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Profile: Kathrin Glüer (Stockholm University)
  1. Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.
    As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: 'CE normativism', according to which it is essential to content that certain 'oughts' can be derived from it, and 'CD normativism', according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny. CE normativism appeals to the fact that there is an essential connection (...)
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  2. In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. (...)
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  3. The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    There is a long tradition of thinking of language as conventional in its nature, dating back at least to Aristotle De Interpretatione ). By appealing to the role of conventions, it is thought, we can distinguish linguistic signs, the meaningful use of words, from mere natural ‘signs’. During the last century the thesis that language is essentially conventional has played a central role within philosophy of language, and has even been called a platitude (Lewis 1969). More recently, the focus has (...)
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  4. Relational Modality.Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin - 2008 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (3):307-322.
    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite (...)
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  5. Proper Names and Relational Modality.Peter Pagin & Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535.
    Saul Kripke's thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite (...)
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  6.  83
    The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen.K. Gluer & A. Wikforss - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):757-761.
    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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  7. Colors Without Circles?Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):107--131.
    Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) (...)
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  8. Meaning Theory and Autistic Speakers.Kathrin Gluer & Peter Pagin - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (1):23-51.
  9.  43
    Aiming at Truth: On The Role of Belief.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):137-162.
    We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have (...)
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  10.  28
    Sense and Prescriptivity.Kathrin Gluer - 1999 - Acta Analytica 14 (23):111-128.
  11.  66
    Reply to Forbes.K. Gluer & P. Pagin - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):298-303.
    In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics (...)
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  12.  62
    General Terms and Relational Modality.Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1):159-199.
    Natural kind terms have exercised philosophical fancy ever since Kripke, in Naming and Necessity, claimed them to be rigid designators. He there drew attention to the peculiar, name-like behavior of a family of prima facie loosely related general terms of ordinary English: terms such as ‘water’, ‘tiger’, ‘heat’, and ‘red’. Just as for ordinary proper names, Kripke argued that such terms cannot be synonymous with any of the definite descriptions ordinary speakers associate with them. Rather, the name-like behavior of these (...)
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  13.  95
    Against Belief Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    We have argued against the thesis that content is essentially normative (Glüer & Wikforss 2009). In the course of doing so, we also presented some considerations against the thesis that belief is essentially normative. In this paper we clarify and develop these considerations, thereby paving the road for a fully non-normative account of the nature of belief.
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  14.  87
    Martin on the Semantics of 'Looks'.Kathrin Glüer - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):292-300.
    A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic (...)
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  15. The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity?Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is charity (...)
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  16. Analyticity and Implicit Definition.Kathrin Glüer - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):37-60.
    Paul Boghossian advocates a version of the analytic theory of a priori knowledge. His defense of an "epistemic" notion of analyticity is based on an implicit definition account ofthe meaning of the logical constants. Boghossian underestimates the power of the classical Quinean criticisms, however; the challenge to substantiate the distinction between empirical and non-empirical sentences, as forcefully presented in Two Dogmas, still stands, and the regress from Truth by Convention still needs to be avoided. Here, Quine also showed that there (...)
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  17.  53
    Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.
    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further (...)
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  18.  70
    Analyticity, Modality and General Terms.Peter Pagin & Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    In his recent paper ‘Analyticity: An Unfinished Business in Possible-World Semantics’ (Rabinowicz 2006), Wlodek Rabinowicz takes on the task of providing a satisfactory definition of analyticity in the framework of possible-worlds semantics. As usual, what Wlodek proposes is technically well-motivated and very elegant. Moreover, his proposal does deliver an interesting analytic/synthetic distinction when applied to sentences with natural kind terms. However, the longer we thought and talked about it, the more questions we had, questions of both philosophical and technical nature. (...)
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  19.  16
    Defeating Looks.Kathrin Glüer - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility (...)
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  20. Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions.Kathrin Glüer - 2012 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International.
    Or, in Donald Davidson’s much quoted words: “What is it for words to mean what they do?” (Davidson 1984, xiii). Davidson himself suggested approaching this matter by asking two different questions: What form should a formal semantics take? And: What is it that makes a semantic theory correct for a particular language, i.e. what determines meaning? The second question concerns the place of semantic facts in a wider metaphysical space: How do these facts relate to non-semantic facts? Can they be (...)
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  21.  27
    Colors and the Content of Color Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):421-437.
    In previous work, I have defended a non-standard version of intentionalism about perceptual experience. According to the doxastic account, visual experience is a peculiar kind of belief: belief with “phenomenal” or looks-content. In this paper, I investigate what happens if this account of experience is combined with another idea I find very plausible: That the colors are to be understood in terms of color experience. I argue that the resulting phenomenal account of color experience captures everything essential to what has (...)
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  22. Perception and Intermediaries.Kathrin Glüer - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
    Donald Davidson famously held that only beliefs provide reasons for belief. Perceptual experiences, he held, are not even propositional attitudes, and thus doubly disqualified from being reason providers. John McDowell and others have tried to restore the intuitive reason-providing role of experience by suggesting that experiences do have contents. However, on McDowell’s account, experiences provide ‘reasons’ in a sense very different from the Davidsonian. In this paper, I argue that there is a better way of rescuing the reason-providing role of (...)
     
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  23.  58
    On Perceiving That.Kathrin Glüer - 2004 - Theoria 70 (2-3):197-212.
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  24.  15
    Es Braucht Die Regel Nicht: Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2010 - In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    According to the received view the later Wittgenstein subscribed to the thesis that speaking a language requires being guided by rules (thesis RG). In this paper we question the received view. On its most intuitive reading, we argue, (RG) is very much at odds with central tenets of the later Wittgenstein. Giving up on this reading, however, threatens to deprive the notion of rule-following of any real substance. Consequently, the rule-following considerations cannot charitably be read as a deep and subtle (...)
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  25. Sprache Und Regeln Zur Normativität von Bedeutung.Kathrin Glüer - 1999
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  26.  47
    Still No Guidance: Reply to Steglich‐Petersen.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):272-279.
    In a recent article in this journal, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen criticizes an argument we have called the “no-guidance argument”. He claims that our argument fails because it “presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour” and “betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm”. If these claims could be substantiated, the no-guidance argument would lose all interest. But Steglich-Petersen's attempt at substantiating them fails. The suggested sense in which the truth (...)
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  27.  30
    Introduction.Hans-Johann Glock, Kathrin Glüer & Geert Keil - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66:1-5.
    Introduction to a collection of essays that celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Quine's paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Contributor: Herbert Schnädelbach, Paul A. Boghossian, Kathrin Glüer, Verena Mayer, Christian Nimtz, Åsa Maria Wikforss, Hans-Johann Glock, Peter Pagin, Tyler Burge, Geert Keil und Donald Davidson.
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  28.  22
    Wittgenstein and Davidson on Agreement in Judgement.Kathrin Glüer - 2001 - Wittgenstein-Studien 2:81-103.
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  29.  23
    Critical Notice: Donald Davidson's Collected Essays.Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):275–284.
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  30. Bedeutung zwischen Norm und Naturgesetz.K. Gluer - 2000 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48 (3):449-468.
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  31.  14
    Brief Aus Schweden.Kathrin Glüer - 2013 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (5-6):823-826.
    This short text is part of a series of letters from philosophers working abroad. I write about what brought me to Sweden and about what philosophy and academic life are like there, including some reflections on language politics as well as on the situation of women in philosophy and in academia more generally.
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  32. Brown Against the Reductio.Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
     
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  33. Critical Notice: Donald Davidson’s Collected Essays.Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):275-284.
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  34. „On Perceiving That “, Erscheint In.Kathrin Glüer - forthcoming - Theoria.
     
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  35. „Rationalität und Regeln “.Kathrin Glüer - 1998 - Ethik Und Sozialwissenschaften 9:106-108.
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  36. Talking About Looks.Kathrin Glüer - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    In natural language, looks-talk is used in a variety of ways. I investigate three uses of ‘looks’ that have traditionally been distinguished – epistemic, comparative, and phenomenal ‘looks’ – and endorse and develop considerations in support of the view that these amount to polysemy. Focusing on the phenomenal use of ‘looks’, I then investigate connections between its semantics, the content of visual experience, and the metaphysics of looks. I argue that phenomenal ‘looks’ is not a propositional attitude operator: We do (...)
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  37. The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen: Discussions.Kathrin Glüer & åsa Wikforss - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):757-761.
    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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  38.  69
    Fifty Years of Quine’s Two Dogmas.Hans-Johann Glock, Kathrin Glüer & Geert Keil (eds.) - 2003 - Rodopi.
    W. V. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, first published in 1951, is one of the most influential articles in the history of analytic philosophy. It does not just question central semantic and epistemological views of logical positivism and early analytic philosophy, it also marks a momentous challenge to the ideas that conceptual analysis is a main task of philosophy and that philosophy is an a priori discipline which differs in principle from the empirical sciences. These ideas dominated early analytic philosophy, (...)
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  39. Schwerpunkt: Sprache und Regeln. 1st Bedeutung normativ?K. Gluer - 2000 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48 (3):393-394.
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