The old duality that eventually came to produce the mind/body-problem indicates the problem of transcendental subjectivity. The enduring significance of this problem shows itself in a provocation of any paradigm that has become too objectivistic, too naturalistic – even too idealistic in a certain sense – and too forgetful of its own departure from a perspective always presumed. Analytic philosophy bears a tendency towards such a ‘view from nowhere’ which denies a fundamental subjective connection. The rebuttal of this position entails (...) accepting the interrelation between first- and third-person-perspective; we call this the ‘view from somewhere’. Tracing the tension between the subjective and the objective we find this “view” embraced in the phenomenological tradition. At the same time we find the mind/body-problem seemingly dissolved through, among other key concepts, the introduction of the ‘lived body’. We will see, however, that this is no thorough solution; a fundamental mind/world polarity escapes the phenomenological framework and ends up mounting a critical threat to its own stability. A demonstration is attempted of how both the process of objectification and the process of subjectification falls into regressive patterns. This is due to the interplay of the gaze and the source, the ‘from’ and the ‘towards’: Ajin. Later this argumentation calls for a discussion of the pre-reflective sphere of consciousness. Finally we show the alignment between conclusions driven forth in our own dialectic and the ones found in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna. The transcendental interconstitution of subjectivity and objectivity, perspective and world, has a name in emptiness. (shrink)

We advocate an analysis of meaning that departs from the pragmatic slogan that “meaning is use”. However, in order to avoid common missteps, this claim is in dire need of qualification. We argue that linguistic meaning does not originate from language use as such; therefore we cannot base a theory of meaning only on use. It is important not to neglect the fact that language is ultimately reliant on non-linguistic factors. This might seem to oppose the aforementioned slogan, but it (...) will be made clear how this opposition is chimerical. We propose that meaning traces back to the relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which is at the heart of the matter by inducing strong interdependency between intention and interpretation. But to base a full-fledged analysis of meaning in communicative dyads alone is also insufficient. What needs to be further acknowledged is that meaning sharing becomes regulated by the interactions of a community. This we call consensus and it is at play in framing all communicative acts. Hence arises a triadic structure – we call this the meaningsharing network. The main motivation behind this model is to capture that meaning is not “in the head”, nor is it autonomous of the individual members that constitute it. (shrink)

In this paper, we are mainly concerned with coherentism as an approach to ethical dialog in school. We have two different but connected aims with the paper. The first aim is to say something about general philosophical questions relating to coherentism as a theory in metaethics, and especially in relation to value education; the second aim is to explore some possible implications of coherentism as a method in studying the enterprise of discussing ethical issues and questions with children as well (...) as the study of the actual ethical discussion in school. Furthermore, we evaluate the connection between a coherentistic approach to justification and the methodological parts of a Philosophy with Children, or Community of Inquiry, approach to ethics in school. Related to this, we scrutinize what implications this has for evaluating ethical learning within Philosophy with Children, or Community of Inquiry, as well as implications for evaluation of the Philosophy with Children, or Community of Inquiry, approaches as methods for dealing with ethical matters in school. (shrink)

A main issue in Swedish school debate is the question of how to teach the student a common value system based on democracy and western humanism. The debate is rather intense, to say the least. Not only is the premise that there exists one value system that we share a target for critique, but there is also the question of what value education is or could be. There is, as well, quite a body of research on children's moral development, where (...) many take as their departure the work of Kohlberg. However, there has been little or no attention on how the individual learner conceptualizes and makes meaning out of ethical issues. That is, descriptions of processes. In this paper we will present what we take to be urgent questions that need to be investigated against the background of prior research and practical work at Södra teatern in Stockholm, Sweden. For eight years in a row, Södra teatern has had as a main project to lead a practice on the subject of philosophy with children. Several groups of youths in the age of nine to eighteen have regularly met to discuss philosophical thoughts and problems, which in a democratic manner are settled for discussion by the participants. Today this philosophical practice has spread to the north of Sweden. In Backman's final exam within the teacher education she has explored the development of children's (7‐8 years old) ability to argue for different ethical positions, both verbally and in writing and painting. This practice has been inspired by the tradition at Södra teatern, but customized to fit a regular school class in Luleå, with very little experience of philosophical discussion. In the very short period of five weeks Backman has been able to see quite significant changes in the children's ability to argue for their ethical positions. The study was initiated by examining some argumentative abilities of the pupils, for instance the ability of expressing an argument for an ethical position in writing. In the final part of the study, the same ability was examined in very similar circumstances, and the augment of expressed arguments in writing was significant. Another consideration that was raised as a consequence of the study regards the pupil's conceptualizing of ethical issues. In some conversations about the notion of justice it became clear that children interpreted the term very differently. This is not very surprising but important to pay further attention to. As mentioned earlier, there has been very little attention on how individual children conceptualize ethical issues. In this paper we argue that more interest should be put on investigating these issues in more depth, and we will do this by an outlining of a research application. (shrink)

This article is about a coming project concerning a coherentist approach to ethics in school. The project has two main parts; one theoretical and one empirical. The former focuses on philosophical problems and issues concerning coherentism as a metaethical position in general, and particularly when applied to the field of value education, and the latter aims to study some consequences of a coherentist approach to the study of discussing ethical matters with children.Metaethical coherentism is a position in the discussion about (...) justification of moral judgements. According to coherentism, we build some kind of web in which different moral judgements are connected by some justification‐relation or the like. Some judgements might be more central than others, but these can be justified by the more particular and peripheral ones, and vice versa. Coherentism differs from foundationalism, according to which there are some foundational judgements that are not justified by any other judgements. The rest of our judgements are justified if they are justified by this foundation. We wish to study what benefits a coherentist approach might have in the study of ethical discussions in school. In Sweden, the educational system has as one of its main purposes to mediate a "value foundation" based on "Christian ethical tradition and western humanism" to the pupils. Suppose now that you have a foundationalist approach to ethical discussion in schools, as many seem to have had historically, and that some pupil expresses the judgement that some of his classmates have a lower value than him, due to the colour of their skin. This judgement conflicts with the judgement that the colour of ones skin does not have any bearing of ones value, included in the value foundation of the school. According to a foundationalist, we here have a conflict between foundational values, or so we can suppose. In this case, there is nothing obvious to do to resolve this conflict, because the foundational values cannot be justified; it is supposed that we simply realise the correctness of them by our moral intuition, or the like. A coherentist, on the other side, could point to how these two different judgements gain different amount of justification from other judgements, and thereby hopefully find consensus, and hence dissolve the conflict.Coherentism is not theoretically unproblematic, though. One problem is how to understand the justification‐relation. What does it mean that two propositions justify each other? Philosophers have discussed several different proposals. We give a new proposal, based on some of Arne Naess' theories. With regard to methods for ethical discussion in relation to a coherentistic approach, it seems as a "philosophy with children" approach will seem as a natural choice. (shrink)

Background:Ethics rounds are one way to support healthcare personnel in handling ethically difficult situations. A previous study in the present project showed that ethics rounds did not result in significant changes in perceptions of how ethical issues were handled, that is, in the ethical climate. However, there was anecdotal evidence that the ethics rounds were viewed as a positive experience and that they stimulated ethical reflection.Aim:The aim of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the ethics rounds (...) were experienced and why the intervention in the form of ethics rounds did not succeed in improving the ethical climate for the staff.Research design:An exploratory and descriptive design with a qualitative approach was adopted, using individual interviews.Participants and research context:A total of 11 healthcare personnel, working in two different psychiatry outpatient clinics and with experience of participating in ethics rounds, were interviewed.Ethical considerations:The study was based on informed consent and was approved by one of the Swedish Regional Ethical Review Boards.Findings:The participants were generally positive about the ethics rounds. They had experienced changes by participating in the ethics rounds in the form of being able to see things from different perspectives as well as by gaining insight into ethical issues. However, these changes had not affected daily work.Discussion:A crucial question is whether or not increased reflection ability among the participants is a good enough outcome of ethics rounds and whether this result could have been measured in patient-related outcomes. Ethics rounds might foster cooperation among the staff and this, in turn, could influence patient care.Conclusion:By listening to others during ethics rounds, a person can learn to see things from a new angle. Participation in ethics rounds can also lead to better insight concerning ethical issues. (shrink)

Festschrift volume to K. Ramakrishna Rao, Indian psychologist, philosopher and educationist; contributed articles.

Constitutional and judicial law-making is increasingly beginning to find its reflection not only in the Anglo-Saxon, but also in the Romano-Germanic legal family. However, the prerequisites for the use of this legal instrument are different, which determines the relevance of conducting a comparative analysis regarding the provision of such a mechanism in the USA and Kazakhstan. The purpose of the research is to identify common and distinctive features in the process of implementation of constitutional and judicial law-making in countries belonging (...) to different legal systems. The article uses the methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison, deduction and generalization. As a result, the specificity of ensuring the mechanism of constitutional law-making in the USA was expressed, taking into account various forms of law-making activity. It has been established that the development of constitutional provisions in the United States takes place with the help of the constitutional doctrines of the Supreme Court of the United States, which provide for the introduction of amendments to constitutional provisions without a formal procedure. As a result of the study of the experience of Kazakhstan, it was established that special priority was given to the role of precedent, in particular, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is explained by the integrative nature of the Romano-Germanic legal system, which allows effective development of national legislation as a whole and its provisions. The obtained results can be used during the professional training of judges in the Republic of Kazakhstan. (shrink)

K. Satchidananda Murty (1924-2011) was a vociferous writer and an iconoclast. This volume is a collection of his unpublished writings. It includes Murty's views on the Veda, its meaning, relevance, and study, and shows the significance of the Vedāntic vision to the modern world. Murty elucidates the basic tenets of Advaita Vedānta and expounds the Advaitic doctrine of the relationships between Brahman and God, Brahman and the individual self, as well as between God and the world. In his writings, Murty (...) contrasts empirical knowledge with transcendental wisdom and surveys the history of Indian science and scientific views in ancient times. The book also includes Murty's musings on the scholar Śankara's philosophy, authorship and religious life. An important contribution to Indian philosophy, the volume will be of great interest to scholars, teachers and students of Hindu philosophy, Vedāntic philosophy, Advaita Vedanta, comparative philosophy, religious studies, and South Asian studies. (shrink)

This monograph aims to mathematically codify the notion of "moral systems" and define a sensible distance between them. It consists of three parts, aimed at an audience with varying interests and mathematical backgrounds. The first part steers philosophical, formally defining moral systems and several related concepts. The second part studies black box algorithms, including questions of inference and metric construction. The third part explores the technical construction of metrics amongst conditional probability distributions.

PART The Early Wittgenstein Half of what I say is meaningless. I say it so that the other half may reach you. Kahlil Gibran My work consists of two parts ...

Principles of justice, David Estlund argues, cannot be falsified by people’s unwillingness to satisfy them. In his Utopophobia, Estlund rejects the view that justice must bend to human motivation to deliver practical implications for how institutions ought to function. In this paper, I argue that a substantive argument against such bending of justice principles must challenge the reasons for making these principles sensitive to motivational limitations. Estlund, however, provides no such challenge. His dispute with benders of justice is therefore a (...) verbal one over the true meaning of justice, which need not worry those with the intuition that justice should perform a function that requires bending. By focusing on John Rawls’s reasons for bending his justice principles, I point towards a substantive critique of bent justice. (shrink)

What is interest and how has it been conceptualized and studied? -- What explains the power of interest? : Why are students who have an interest for content more likely to continue to reengage and develop more conceptual sophistication? -- What is known about assessing existing interest? How do new interests develop? How can the phase of a person's interest be identified and measured? -- What is the relation between the development of interest and other motivational variables? -- Is it (...) a paradox that interest declines as subject matter gets more developed? What is "interest driven learning"? Does it matter if interests are taken up in rather than out of school? How different is an interest in one versus another subject matter, or domain? -- What we can now say about interest, its generation and development? What are the implications of knowing that interest can be developed? What could further research help us to understand? (shrink)

Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this: the simulation constraint theory (Bering, Citation2002); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, Citation2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of these theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal immortality, (...) leave an explanatory gap in that they do not explain why one would intuitively attribute survival of death to others. To fill in the gap, I offer a cognitive theory based on offline social reasoning and social embodiment which provides for the belief in an eternal social realm in which the deceased survive—the afterlife. (shrink)