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Krister Bykvist [38]K. Bykvist [2]
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Profile: Krister Bykvist (Stockholm University)
  1. Does Thought Imply Ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (296):277–285.
    N.B. Dr Bykvist is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page.
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  2.  17
    Weighing Reasons By Errold Lord and Barry Maguire.Krister Bykvist - forthcoming - Analysis:anx079.
    _Weighing Reasons_ By LordErrold and MaguireBarryOxford University Press, 2016. x + 302 pp. £52.73.
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  3.  78
    No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails.K. Bykvist - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):1-30.
    Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with the value the thing has (...)
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  4.  37
    Moral Uncertainty.Krister Bykvist - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12408.
    What should we do when we are not certain about what we morally should do? There is a long history of theorizing about decision-making under empirical uncertainty, but surprisingly little has been written about the moral uncertainty expressed by this question. Only very recently have philosophers started to systematically address the nature of such uncertainty and its impacts on decision-making. This paper addresses the main problems raised by moral uncertainty and critically examines some proposed solutions.
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  5. Prudence for Changing Selves.Krister Bykvist - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (3):264-283.
    What is the prudentially right thing to do in situations in which our actions will shape our preferences? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. This is the problem I will deal with in this article. I will begin by explaining why preferences matter to prudence. I will then go on to discuss a (...)
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  6. The Benefits of Coming Into Existence.Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):335-362.
    This paper argues that we can benefit or harm people by creating them, but only in the sense that we can create things that are good or bad for them. What we cannot do is to confer comparative benefits and harms to people by creating them or failing to create them. You are not better off created than you would have been had you not been created, for nothing has value for you if you do not exist, not even neutral (...)
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  7.  35
    Alternative Actions and the Spirit of Consequentialism.Krister Bykvist - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):45 - 68.
    The simple idea behind act-consequentialism isthat we ought to choose the action whoseoutcome is better than that of any alternativeaction. In a recent issue of this journal, ErikCarlson has argued that given a reasonableinterpretation of alternative actions thissimple idea cannot be upheld but that the newtheory he proposes nevertheless preserves theact-consequentialist spirit. My aim in thispaper is to show that Carlson is wrong on bothcounts. His theory, contrary to his ownintentions, is not an act-consequentialisttheory. By building on a theory formulated (...)
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  8.  15
    Epistemic Transformation and Rational Choice.Krister Bykvist & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (1):125-138.
    L. A. Paul has recently argued that the epistemically transformative nature of certain experiences makes it impossible to rationally decide whether to have the experience or not. We start by explaining why, contrary to what Paul claims, epistemically transformative experiences do not pose a general problem for the possibility of rational choice. However, we show there is a particular type of agent for whom the problem identified by Paul does arise. With this agent in mind, we examine Paul’s own suggestion (...)
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  9.  13
    Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-6.
    Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution (...)
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  10.  79
    Comments on Dennis McKerlie's 'Rational Choice, Changes in Values Over Time, and Well-Being'.Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (1):73-77.
    I am grateful to have been given the opportunity to comment on McKerlie's interesting article, especially since it concerns one of my pet topics and provides many helpful comments on one of my own articles on this topic. My comments will be brief because I agree with most of his points, in particular, his criticisms of the prudential view and the present-aim theory. What I want to do here is just to clarify a couple of things concerning my own theory, (...)
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  11. Expressivism and Moral Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...)
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  12. Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed.Krister Bykvist - 2009 - Continuum.
    Introduction -- The nature and assessment of moral theories -- What is utilitarianism? -- Well-being -- Utilitarian aggregation -- A user-friendly guide to action? -- Is utilitarianism too demanding? -- Is utilitarianism too permissive? -- The way outcomes are brought about -- The place of rules in utilitarianism.
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  13.  55
    Violations of Normative Invariance: Some Thoughts on Shifty Oughts.Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):98-120.
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  14. Future Generations and Interpersonal Compensations: Moral Aspects of Energy Use.Gustaf Arrhenius & Krister Bykvist - unknown
    Several people have helped us to write this essay. Our greatest debt is to Wlodek Rabinowicz, who has been an excellent supervisor of the project. He spent a lot of time and energy reading drafts of the essay. Without his painstaking criticism and helpful comments this essay would lack in precision, relevance, and logical correctness. Earlier drafts of the essay were discussed in Sven Danielsson and Wlodek Rabinowicz's seminar at the Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala. The participants of the (...)
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  15. Objective Versus Subjective Moral Oughts.Krister Bykvist - manuscript
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  16.  73
    Normative Supervenience and Consequentialism.Krister Bykvist - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (1):27.
    Act-consequentialism is usually taken to be the view that we ought to perform the act that will have the best consequences. But this definition ignores the possibility of various non-maximizing forms of act-consequentialism, e.g. satisficing theories that tell us to perform the act whose consequences will be good enough. What seems crucial to act-consequentialism is not that we ought to maximize value but that the normative status of alternative actions depends solely on the values of their outcomes. The purpose of (...)
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  17.  79
    Can Unstable Preferences Provide a Stable Standard of Well-Being?Krister Bykvist - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
    How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not stable across worlds? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. The general problem is to find a stable standard of well-being when the standard is set by preferences that are not stable. In this paper, I shall show that the (...)
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  18.  14
    The Moral Relevance of Past Preferences.Krister Bykvist - 2003 - In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 115--136.
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  19.  41
    Sumner on Desires and Well-Being.Krister Bykvist - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):475 - 490.
  20.  57
    Utilitarian Deontologies? On Preference Utilitarianism and Agent-Relative Value.Krister Bykvist - 1996 - Theoria 62 (1-2):124-143.
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  21.  29
    Reply to Orsi.Krister Bykvist - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1201-1205.
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  22.  46
    What Are Desires Good For? Towards a Coherent Endorsement Theory.Krister Bykvist - 2006 - Ratio 19 (3):286–304.
  23.  37
    John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), Pp. 286.Krister Bykvist - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):497-500.
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  24.  55
    Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good * Edited by Sergio Tenenbaum.K. Bykvist - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):200-202.
  25.  55
    Interrogating Ethics.Krister Bykvist - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine 49 (49):110-111.
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  26.  63
    All Time Preferences?Krister Bykvist - 1999 - Theoria 65 (1):36-54.
  27.  15
    Explaining Right and Wrong.Geoffrey Harrison Ferrari & Krister Bykvist - unknown
    When an act is right or wrong, there may be an explanation why. Different moral theories recognize different moral facts and offer different explanations of them, but they offer no account of moral explanation itself. What, then, is its nature? This thesis seeks a systematic account of moral explanation within a framework of moral realism. In Chapter 1, I develop a pluralist theory of explanation. I argue that there is a prima facie distinctive normative mode of explanation that is essential (...)
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  28.  25
    Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.
    Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for to account for normative certitude. We shall (...)
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  29.  59
    The Good, the Bad, and the Ethically Neutral.Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):97-105.
    John Broome's Weighing Lives provides a much-needed framework for the intriguing problems of population ethics. It is also an impressive attempt to find a workable solution to these problems. I am not sure that Broome has found the right solution, but I think he has done the ethics profession a tremendous service in tidying up the discussion. The framework he presents will make it possible for the participants in this debate to formulate their positions in a clear and precise manner. (...)
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  30.  45
    Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, Edited by Michael Byron. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 245 Pages. [REVIEW]Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):240-245.
  31.  15
    A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake1.Krister Bykvist, Garrett Cullity, Åsa Carlson, Johan Brännmark, Klemens Kappel, Ulrik Kihlbom, Ian Law, Hans Mathlein, Derek Parfit & Ingmar Persson - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 115.
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  32.  19
    Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints:Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints.Krister Bykvist - 2002 - Ethics 112 (2):375-378.
  33.  2
    McKerlie, Dennis.Justice Between the Young and the Old.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 223. $69.00.Krister Bykvist - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):895-900.
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  34. And Intergenerational Justice.Krister Bykvist - 2009 - In Gosseries Axel & Meyers L. (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oxford University Press. pp. 301.
     
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  35. Interrogating Ethics. [REVIEW]Krister Bykvist - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine 49:110-111.
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  36. Om moraliska övertygelsers styrka och emotivismens svaghet.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2010 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 4.
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  37. Preference Formation and Intergenerational Justice.Krister Bykvist - 2009 - In Axel Gosseries & Lukas H. Meyer (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oxford University Press.
     
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  38. Är de flesta utilitarister deontologer?Krister Bykvist - 1995 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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  39. Review of Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. [REVIEW]Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):240-245.
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  40. Sumner On Desires and Well-Being.Krister Bykvist - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):475-490.
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