In light of recent interest among political theorists in the idea of political realism, Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear has come to be associated with anti-Rawlsian thought. This paper seeks to show that, on the contrary, Shklar’s specific formulation of political realism, unlike more recent variations, was not motivated by a critique of Rawls. This paper will address three concerns: first, it will show what exactly Shklar’s initial realism was responding to; second, it will consider the implications of this realism (...) for thinking about liberal democracies; third, it will attempt, briefly, in light of this, to make sense of her relationship with Rawls and, in turn, through a comparison with Bernard Williams’s thought, her relationship to anti-Rawlsian political realism. (shrink)
Current interpretations of the political theory of Judith Shklar focus to a disabling extent on her short, late article (1989); commentators take this late essay as representative of her work as a whole and thus characterize her as an anti-totalitarian, Cold War liberal. Other interpretations situate her political thought alongside followers of John Rawls and liberal political philosophy. Challenging the centrality of fear in Shklar's thought, this essay examines her writings on utopian and normative thought, the role of history in (...) political thinking and her notions of ordinary cruelty and injustice. In particular, it shifts emphasis away from an exclusive focus on her late writings in order to consider works published throughout her long career at Harvard University, from 1950 until her death in 1992. By surveying the range of Shklar's critical standpoints and concerns, it suggests that postwar American liberalism was not as monolithic as many interpreters have assumed. Through an examination of her attitudes towards her forebears and contemporaries, it shows why the dominant interpretations of Shklarmigrare flawed. In fact, Shklar moved restlessly between these two categories, and drew from each tradition. By thinking about both hope and memory, she bridged the gap between two distinct strands of postwar American liberalism. (shrink)
This paper was originally presented at the annual meeting of the program board of the Division of Overseas Ministries of the National Council of Churches. It followed a discussion by Jorgen Randers showing the implications of present world trends in growth of population and industrialization, depletion of natural resources, rise in population, and full utilization of agricultural land. Referring to the two hours of his talk and the ensuing discussion, Randers said, “The entire purpose is to convince you that exponential (...) growth cannot go on forever in a world of fixed size.” Randers stressed that overtaxing of the natural environment is caused more by industrialization than by population. Industrial processes use natural resources and emit pollution. Capital‐intensive agriculture in time decreases the productivity of land. Limiting of capital accumulation is as necessary as limiting of population. World civilization must and will move from growth to equilibrium, either by human choice or by the pressure of natural and social forces.Many trade‐offs and choices lie before us in the approaching equilibrium. We can press forward along the historical growth curves, exceed the limits of the world environment, and endure a collapse of population and industrialization back to a level the world can support. Or we can choose a redirection of law, policies, and religions to create a smooth transition to world equilibrium. Even in choosing equilibrium, alternatives arise. The higher the population, the lower will be the achieveable standard of living and quality of life. Trade‐offs will be made consciously or implicitly between advantages in the immediate future compared to advantages in the distant future. An inherent conflict exists between time horizons. Choosing to maximize the present quality of life condemns future generations to suffer for their predecessors' advantage.The reader should, if possible, read first any of those cited in notes1, 2, or 6 listed at the end of this paper before reading the following text, —J A Y W. FORRESTER. (shrink)
There is some limited contemporary scholarship on the theory of metaphor Kant appears to provide in his Critique of Judgment. The dominant interpretations that have emerged of Kant’s somewhat nascent account of metaphors are what I refer to as the symbolist view, which states that Kantian symbols should be viewed as Kantian metaphors, and the aesthetic idea view, which holds that Kant defi ned metaphors as aesthetic ideas . In this essay, I claim that the symbolist view of Kantian metaphors (...) is not plausible and that we should accept the aesthetic idea view in its stead. The jumping off points for my discussion are two fairly recent essays on the subject: A. T. Nuyen’s “The Kantian Theory of Metaphor” and Kirk Pillow’s “Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of Metaphor in Kant.” Nuyen defends the symbolist view of Kantian metaphor and Pillow defends a split view, i.e., Pillow thinks Kant has a dual-aspect view of metaphor that can bear both the symbolist and the aesthetic idea interpretations. Although I make use of some of Pillow’s objections against the symbolist view, I conclude that both he and Nuyen are wrong in thinking that Kantian symbols have any relationship to Kantian metaphors at all. Lastly, I will provide my own positive account of Kant’s theory of metaphors as well as show how this debate affects Kant’s overallaesthetic theory. (shrink)
This article pursues the hypothesis that there is a structural affinity between the case study as a genre of writing and the question of gendered subjectivity. With John Forrester’s chapter ‘Inventing Gender Identity: The Case of Agnes’ as my starting point, I ask how the case of ‘Agnes’ continues to inform our understanding of different disciplinary approaches to theorizing gender. I establish a conversation between distinct, psychoanalytically informed feminisms to move from the mid-20th century to contemporary cultural debate.
During the early years a young child gradually becomes a member of a culture by learning how to understand and then produce relevant social practices – particularly through interaction in conversation. This paper examines how one child adapts to the practices surrounding the production of questions and answers. Adopting a longitudinal case-study approach and employing conversation analysis, consideration is given to the question-answer practices this child produces during asymmetric conversations across the period when she is acquiring conversational skills (from 12 (...) months to 3 years 7 months). Through a micro-analytic examination of extract examples across this period, it becomes clear that although initially a child can learn the format of question-answer sequences, it is not until the third year that some recognition of being accountable for the form of an answer becomes evident. Between the ages of 2 and 3, we observe that this child is called to account for answers that are deemed inappropriate or odd. Concluding comments consider these practices as forms of social adaptation within asymmetric interactive contexts. Keywords: child-parent-interaction; asymmetric interaction; learning conversational skills. (shrink)
This article examines the changing scope and method of ecumenical public theology from the World Missionary Conference of 1910 until the present. Most changes were made in response to the changing ideological and political contexts. The collapse of liberalism and the social gospel was followed by a type of confessional ethics which arose directly out of the German Church Struggle. In opposition to this there emerged a realist ecumenical social ethics, much indebted to Reinhold Niebuhr, and of Ronald Preston. This (...) type of public theology and its distinctive ‘middle axiom’ method are examined and contrasted with the more recent public theologies which were influenced by liberation theology and grassroots movements. It is suggested that the ending of the Cold War and the fundamental changes that have taken place since September 11 2001 present a radically new kind of challenge to public theology. (shrink)
Both the Hempelian and the Dravian models of historical explanation are inadequate. They are based on the belief that in some way action may be deduced from a given reason for it. The chief difficulty is in showing how reasons are logically related to actions. An act can never be shown deductively to be necessary for the achievement of an end. Rather, practical reasoning enables us to infer inductively that a particular act will result in the achievement of some goal. (...) An act is explained not when it is inferred from a set of premises one of which states the reason for it, but instead where the end may be inferred from a set of premises one of which states that the action has been performed. Studying an agent's other actions and the actions of other people enables us to determine which ends are desired, which are not, and whether the agent was rational or irrational. (shrink)
When a young child begins to engage in everyday interaction, she has to acquire competencies that allow her to be oriented to the conventions that inform talk-in-interaction and, at the same time, deal with emotional or affective dimensions of experience. The theoretical positions associated with these domains - social-action and emotion - provide very different accounts of human development and this book examines why this is the case. Through a longitudinal video-recorded study of one child learning how to talk, Michael (...) A. Forrester develops proposals that rest upon a comparison of two perspectives on everyday parent-child interaction taken from the same data corpus - one informed by conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, the other by psychoanalytic developmental psychology. Ultimately, what is significant for attaining membership within any culture is gradually being able to display an orientation towards both domains - doing and feeling, or social-action and affect. (shrink)
Freud may never have set foot in Cambridge - that hub for the twentieth century's most influential thinkers and scientists - but his intellectual impact there in the years between the two World Wars was immense. This is a story that has long languished untold, buried under different accounts of the dissemination of psychoanalysis. John Forrester and Laura Cameron present a fascinating and deeply textured history of the ways in which a set of Freudian ideas about the workings of (...) the human mind, sexuality and the unconscious affected Cambridge men and women - from A. G. Tansley and W. H. R. Rivers to Bertrand Russell, Bernal, Strachey and Wittgenstein - shaping their thinking across a range of disciplines, from biology to anthropology, and from philosophy to psychology, education and literature. Freud in Cambridge will be welcomed as a major intervention by literary scholars, historians and all readers interested in twentieth-century intellectual and scientific life. (shrink)
“Resistir significa en primer lugar rechazar. Hoy, la insurgencia consiste en ese rechazo que no tiene nada de negativo, que es un acto indispensable, vital “ V. F.Hace ya seis años, en 1997, dos importantes editoriales publicaron en Barcelona, México y Buenos Aires, una traducción al español de El horror económico, y tres años después apareció en nuestra lengua Una extraña dictadura, ambos de la destacada ensayista y novelista francesa Vivianne Forrester. Estas obras se convirtieron en éxit..
Deontic logic ought to be fundamental to ethical theory and the theory of practical reasoning, but, for various reasons, it hasn’t been. James Forrester faults the standard systems themselves; so, in place of standard deontic logic, he proposes a new deontic logic that should, he thinks, serve moral philosophy more adequately.
We draw on empirical data and theorising that focuses on the relationship between the state, public policy and knowledge in the construction and configuration of school leadership under New Labour from 1997. Specifically we show how a school leadership policy network comprises people in different locations who operate as policy entrepreneurs in shaping policy.
This paper defends what the philosopher Merleau Ponty coins ‘the imaginary texture of the real’. It is suggested that the imagination is at work in the everyday world which we perceive, the world as it is for us. In defending this view a concept of the imagination is invoked which has both similarities with and differences from, our everyday notion. The everyday notion contrasts the imaginary and the real. The imaginary is tied to the fictional or the illusory. Here it (...) will be suggested, following both Kant and Strawson, that there is a more fundamental working of the imagination, present in both perception and the constructions of fictions. What Kant and Strawson failed to make clear, however, was that the workings of the imagination within the perceived world, gives that world, an affective logic. The domain of affect is that of emotions, feelings and desire, and to claim such an affective logic in the world we experience, is to point out that it has salience and significance for us. Such salience suggests and demands the desiring and sometimes fearful responses we make to it; the shape of the perceived world echoed in the shapes our bodies take within it. (shrink)
Ernst Haeckel has become famous, and perhaps infamous, for many reasons. Presently, he is probably most widely-known for his paintings of plants and animals in his very popular book, Art Forms in Nature, originally collected and published in 1904. However, in addition to Haeckel’s art, he is also well-known for his advocacy of Darwinism and Social Darwinism, for first coining the term ‘ecology,’ for having his work utilized by Nazi pseudo-scientists, and for famously producing drawings of animal and human embryos (...) so as to confirm his biogenetic law. Something Haeckel is not as well-known for today is the fact that he seemed to be both a strenuous critic of the metaphysical and moral philosophies of Immanuel Kant and yet also something of an adherent to Kant’s aesthetic views. In terms of metaphysics and morality, Haeckel sought to exorcise Kant’s ideas as much as possible from twentieth century views on science, humanity, and nature; however, in terms of aesthetic theory, Haeckel seemed to embrace a distinctly Kantian approach to art and artworks. This essay proposes to: carefully examine Haeckel’s refutations of some of Kant’s central metaphysical concepts, explore some of the, arguably Kantian, assumptions underlying Haeckel’s approach to aesthetics and his artistic practice, and combine these two lines of inquiry into a portrait of Haeckel’s mind as one that is conflicted about the role Kantian philosophy, and more specifically Kantian noumena, should play in twentieth century science and art. This unresolved tension in Haeckel’s mind regarding Kant’s noumenal realm is what I propose to call his ‘Kant Problem’. (shrink)