Results for 'KK'

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  1. Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though its unpopular, a flurry of considerations has (...)recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the formIf I dont know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertablea fact that KK defenders can easily explain. I survey a variety of KK-denying responses and find them wanting. Those who object to the knowability of such conditionals must either deny the possibility of harmony between knowledge and belief, or deny well-supported connections between conditional and unconditional attitudes. Meanwhile, those who grant knowability owe us an explanation of such conditionalsunassertabilityyet no successful explanations are on offer. Upshot: we have new evidence for KK. (shrink)
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  2. Transparency and the KK Principle.Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):3-23.
    An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position (...)to know that she knows that p. We explain how atransparencyaccount of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version of the KK principle with anexternalistorreliabilistconception of knowledge commonly thought to make that principle particularly problematic. (shrink)
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  3. Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK).Murali Ramachandran - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):142-149.
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The (...)lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamsons _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges. (shrink)
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  4. On a Flawed Argument Against the KK Principle.S. Okasha - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):80-86.
    Externalists in epistemology often reject the KK principlewhich says that if a person knows that p, then they know that they know that p. This paper (...) argues that one standard argument against the KK principle that many externalists make is fallacious, as it involves illicit substitution into an intensional context. The fallacy is exposed and discussed. (shrink)
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  5.  96
    A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis.James R. Beebe - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):315-326.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of (...)
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  6.  71
    Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle.Simon D'Alfonso - 2013 - Logos and Episteme (4):399-406.
    The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In (...)
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  7.  13
    Argument Williamsona przeciwko KK-tezie.Grzegorz Lisowski - 2017 - Diametros 52:81-95.
    The KK-principle can be defined as follows: “For any subject x : if x knows that p, then she is always in a position to know that (...)
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  8. Could KK Be OK?Daniel Greco - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (4):169-197.
    In this paper I present a qualified defense of the KK principle. In section one I introduce two popular arguments against the KK principle, along with an (...)
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  9. Taking a Chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.
    Dorr et al. present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an (...)
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  10. Self-Knowledge and the KK Principle.Conor McHugh - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):231-257.
    I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is (...)commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions. (shrink)
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  11.  29
    Williamson, Closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Closure principles say that if you know some proposition which entails a second and you meet further conditions then you know the second. In this paper I (...)
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  12.  29
    Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle.Alexander Bird & Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha :8086, 2013) (...)and Greco :169197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism. (shrink)
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  13. Williamsons Argument Against the KK-Principle 157.Murali Ramachandran - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
    Timothy Williamson (2000 ch. 5) presents a reductio against the luminosity of knowing, against, that is, the so-called KK-principle: if one knows p, then one knows (...) (or is at least in a position to know) that one knows p.1 I do not endorse the principle, but I do not think Williamsons argument succeeds in refuting it. My aim here is to show that the KK-principle is not the most obvious culprit behind the contradiction Williamson derives. (shrink)
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  14. The KK-Principle, Margins for Error, and Safety.Murali Ramachandran - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):121-136.
    This paper considers, and rejects, three strategies aimed at showing that the KK-principle fails even in most favourable circumstances (all emerging from Williamsons Knowledge and its (...) Limits ). The case against the final strategy provides positive grounds for thinking that the principle should hold good in such situations. (shrink)
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  15.  21
    Augustines Use of the KK-Thesis in The City of God, Book 11.Joshua Anderson - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (2):151-168.
    It seems odd that in such a densely theological text that Augustine would bring up something like the KK-thesis, which is so epistemological. Yet, as one (...)progresses through the book it does begin to make sense. In this paper, I aim to try to come to some understanding of how and why Augustine uses something like the KK-thesis in Book 11 of The City of God. The paper will progress in the following way: First, I discuss Jaakko Hintikka's work on the KK-thesis in order to have a clear idea of what the KK-thesis is, and some associated problems with it. Next, since Augustine most explicitly deals with the KK-thesis in De Trinitate, with the help of Gareth Matthews work, I discuss Augustine's use of the KK-thesis there. Finally, I return to The City of God, in order come to an understanding of Augustine's use of the KK-thesis there. (shrink)
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  16.  18
    KK-Thesis and Contextualism.Yves Bouchard - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):19-39.
    In this paper, I defend a contextualist reading of the KK-thesis. In the first part, I present the general problem and I contrast three concepts of (...)knowledge with respect to the KK-thesis, that all rely on a univocal interpretation of the K-predicate. In the second part, I provide a contextualist framework based upon an indexical interpretation of the K-predicate and the notion of epistemic context. I show how this framework can integrate different concepts of knowledge, and how it highlights the crucial significance of the KK-thesis for epistemology. (shrink)
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  17.  5
    Editorischer Bericht zu KK.Heiko Schulz & Richard Purkarthofer - 2008 - In Heiko Schulz & Richard Purkarthofer (eds.), Journale Ee · Ff · Gg · Hh · Jj · Kk. De Gruyter. pp. 661-674.
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  18.  5
    Journal kk.Heiko Schulz & Richard Purkarthofer - 2008 - In Heiko Schulz & Richard Purkarthofer (eds.), Journale Ee · Ff · Gg · Hh · Jj · Kk. De Gruyter. pp. 325-396.
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  19.  5
    Kommentar zu KK.Heiko Schulz & Richard Purkarthofer - 2008 - In Heiko Schulz & Richard Purkarthofer (eds.), Journale Ee · Ff · Gg · Hh · Jj · Kk. De Gruyter. pp. 675-716.
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  20.  83
    Luminosity and the KK Thesis.Robert Stalnaker - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-40.
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  21. The KK Principle.Antony Eagle - unknown
    relevant alternatives: I take it that a process is reliable in the actual world iff, in the actual set of outcomes (i.e. beliefs being formed), the (...)frequency of successes (those beliefs being true) is much greater than the frequency of failures (those beliefs being false). One may wish to run a more sophisticated kind of reliabilism, where one demands that a reliable process also be reliable in counterfactual situations, but one need not, and I wont here. If perception is a reliable belief forming process, then I can know things on the basis of perception. So lets say I know p on the basis of perception. To know that I know p involves, first, knowing that I believe p, and second, knowing that I believe p on the basis of a reliable belief forming process, by the definition of knowledge. But can I know either of these things? (shrink)
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  22.  50
    Rational Failures of the KK Principle.Timothy Williamson - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. pp. 101--118.
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  23.  28
    KK and the Knowledge Norm of Action.Michael Da Silva - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):321-331.
    This piece examines the purported explanatory and normative role of knowledge in Timothy Williamsons account of intentional action and suggests that it isin tension with his (...)argument against the luminosity of knowledge. Only iterable knowledge can serve as the norm for action capable of explaining both why people with knowledge act differently than those with mere beliefs and why only those who act on the basis of knowledge-desire pairs are responsible actors. (shrink)
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  24.  8
    Patching Ideal Families on &* Kk.Christopher C. Leary - 1988 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 30 (4):269-275.
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  25.  52
    Lehrer's Personal Coherentism and the KK Thesis.G. J. Mattey - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (3):423 - 438.
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  26.  14
    Williamson's AntiKK Argument.Zixin Luo & Yetao Liu - 2016 - Philosophical Forum 47 (3-4):459-468.
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  27.  22
    On (C.KK*) and the KK-Thesis.Kathleen Johnson Wu - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):91 - 95.
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  28.  9
    Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks Volume 1: Journals AA-DD; Volume 2: Journals EE-KK Reviewed by.Brian Gregor - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (2):105-108.
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  29. KK (Knowing That One Knows) Principle.David Hemp - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  30. Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks: Volume 2: Journals Ee-Kk.Niels Jørgen Cappelorn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, Vanessa Rumble, K. Brian Söderquist & George Pattison (eds.) - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
    Søren Kierkegaard published an extraordinary number of works during his lifetime, but he left behind nearly as much unpublished writing, most of which consists of what are (...)
     
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  31. Matthysse 55, Kidd KK: Genetic Counseling for Schizophrenic Patients and Their Families.S. S. Kety - 1978 - In John Paul Brady & H. Keith H. Brodie (eds.), Controversy in Psychiatry. Saunders.
     
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  32. Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks: Volume 2: Journals Ee-Kk.Søren Kierkegaard - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
     
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  33. Journale Ee · Ff · Gg · Hh · Jj · Kk.Heiko Schulz & Richard Purkarthofer (eds.) - 2008 - De Gruyter.
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  34. Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.
    Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. In this paper I show that their result only applies to a restricted range of cases. I then (...)
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  35.  84
    Higher Order Ignorance Inside the Margins.Sam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1789-1806.
    According to the KK-principle, knowledge iterates freely. It has been argued, notably in Greco, that accounts of knowledge which involve essential appeal to normality are particularly (...)conducive to defence of the KK-principle. The present article evaluates the prospects for employing normality in this role. First, it is argued that the defence of the KK-principle depends upon an implausible assumption about the logical principles governing iterated normality claims. Once this assumption is dropped, counter-instances to the principle can be expected to arise. Second, it is argued that even if the assumption is maintained, there are other logical properties of normality which can be expected to lead to failures of KK. Such failures are noteworthy, since they do not depend on either a margins-for-error principle or safety condition of the kinds Williamson appeals to in motivating rejection KK. “Introduction: KK and Being in a Position to KnowSection formulates two versions of the KK-Principle; “Inexact Knowledge and Margins for ErrorSection presents a version of Williamsons margins-for-error argument against it; “Knowledge and NormalityandIterated NormalitySections discuss the defence of the KK-Principle due to Greco and show that it is dependent upon the implausible assumption that the logic of normality ascriptions is at least as strong as K4; finally, “Knowledge in Abnormal ConditionsandHigher-Order Ignorance Inside the MarginsSections argue that a weakened version of Grecos constraint on knowledge is plausible and demonstrate that this weakened constraint will, given uncontentious assumptions, systematically generate counter-instances to the KK-principle of a novel kind. (shrink)
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  36. Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments Can Deliver Knowledge.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):52-56.
    In a recent paper, Murali Ramachandran endorses a principle that he thinks can help us solve the surprise test puzzle and cause problems for a Williamsonian argument (...)
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  37.  58
    Random and Systematic Error in the Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    A puzzle of an unmarked clock, used by Timothy Williamson to question the KK principle, was separately adapted by David Christensen and Adam Elga to critique a (...)
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  38.  19
    The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios.Peter Murphy - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):271-281.
    What epistemic defect needs to show up in a skeptical scenario if it is to effectively target some belief? According to the false belief account, the targeted (...)
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  39.  74
    The Self-Knowledge Gambit.Berislav Marušić - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.
    If we hold that perceiving is sufficient for knowing, we can raise a powerful objection to dreaming skepticism: Skeptics assume the implausible KK-principle, because they hold (...)that if we dont know whether we are dreaming or perceiving p, we dont know whether p. The rejection of the KK-principle thus suggests an anti-skeptical strategy: We can sacrifice some of our self-knowledgeour second-order knowledgeand thereby save our knowledge of the external world. I call this strategy the Self-Knowledge Gambit. I argue that the Self-Knowledge Gambit is not satisfactory, because the dreaming skeptic can avail herself of a normative counterpart to the KK-principle: When we lack second-order knowledge, we should suspend our first-order beliefs and thereby give up any first-order knowledge we might have had. The skeptical challenge is essentially a normative challenge, and one can raise it even if one rejects the KK-Principle. (shrink)
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  40.  92
    Kumārila and Knows-Knows.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Philosophy East and West 68 (2):408-422.
    This essay defends a principle that promises to help illuminate the nature of reflective knowledge. The principle in question belongs to a broader category called knows-knows (...)principles, or KK principles for short. Such principles say that if you know some proposition, then you're in a position to know that you know it.KK principles were prominent among various historical philosophers and can be fruitfully integrated with many views in contemporary epistemology and beyondand yet almost every contemporary analytic epistemologist thinks that they are false.Regarding their historical pedigree: they've been endorsed by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Averroes, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer, among others.1Regarding... (shrink)
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  41.  51
    Effective Skeptical Arguments.Christopher T. Buford & Anthony Brueckner - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1):55-60.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 55 - 60 Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios all have the following feature: the subject involved in the (...) scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standardfalse beliefconception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem for skeptical arguments: they require the KK principle. We respond to this criticism on behalf of the skeptic in our paper. (shrink)
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  42.  92
    Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.Tim Kraft - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):269-295.
    What is the role of sceptical scenariosdreams, evil demons, brains in a vatin scep- tical arguments? According to the error view, sceptical scenarios illustrate the possibil (...)- ity of massive falsity in ones beliefs, whereas according to the ignorance view, they illustrate the possibility of massive ignorance not necessarily due to falsity. In this paper, the ignorance view is defended by surveying the arguments in favour of it and by replying to two pressing objections against it. According to the first objection, the ignorance view illicitly introduces the kk-principle into sceptical arguments. In reply I argue that kk is not less plausible than its main rival, the closure principle. According to the second objection, relying on veridical ignorance-possibilities contradicts the transparency of belief. In reply I introduce a version of transparency that is consistent with the ignorance view. (shrink)
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  43. Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. (...)
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  44. Disappearing Diamonds: Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic.Weng San - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1003-1016.
    Augment the propositional language with two modal operators: □ and ■. Defineto be the dual of ■, i.e. ⧫=¬■¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φψ, (...)let (X⧫) be φ→⧫ψ . (X⧫) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)—for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of ⧫, where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X⧫) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (X⧫) to imply (X)—so, the modally qualified principle is as strong as its unqualified counterpart. These results have surprising and interesting implications for issues spanning many areas of philosophy. (shrink)
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  45. If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom.Susanne Bobzien - 2012 - In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc.: Essays in honour of Jonathan Barnes. OUP UK.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context (...)
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  46. Hope, Knowledge, and Blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.
    Roy Sorensen introduced the concept of an epistemic blindspot in the 1980s. A proposition is an epistemic blindspot for some individual at some time if and only (...)
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  47. Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection.Julien Dutant - 2007 - Proceedings of Tark XI.
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on (...) a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamsons argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge that underlies the new require- ment provides a better account of inexact knowledge and higher-order knowledge than both Williamsons and Halperns. (shrink)
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  48.  88
    Limiting Skepticism.Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):211–224.
    Skeptics argue that the acquisition of knowledge is impossible given the standing possibility of error. We present the limiting convergence strategy for responding to skepticism and discuss (...)
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  49.  18
    When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning?Wesley H. Holliday, Yifeng Ding & Cedegao Zhang - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:121–139.
    The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about "introspection axioms&quot (...); such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about what agent B believes about what agent A believes; but it is rarely important to reason just about what agent A believes about what agent A believes. This raises the question of the extent to which single-agent introspection axioms actually matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In this paper, we formalize and answer this question. To formalize the question, we first define a set of multi-agent formulas that we call agent-alternating formulas, including formulas like Box_a Box_b Box_a p but not formulas like Box_a Box_a p. We then prove, for the case of belief, that if one starts with multi-agent K or KD, then adding both the 4 and 5 axioms (or adding the B axiom) does not allow the derivation of any new agent-alternating formulasin this sense, introspection axioms do not matter. By contrast, we show that such conservativity results fail for knowledge and multi-agent KT, though they hold with respect to a smaller class of agent-nonrepeating formulas. (shrink)
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  50.  49
    Skepticism, A Priori Skepticism, and the Possibility of Error.Hamid Vahid - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):235-252.
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