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  1.  84
    Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter.Kadri Vihvelin - 2013 - Oup Usa.
    In Causes, Laws, and Free Will, Kadri Vihvelin argues that we can have free will even if everything we do is predictable given the laws of nature and the past. The belief that determinism robs us of free will springs from mistaken beliefs about the metaphysics of causation, the nature of laws, and the logic of counterfactuals.
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  2. Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
  3. What Time Travelers Cannot Do.Kadri Vihvelin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):315 - 330.
  4.  28
    An Essay on Moral Responsibility.Kadri Vihvelin - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):455.
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  5. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.
    The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued (...)
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  6. Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature: very roughly, it is the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Incompatibilism is a philosophical thesis about the relevance of determinism to free will: that the truth of determinism rules out the existence of free will. The incompatibilist believes that if determinism turned out to be true, it would also be true that we don't have, and have never had, free will. The (...)
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  7. Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.
    There is one important point about which Fischer and I are in agreement. We agree that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. We disagree about the best way of defending that claim. He thinks that Frankfurt's strategy is a good one, that we can grant incompatibilists the metaphysical victory while insisting that we are still morally responsible. I think this a huge mistake and I think the literature spawned by Frankfurt's attempt to undercut the metaphysical debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists (...)
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  8. The Dif.Kadri Vihvelin & Terrance A. Tomkow - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):183-205.
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  9.  86
    Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 303--318.
  10.  71
    How to Think About the Free Will/Determinism Problem.Kadri Vihvelin - 2011 - In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. MIT Press. pp. 314--340.
    This chapter proposes an approach to the free will/determinism problem that addresses the issue of whether the apparent conflict between free will and determinism is real or not. According to common sense, man has free will; when a person makes a choice, he or she indeed has the choice thought to be had. However, who is to say that the choices one makes are not predetermined? For all we know, determinism might be true. Common sense either is not aware of, (...)
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  11. Libertarian Compatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):139-166.
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  12.  39
    Determinism.Terrance Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin - manuscript
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  13.  22
    Libertarian Compatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):139-166.
  14. The Modal Argument for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.
  15.  80
    Stop Me Before I Kill Again.Kadri Vihvelin - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):115-148.
  16.  68
    Counterfactuals: The Short Course.Terrance Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin - manuscript
  17.  74
    Freedom, Causation, and Counterfactuals.Kadri Vihvelin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (2):161-84.
  18. Freedom, Necessity, and Laws of Nature as Relations Between Universals.Kadri Vihvelin - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (December) 371 (December):371-381.
  19. Causes, Effects and Counterfactual Dependence.Kadri Vihvelin - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):560 – 573.
  20.  76
    John Martin Fischer, the Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).Kadri Vihvelin - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):406–420.
  21. Causation.Terrance A. Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin - manuscript
    Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is (...)
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  22. The Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactuals.Terrance A. Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin - manuscript
  23. Ability and Being Able to Do Otherwise.Kadri Vihvelin - 1989 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The free will debate is a modal one--if determinism is true, can agents ever do other than what they do? Compatibilists have tried to show that statements about what an agent could have done are deductible to statements about what she would have done if certain conditions had obtained. But recent developments in modal logic and the logic of counterfactuals provide arguments that no such analysis can succeed. There is in the literature no satisfactory reply to these arguments, and some (...)
     
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  24.  88
    A Defense of a Reliabilist Account of a Priori Knowledge.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):90–97.
  25.  17
    Killing Time Again.Kadri Vihvelin - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):312-327.
    I have argued that even if time travel is metaphysically possible, there are some things a time traveler would not be able to do. I reply here to critics who have argued that my account entails fatalism about the past or entails that the time traveler is unfree or that she is bound by “strange shackles.” My argument does not entail any sort of fatalism. The time traveler is able to do many of the things that everyone else can do (...)
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  26.  18
    Reply to 'Causes and Nested Counterfactuals'.Kadri Vihvelin - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):579 – 581.