scientific Specialization.K. Brad Wray - 2005 - Social Studies of Science 35 (1):151-164.
    My aim in this paper is to re-examine specialization in science. I argue that we need to acknowledge the role that conceptual changes can play in the creation of new specialties. Whereas earlier sociological accounts focus on social and instrumental changes as the cause of the creation of new specialties, I argue that conceptual changes play an important role in the creation of some scientific specialties. Specifically, I argue that conceptual developments played an important role in the creation of both (...)
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  27.  23
    The Influence of James B. Conant on Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):1-23.
    I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s picture (...)
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  28.  8
    How Nature Changed.K. Brad Wray - 2017 - Metascience 26 (1):169-170.
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  29.  76
    The Future of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Topoi 32 (1):75-79.
    I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work provides (...)
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  30.  67
    The Pessimistic Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science Reassessed.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4321-4330.
    My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The problem with (...)
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  31.  25
    The Methodological Defense of Realism Scrutinized.K. Brad Wray - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 54:74-79.
    I revisit an older defense of scientific realism, the methodological defense, a defense developed by both Popper and Feyerabend. The methodological defense of realism concerns the attitude of scientists, not philosophers of science. The methodological defense is as follows: a commitment to realism leads scientists to pursue the truth, which in turn is apt to put them in a better position to get at the truth. In contrast, anti-realists lack the tenacity required to develop a theory to its fullest. As (...)
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  32.  4
    Exciting Days.Luciano Boschiero & K. Brad Wray - 2017 - Metascience 26 (1):1-2.
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  33.  2
    Scientific Authorship In The Age Of Collaborative Research.K. Brad Wray - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):505-514.
    I examine two challenges that collaborative research raises for science. First, collaborative research threatens the motivation of scientists. As a result, I argue, collaborative research may have adverse effects on what sorts of things scientists can effectively investigate. Second, collaborative research makes it more difficult to hold scientists accountable. I argue that the authors of multi-authored articles are aptly described as plural subjects, corporate bodies that are more than the sum of the individuals involved. Though journal editors do not currently (...)
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  34.  14
    The Cognition Dimension of Theory Change in Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):610-613.
    This is an essay review of Andersen, Barker and Chen's The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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  35.  32
    Explaining Science's Success, by John Wright: Understanding How Scientific Knowledge Works, Durham: Acumen, 2013, Pp. 256,£ 40.00 (Hardback). [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):833-834.
  36.  17
    Does Science Have a Moving Target?K. Brad Wray - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):47-58.
  37.  7
    Knowledge and Inquiry: Readings in Epistemology.K. Brad Wray (ed.) - 2002 - Broadview Press.
    This anthology focuses on three areas in the theory of knowledge: epistemic justification; analyses of knowledge and scepticism; and recent development in epistemology. Each of the three sections includes a brief introduction to the readings, a series of study questions, and a list of suggested readings. Section 1 deals with coherentism, foundationalism, reliabilism, and includes articles by Chisholm, BonJour, Audi, Goldman, and Fumerton. Section 2 deals with the analysis of knowledge and Gettier problems, and a variety of forms and responses (...)
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  38.  21
    Kuhn’s Social Epistemology and the Sociology of Science.K. Brad Wray - 2015 - In Alisa Bokulich & William J. Devlin (eds.), Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. Springer. pp. 167-183.
    This chapter discusses Kuhn’s conception of the history of science by focussing on two respects in which Kuhn is an historicist historian and philosopher of science. I identify two distinct, but related, aspects of historicism in the work of Hegel and show how these are also found in Kuhn’s work. First, Kuhn held tradition to be important for understanding scientific change and that the tradition from which a scientific idea originates must be understood in evaluating that idea. This makes Kuhn (...)
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  39.  78
    Shapin's the Scientific Revolution: What Will Philosophers Find? [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 1999 - Social Epistemology 13 (3 & 4):331 – 335.
    This is a book review of Steven Shapin's The Scientific Revolution.
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  40.  21
    Explaining Science's Success: Understanding How Scientific Knowledge Works, by Wright John. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):833-834.
  41.  22
    The Future of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Topoi 32 (1):75-79.
    I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work provides (...)
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  42. Social Epistemology.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
  43. James Robert Brown, Who Rules in Science?: An Opinionated Guide to the Wars Reviewed. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23 (2):84-86.
    A critical examination of James Brown's Who Rules in Science?
     
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  44.  16
    Science and Systematicity. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2014 - Metascience 23 (1):1-4.
  45.  8
    Metascience and Neurath’s Boat.K. Brad Wray & Luciano Boschiero - 2015 - Metascience 24 (2):171-172.
    Otto Neurath compared science to a ship at sea on which the sailors have to repair their vessel as they keep it afloat. Metascience is a ship of a similar sort. Do not worry. There are no repairs to report. But changes are being made at Metascience on an ongoing basis, even as we work to meet our production deadlines. With this, our second issue, we would like to announce some further changes with the journal.Ties Nijseen and Christi Lue who (...)
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  46.  8
    Philosophy of Science Viewed Through the Lense of “Referenced Publication Years Spectroscopy” (RPYS).K. Brad Wray & Lutz Bornmann - 2015 - Scientometrics 102 (3):1987-1996.
    We examine the sub-field of philosophy of science using a new method developed in information science, Referenced Publication Years Spectroscopy (RPYS). RPYS allows us to identify peak years in citations in a field, which promises to help scholars identify the key contributions to a field, and revolutionary discoveries in a field. We discovered that philosophy of science, a sub-field in the humanities, differs significantly from other fields examined with this method. Books play a more important role in philosophy of science (...)
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  47.  21
    Creativity in Science: Chance, Logic, Genius.. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (4):656-658.
    This is a book review of Dean Simonton's Creativity in Science.
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  48. WH Newton-Smith, Ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Science Reviewed. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2002 - Philosophy in Review 22 (2):136-128.
     
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  49.  5
    Reinterpreting § 56 of Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic.K. Brad Wray - 1995 - Auslegung (2).
    I defend an alternative reading of §56 of Frege's Grundlagen, one that rescues Frege from Dummett's charge that this section is the weakest in the whole book. On my reading, Frege is not presenting arguments against the adjectival strategy. Rather, Frege presents the definitions in §55 in order to convince his reader that numbers must be objects. In §56 Frege suggests that these definitions contain two shortcomings that adequate definitions of numbers must overcome. And these short-comings, he argues, can only (...)
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  50.  7
    Introduction: Collective Knowledge and Science.K. Brad Wray - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):181-184.
    The literature on collective belief and collective intentionality has grown rapidly and is now quite extensive. Philosophers have applied the concepts of “collective belief” and “collective intentionality” in a variety of contexts, including political and legal contexts as well as scientific contexts, specifically to model the behavior of research teams and scientific specialties.
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