The author has set out to provide an introduction to the theory of knowledge through a more "thorough study of three of its central topics." Unfortunately, he (...) does not accomplish this for many reasons. Arner never discusses the birth of the epistemological problem that can be traced as far back as Plato, nor does he go into the implications of the problem. He chooses rather to give a superficial introduction into some of the more common problematic themes. Assuming this cursory survey of 18 pages to be sufficient he devotes the remainder of the book to an offering of sampling selections by philosophers. Considering that the author furnishes only nine readings it is disconcerting to find C. I. Lewis and H. A. Prichard represented when notably absent are thinkers of such import as Plato, James, and Husserl among others. That no fewer pages are devoted to Lewis than to Kant and Descartes is indicative that Arner has missed the target. When a series of texts is used at the introductory level to offer a clear exposition of the philosophers’ thoughts, problems, methods, and attempted solutions, it is incumbent on the author to provide a general but thorough introduction to the theme along with appropriate brief introductions accompanying the particular readings. The fact that Arner has failed to do this, paired with the brevity and insignificance of some of the selections makes this book of little value to the student who professes no prior familiarity with the epistemological question.—K.R.M. (shrink)

Publication date: 30 November 2016 Source: Author: Wen Lee Ng, Manimangai Mani, Wan Roselezam Wan Yahya While the growing body of research on Tan Twan Eng’s (...) class='Hi'>The Gift of Rain focuses on the protagonist, Philip Hutton’s traumatic condition, his Chinese identity, and his ambiguous identity, this study devotes particular attention to the complexity of interactions between various cultures practised by Philip. This study aims to address this gap by applying the concept of transculturalism to analyse the processes of acquiring a foreign culture and incorporating the foreign culture into traditional cultures experienced by Philip. In other words, this study employs the concept of transculturalism to examine multicultural depictions in the novel. Scholars, such as Khan, Tiwari, Sheoran and Tan C. S. who have examined multicultural depictions in various literary texts, have found that multicultural circumstances cause certain ethnic groups to lose their cultures and identities. Hence, the multicultural circumstances depicted are perceived as negative phenomena. However, this study has found that by examining the interactions between various cultures, rather than focusing on the end products such as portrayals of hybridity, the positive sides of multicultural depictions could be revealed. The transculturation process experienced by Philip shows that the new cultural practices he has created are made up of both his traditional cultures and the foreign culture he has acquired. This means that Philip does not totally lose his traditional cultures and identities. Therefore, this study concludes that multicultural depictions in The Gift of Rain could be read positively, provided that the interactions between various cultures, which resulted in the incorporation of a foreign culture into traditional cultures, are examined. (shrink)

Seventeen studies, many of them newly translated, present a wide view of current Kierkegaardean scholarship, with a decided emphasis upon S.K's message for the Christian faithful (...) class='Hi'>. Two or three authors join battle with earlier interpreters; at least two quarrel with Kierkegaard himself; most of them labor at clearing the way--in scholarly fashion--for Kierkegaard's aggression upon the reader's own consciousness.--C. D. (shrink)

The history of contemporary modal logic dates back to the writings of C. S. Lewis in the early part of this century. Since then, a growing body (...) of literature has attested to professional interest in the area, and in a number of related issues in philosophical logic which have received wide attention. The recent development of powerful formal techniques for modal system building, together with an increasing interest in modal logic as a tool for philosophical analysis, have created a need for an up-to-date text to introduce students to this material. Snyder's book attempts to answer this need. Assuming an understanding of elementary propositional logic, Snyder introduces a reductive technique called cancellation for detecting the theorems of a system of logic. This technique, analogous to the construction of Smullyan trees but more compact, is extended to modal and quantified contexts. Cancellation versions of the systems M and Mn of G. H. von Wright, and S4 and S5 of Lewis are developed. Snyder uses a Hintikka type of semantics, showing how the various formal systems are differentiated at the semantic level by differing conditions which must be imposed on the model systems used as interpretations for them. These model systems, and the conditions imposed upon them, are in turn described by means of a metalanguage which is essentially first-order quantificational logic. The power of this technique stems from the fact that for every object language formula of a system, there is a corresponding formula in the metalanguage which describes the conditions an interpretation must meet in order to satisfy the original formula. The conditions that the interpretations of a given system of logic must meet are reflected in this metalanguage as "antecedent assumptions," and these in turn correspond to cancellation rules for the object language. This correspondence is constructed in such a way that the metalinguistic counterpart of each theorem of the system will be a theorem of first-order logic. Snyder's primary interest is in showing how modal logic can be used, with the help of these techniques, to build a large variety of formal systems and to "tailor" such systems to meet a variety of analytical tasks. Simple modal systems are developed for the articulation of a number of modal concepts, in addition to the classic alethic ones. Examples are taken from temporal, deontic, and epistemic logic to show how specific interpretations of the meanings of the relevant operators lead to the incorporation of appropriate conditions in the formal systems used to articulate them. An entire chapter is devoted to a discussion of the paradoxes of material and strict implication, and to an attempt to articulate the notion of entailment through the development of formal systems which include a dyadic modal operator that is free of these paradoxes. The final chapter discusses such classical issues as proper names, reference, fictional entities, definite descriptions, and existence presuppositions. Appendices deal with such matters as the equivalence of the cancellation systems to more classical axiomatic-deduction systems, and the sketch of a proof of soundness and completeness for all the modal systems presented. While designed as a text, this volume should be of interest to both logicians and those working in metaphysics and language analysis, since the primary concern of the author is to develop techniques that will facilitate the usefulness of modal logic as a tool for philosophical analysis. The instructor's manual contains many suggestions derived from the author's experience in teaching this non-standard treatment of the subject.--K. T. (shrink)

The title of this and proposed second volume presents the basic idea which unifies the wide variety of topics developed and investigated by the principal authors, major (...) contributing authors, J. M. Dunn and Robert K. Meyer, and eleven other contributors. The other contributors are: J. R. Chidgey, J. A. Coffa, Dorthy L. Grover, Bas van Fraassen, H. Leblanc, Storrs McCall, A. Parks, G. Pottinger, R. Routley, A. Urquhart, and R. G. Wolf. From both the useful analytic table of contents and from the section titles it is clear which contributing author has written each section. Chapter I, "The Pure Calculus of Entailment," suggests how logics of entailment are logics of relevance and necessity. When we explain why a large number of systems are investigated, it will be clear why we write of logics of entailment instead of the logic of entailment. The principal authors build a case in Chapter I, and elsewhere, that a genuinely valid formal inference, viz., a formal entailment, from a formula A to a formula B requires that A be relevant to B in addition to it being impossible that there be an interpretation making A true and B false. So, a claim that A entails B tells us, explicitly or implicitly, that A is relevant to B and that "if A then B" is necessarily true, i.e., A strictly implies B. Consequently since a logic of entailment presents allegedly unfalsifiable claims, i.e., theses, using entailment claims, a logic of entailment presents theses about relevance between antecedents and consequents and necessity. It should be noted that the systems of logic developed are for formal entailments; they may not be logics for material entailments such as: being a cube entails having six surfaces. (shrink)

Five essays of which two deserve special mention: Edward Ballard's survey and interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity in Husserl, showing Husserl's place in the heritage (...) class='Hi'> of Kant, and a critical presentation by Andrew Reck of the social philosophy of Elijah Jordan. The other essays are: "The Impact of Science on Society," by James K. Feibleman; "The Social Import of Empiricism," by Paul G. Morison; and "The Case for Sociocracy," by Robert C. Whittemore. Careless printing proves distracting.--C. D. (shrink)

Four essays of interest to the philosopher of science. The collection includes three short essays by L. P. Coonen, D. M. Lilly and C. DeKoninck. In the (...) major essay, "Evolution: Scientific and Philosophical Dimensions," R. J. Nogar first presents a detailed analysis of the current status of the concept of evolution, showing that its meaning varies greatly from discipline to discipline. He argues that in view of the great stability of organic species, the consideration of evolutionary processes exclusively as space-time distributions in inadequate, and needs supplementing by a concept of "nature," to explicate the relation between generator and generated, and the facts of heredity.--K. P. F. (shrink)

Aesthetic hedonists agree that an aesthetic value is a property of an item that stands in some constitutive relation to pleasure. Surprisingly, however, aesthetic hedonists need not (...) reduce aesthetic normativity to hedonic normativity. They might demarcate aesthetic value as a species of hedonic value, but deny that the reason we have to appreciate an item is simply that it pleases. Such is the approach taken by an important strand of South Asian rasa theory that is represented with great clarity and ingenuity in the work of K. C. Bhattacharyya. Bhattacharyya is an aesthetic hedonist who grounds aesthetic normativity in freedom. (shrink)

: Classical Sāmkhya, as represented by Īśvarakrsna's Sāmkhya-kārikā, is well known for its attempt to prove not only the reality but the plurality of selves (purusa-bahutva (...) class='Hi'>). The Sāmkhya argument, since it proceeds from the reality of the manyness of the bodies as its basic premise, approximates, even if not in every detail, the 'argument from analogy' in its traditional form (which the essay tries to explicate). One distinguished modern interpreter, K. C. Bhattacharyya, however, not satisfied with this account, attempts to interpret and expound Sāmkhya pluralism in terms of a radically different strategy consisting of showing that the self is known in buddhi in its pure asmita function as an infinite I and so as necessarily involving all Is or selves. This solution, which in the process offers reflections on such issues as infinity, universals, the role of 'I', the individuality (of self ), et cetera, is examined and criticized at length with respect to some of its basic assumptions, with a brief focus on the idea of 'self-consciousness', which according to some (Western) philosophers presupposes 'other'-consciousness and which in certain respects seems to inform Bhattacharyya's thoughts on the main issue. (shrink)

This is the review of the book by W.K.C. Guthrie, Filozofowie greccy od Talesa do Arystotelesa.

I shall examine in this paper the distinctive way in which the prominent Indian philosopher Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya engaged with Advaita Vedānta during the terminal phase of the (...) colonial period. I propose to do this by looking, first, at ways in which Krishnachandra understood the role of his own philosophizing within the colonial predicament. I will call this his agenda in ‘confrontative’ philosophy. I shall proceed, then, by sketching out the unique manner in which this agenda was successfully enacted through his engagement with the Advaitic notion of self-knowledge. Finally, I will suggest that putting K. C. Bhattacharyya’s thought into the historical perspective of cross-cultural philosophy will reveal a number of shortcomings that need to be revised in a postcolonial setup. (shrink)

I am grateful for Mr Bagger's thoughtful remarks, as well as those of Professors Cousins, Smith, Katz, and Gimello at a recent American Academy of Religion (...) class='Hi'>panel devoted to The Problem of Pure Consciousness . But I cannot help but be struck by the tone of Mr Bagger's notice. As one colleague communicated to me after reading the piece, this is one of the most gratuitously rude pieces he had ever seen! If our book is really as bad as all this, it makes one wonder why Religious Studies , or Mr Bagger, would bother to give it such attention, and whether it indicates how deeply we have touched a nerve in the contemporary debate. (shrink)

Although the following essay does not strictly fall within the discipline of classical Indian philosophy, in which our Journal specializes, we publish it here for two reasons: (...) (1) K. C. Bhattacharya was an outstanding philosopher of India in the past generation, and his thought was deeply influenced by his thorough study of classical Indian Vedanta and Jainism, as well as by the study of Kant (four of our consulting editors were his direct students). (2) His view about the notion of the speakable and philosophy is unique, and it has remained opaque to most of us. Hence some discussion will be illuminating. (shrink)

Launched in 1920 by C K Ogden and others as the successor to the Cambridge Magazine , Psyche occupied a unique place for over 30 years as a (...) class='Hi'> journal of general and linguistic psychology. Committed from the outset to keeping readers abreast of developments in the burgeoning fields of experimental, theoretical, and applied psychology, Psyche provided not only systematic reporting in these domains but set itself the task of stimulating research of high quality by the critical thrust of its editorial stance. In addition to full-length articles, Psyche featured lively correspondence and discussion, a regular chronicle of research in the US and on the continent, a comprehensive survey of current literature, and regular reports from the meetings and congresses of associations and societies. I A Richards, E J Dingwall and Whately Smith were among those who added their regular contributions to editorials and features by C K Ogden. (shrink)

Professor C. A. Mace, the psychologist, once wrote: ‘It is difficult … to present and defend any sort of behaviourism whatever without committing oneself to nonsense.’ I shall (...) class='Hi'> illustrate this thesis. I shall comment on the writings of some psychologists. This is relevant to my topic; for psychologists' expositions of behaviourism contain much more philosophy than science, and the inconsistencies which permeate their versions of behaviourism reappear in the works of eminent philosophers. My quotation from Mace comes from a paper defending what he calls ‘analytical behaviourism’; which he distinguishes from ‘methodological behaviourism’ and ‘metaphysical behaviourism’. According to Mace, analytical behaviourism does not question the truth of our everyday statements about a person's mind or states of consciousness; what it claims is that such statements ‘turn out to be, on analysis, statements about the behaviour of material things’, that is, about a person's ‘bodily acts, bodily states, bodily dispositions, bodily “states of readiness” to act in various ways’. The father of behaviourism, J. B. Watson, rarely says anything suggesting this doctrine. As he presents it, behaviourism is both a methodological principle and a metaphysical theory. (shrink)