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  1. Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
  2.  36
    Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter.Kadri Vihvelin - 2013 - Oup Usa.
    In Causes, Laws, and Free Will, Kadri Vihvelin argues that we can have free will even if everything we do is predictable given the laws of nature and the past. The belief that determinism robs us of free will springs from mistaken beliefs about the metaphysics of causation, the nature of laws, and the logic of counterfactuals.
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  3.  30
    The Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactuals.Terrance A. Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin - manuscript
  4. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.
    The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued (...)
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  5. What Time Travelers Cannot Do.Kadri Vihvelin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):315 - 330.
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  6. Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature: very roughly, it is the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Incompatibilism is a philosophical thesis about the relevance of determinism to free will: that the truth of determinism rules out the existence of free will. The incompatibilist believes that if determinism turned out to be true, it would also be true that we don't have, and have never had, free will. The (...)
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  7. Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.
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  8.  70
    The Dif.Kadri Vihvelin & Terrance A. Tomkow - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):183-205.
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  9.  41
    Counterfactuals: The Short Course.Terrance Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin - manuscript
  10.  50
    Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 303--318.
  11.  85
    Libertarian Compatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):139-166.
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  12.  29
    Determinism.Terrance Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin - manuscript
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  13. Freedom, Necessity, and Laws of Nature as Relations Between Universals.Kadri Vihvelin - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (December) 371 (December):371-381.
  14.  25
    How to Think About the Free Will/Determinism Problem.Kadri Vihvelin - 2011 - In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. MIT Press. pp. 314--340.
    This chapter proposes an approach to the free will/determinism problem that addresses the issue of whether the apparent conflict between free will and determinism is real or not. According to common sense, man has free will; when a person makes a choice, he or she indeed has the choice thought to be had. However, who is to say that the choices one makes are not predetermined? For all we know, determinism might be true. Common sense either is not aware of, (...)
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  15.  58
    Stop Me Before I Kill Again.Kadri Vihvelin - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):115-148.
  16.  86
    The Modal Argument for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.
  17.  57
    Freedom, Causation, and Counterfactuals.Kadri Vihvelin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (2):161-84.
  18.  6
    Libertarian Compatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):139-166.
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  19.  14
    Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):343-371.
  20.  1
    An Essay on Moral Responsibility.Kadri Vihvelin & Michael J. Zimmerman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):455.
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  21.  41
    Causes, Effects and Counterfactual Dependence.Kadri Vihvelin - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):560 – 573.
  22.  39
    A Defense of a Reliabilist Account of a Priori Knowledge.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):90–97.
  23.  39
    John Martin Fischer, the Metaphysics of Free Will.Kadri Vihvelin - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):406-420.
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  24.  24
    John Martin Fischer, the Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).Kadri Vihvelin - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):406–420.
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  25.  15
    Reply to 'Causes and Nested Counterfactuals'.Kadri Vihvelin - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):579 – 581.
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  26. Ability and Being Able to Do Otherwise.Kadri Vihvelin - 1989 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The free will debate is a modal one--if determinism is true, can agents ever do other than what they do? Compatibilists have tried to show that statements about what an agent could have done are deductible to statements about what she would have done if certain conditions had obtained. But recent developments in modal logic and the logic of counterfactuals provide arguments that no such analysis can succeed. There is in the literature no satisfactory reply to these arguments, and some (...)
     
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  27. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.
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