Order:
  1.  34
    Who is Causing What? The Sense of Agency is Relational and Efferent-Triggered.Kai Engbert, Andreas Wohlschläger & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):693-704.
    The sense of agency is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects or on its motoric aspects. Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W.. Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel, Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  2.  31
    Intentions and Expectations in Temporal Binding.Kai Engbert & Andreas Wohlschläger - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):255-264.
    Recently, it has been shown that the perceived times of voluntary movements and their effects are perceived as shifted towards each other. This temporal binding phenomenon was explained by an integrated representation of movement and effect, facilitating operant learning and the experience of intentionality. Here, we investigated whether temporal binding depends on explicit intentional attributions. In Experiment 1, participants intended to either produce or avoid producing an effect by the timing of their movements, with the ratio of success being fixed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  3.  47
    Intentionality as a Constituting Condition for the Own Self—and Other Selves.Andreas Wohlschläger, Kai Engbert & Patrick Haggard - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.
    Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  4.  47
    Intentionality as a Constituting Condition for the Own Self—and Other Selves.Andreas Wohlschläger, Kai Engbert & Patrick Haggard - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.
    Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations