Order:
Disambiguations
Keith DeRose [67]K. DeRose [6]Keith Douglas Derose [1]
See also
Keith DeRose
Yale University
  1. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1.Keith DeRose - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Contextualism has been hotly debated in recent epistemology and philosophy of language. The Case for Contextualism is a state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favor of the view and responding to the most pressing objections facing it.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  2. Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
  3. Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   247 citations  
  4. Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
  5.  19
    ``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context&Quot.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper brings together two positions that for the most part have been developed and defended independently of one another: contextualism about knowledge attributions and the knowledge account of assertion.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  6. The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism.Keith DeRose - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198.
    I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  7. Epistemic Possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
  8. Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense.Keith DeRose - 1998 - In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 187--205.
    In epistemology, “contextualism” denotes a wide variety of more-or-less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of “contextualism”. I’ll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  9. Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.Keith DeRose - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):81-110.
    I will here sharply oppose all the phases of the story Schaffer & Knobe tell. In Part 1 we will look at the supposed empirical case against standard contextualism, and in Part 2 we will investigate Schaffer & Knobe’s supposed empirical case for the superiority of contrastivism over standard contextualism.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  10.  11
    Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  11. Single Scoreboard Semantics.Keith DeRose - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):1-21.
    What happens to the "conversational score" when speakers in a conversation push the score for a context-sensitive term in different directions? In epistemology, contextualists are often construed as holding that both the skeptic ("You don't know!") and her opponent ("Oh, yes I do!") speak truthfully when they debate. This assumes a "multiple scoreboards" version of contextualism. But contextualists themselves typically opt for "single scoreboard" views on which such apparently competing claims really do conflict. This paper explores several single scoreboard options (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  12. Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.
    In some lottery situations, the probability that your ticket's a loser can get very close to 1. Suppose, for instance, that yours is one of 20 million tickets, only one of which is a winner. Still, it seems that (1) You don't know yours is a loser and (2) You're in no position to flat-out assert that your ticket is a loser. "It's probably a loser," "It's all but certain that it's a loser," or even, "It's quite certain that it's (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  13. Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  14. “Bamboozled by Our Own Words”: Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism.Keith Derose - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):316 - 338.
    The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions are to be found in how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, nonphilosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as “knowledge” in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others. Contextualists typically appeal to pairs of cases that forcefully display the variability in the epistemic standards that govern ordinary usage: A “low standards” case (henceforth, “LOW”) in which a speaker seems quite appropriately and truthfully to ascribe knowledge (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  15. The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith Derose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
    Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  16.  11
    Knowledge, Assertion, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper brings together two positions that for the most part have been developed and defended independently of one another: contextualism about knowledge attributions and the knowledge account of assertion.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  17. The Conditionals of Deliberation.K. DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-42.
    Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will (likely) happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between 'straightforward' future-directed conditionals like ' If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby' and * "w e r e ' ' e d F (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  18. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader.Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    Recently, new life has been breathed into the ancient philosophical topic of skepticism. The subject of some of the best and most provocative work in contemporary philosophy, skepticism has been addressed not only by top epistemologists but also by several of the world's finest philosophers who are most known for their work in other areas of the discipline. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader brings together the most important recent contributions to the discussion of skepticism. Covering major approaches to the skeptical problem, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  19. Gradable Adjectives: A Defence of Pluralism.Keith DeRose - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):141-160.
    This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a ?pluralist? approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the group-indexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  20. Insensitivity is Back, Baby!Keith DeRose - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):161-187.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  21.  20
    ``The Conditionals of Deliberation&Quot.Keith DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-42.
    Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between ‘straightforward’ future-directed conditionals like ‘If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby’ and ‘ “were”ed-up’ FDCs like ‘If the house were not to be painted, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  22. Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses.Keith DeRose - 2004 - In J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 22--41.
    Fortunately for those of us who work on the topic, Ernie Sosa has devoted much of his (seemingly inexhaustible) intellectual energy to the problem of philosophical skepticism. And to great effect. With the three exceptions of Peter Unger, whose 1975 Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism is a grossly under-appreciated classic of epistemology; Timothy Williamson, whose 2000 Knowledge and its Limits is, I hope, on its way to being a less underappreciated classic; and Thomas Reid, I have benefitted more from Sosa’s (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  23. Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?Keith Derose - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.
    fits our evidence.[1] I will propose some potential counter-examples to test this evidentialist thesis. My main intention in presenting the “counter-examples” is to better understand Feldman’s evidentialism, and evidentialism in general. How are we to understand what our evidence is, how it works, and how are we to understand the phrase “epistemically ought to believe” such that evidentialism might make sense as a plausible thesis in light of the examples? Of course, we may decide that there’s no such way to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  24. How Can We Know That We’Re Not Brains in Vats?Keith Derose - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (Supplement):121-148.
    This should be fairly close to the text of this paper as it appears in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  25.  34
    Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism.Keith DeRose & Michael Williams - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):604.
  26. Now You Know It, Now You Don’T.Keith DeRose - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  27.  85
    Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?Keith DeRose - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):385-413.
    The score was tied in the bottom of the ninth, I was on third base, and there was only one out when Bubba hit a towering fly ball to deep left-center. Although I’m no speed-demon, the ball was hammered so far that I easily could have scored the winning run if I had tagged up. But I didn’t. I got caught up in the excitement and stupidly played it half way, standing between third and home until I saw the center (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  28. Questioning Evidentialism.Keith DeRose - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  29. Conditional Assertions and "Biscuit" Conditionals.Keith DeRose & Richard E. Grandy - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):405-420.
    kind of joke to ask what is the case if the antecedent is false—“And where are the biscuits if I don’t want any?”, “And what’s on PBS if I’m not interested?”, “And who shot Kennedy if that’s not what I’m asking?”. With normal indicative conditionals like.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  30.  19
    Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?Keith Derose - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.
    My focus will be on Richard Feldman’s claim that what we epistemically ought to believe is what fits our evidence. I will propose some potential counter-examples to test this evidentialist thesis. My main intention in presenting the “counter-examples” is to better understand Feldman’s evidentialism, and evidentialism in general. How are we to understand what our evidence is, how it works, and how are we to understand the phrase “epistemically ought to believe” such that evidentialism might make sense as a plausible (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  31.  5
    How Can We Know That We Are Not Brains in Vats?'.Keith Derose - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-48.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  32.  4
    The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith Derose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346-350.
    Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards that comprise (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  33. Simple 'Might's, Indicative Possibilities and the Open Future.K. DeRose - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):67-82.
    are ambiguous. In the mouth of someone who cannot remember whether it was Michael, or rather someone else, who was top scorer, can express the epistemic possibility that Michael led the league in scoring. But from someone who knows that Michael did not even play last season, but is wondering what would have happened if he had, means something quite different. Now where it has this quite different meaning, may still turn out to be the expression of some epistemic possibility. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  34.  91
    Lewis on ‘Might’ and ‘Would’ Counterfactual Conditionals.Keith DeRose - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):413-418.
    Letting denote ‘would’ counterfactual conditionals like If I had looked in my pocket, I would have found a penny and letting denote ‘might’ counterfactual conditionals like If I had looked in my pocket, I might have found a penny,David Lewis’s thesis regarding the connection between these two types of conditionals is that.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  35.  10
    Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality.Keith Derose - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):945-949.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  36.  46
    Delusions of Knowledge Concerning God's Existence.Keith DeRose - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 288-301.
  37. Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193 - 197.
    In “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” I argue that advocates of the “Relevant Alternatives” theory of knowledge fall into certain mistakes result if they tie the content of a knowledge attribution, on a given occasion of use, too tightly to what the range of relevant alternatives is on that occasion, and I sketch an alternative approach to the issues involved that avoids such mistakes. In “The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions,” Anthony Brueckner charges that my own account of these matters falls (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  38.  62
    Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath. [REVIEW]Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):703-721.
  39. The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2.Keith DeRose - 2017 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  20
    Replies to Commentators.Keith DeRose - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):284-320.
    Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuses (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  15
    Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?Keith Derose - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):385-413.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  42. Responding to Skepticism.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    exactly as the essay appears in Skepticism. It's pretty close, though. In the version that appears in the book, page references to other essays in Skepticism refer to page numbers in the book, while below page references are, for the most part, to the original place of publication of the essays referred to. Also, I below make one correction (in red) of a factual error..
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. Descartes, Epistemic Principles, Epistemic Circularity, and Scientia.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):220-238.
  44.  52
    Reid's Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism.Keith DeRose - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):313-348.
  45.  85
    Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):497 - 512.
    My topic is Alvin Plantinga’s ’solution’ to one of the many forms that the problem of evil takes: the modal abstract form. This form of the problem is abstract in that it does not deal with the amounts or kinds of evil which exist, but only with the fact that there is some evil or other. And it is modal in that it concerns the compossibility of the following propositions, not any evidential relation between them: God is omnipotent, omniscient, and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  46.  5
    Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty.Keith DeRose - 1994 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):238-241.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  47. Skepticism: Contemporary Readings.Keith DeRose & Ted Warfield (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. Voodoo Epistemology.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    A critical examination of Alvin Plantinga's attempted defense against the dreaded "Great Pumpkin Objection" to his theistic-belief-as-properly-basic religious epistemology.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49.  11
    Précis of The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2.Keith DeRose - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):321-323.
    The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  82
    Précis of The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1.Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):675-677.
1 — 50 / 73