En las dos últimas décadas, se ha producido dentro de la filosofía analítica un aumento repentino de la investigación sobre la naturaleza y el papel que juea la intuición. Los filósofos empezaron a investigar qué es la intuición, cómo debería definirse, qué papel desempeña en la filosofía, cuál es su estatus epistémico, entre otras cosas. También hay un número creciente de filósofos que sostienen que todo el debate se basa en un error: la intuición en filosofía no desempeña papel alguno (...) y los filósofos no la utilizan como (fuente de) prueba para sus afirmaciones filosóficas. Esta estrategia se lleva a cabo a menudo diferenciando entre los dos sentidos en los que se supone que la intuición desempeña un papel evidencial en filosofía. Así, la intuición puede entenderse como un estado de intuir o como un contenido proposicional que se intuye. En el primer sentido, se argumenta, la intuición no puede ser tratada como evidencia, ya que presentaría el riesgo de psicologizar la evidencia en filosofía. Sin embargo, si tomamos la intuición como evidencia en el segundo sentido, no hay nada distintivo en ella: en última instancia, toda evidencia en filosofía es de naturaleza proposicional, independientemente de la intuitividad de una proposición dada. En mi artículo, sostengo que esta estrategia fracasa y propongo, en su lugar, una visión de la intuición que, en primer lugar, explica por qué la distinción mencionada no hace que la intuitividad del contenido sea irrelevante para su estatus epistémico; en segundo lugar, está de acuerdo con los hallazgos actuales en psicología; y, en tercer lugar, es lo suficientemente mínima como para permitir la incorporación de las diferentes perspectivas sobre las intuiciones. En particular, sostengo que un juicio intuitivo, caracterizado por su no inferencialidad y revocabilidad, sirve de prueba para determinadas afirmaciones filosóficas, mientras que su fuente es una intuición entendida como un estado de carácter no proposicional que puede examinarse empíricamente. (shrink)

In recent years a lot of metaphilosophical attention has been paid to the role of thought experiments in philosophical inquiry. According to the popular picture, thought experiments are among the most prominent methods for conceptual analysis. However, it is also often claimed that thought experiments in ethics differ from those that are used in other fields of philosophy as being of a different nature—they are not about the concepts, but rather about the things in the world (what those things exactly (...) are depends on the particular metaethical theory one subscribes to). In the paper I argue that this claim is wrong. Conceptual analysis is of a huge value to ethics for it substantially helps to clarify the concepts one uses while making a moral judgment. It is very often the case that the apparent moral disagreement between two subjects turns out to be superficial since it is rooted in the misunderstanding on the conceptual level, for example when one uses some concept equivocally. Moreover, through thought experiments conceptual analysis can help to bring out the tacit assumptions that relate to the concepts involved. (shrink)

The inferentialism due to Robert Brandom presents a compelling normative-deontic picture of language and discursive practices, and as such it is well positioned to address phenomena like lying. This short work outlines a simple account of how lying can be conceptualized within that framework. To that end, the basic Brandomian position is extended to include a novel type of status – namely, pseudo-commitments, which are unique in their being non-binding. The traditional definition of lying is then given a status-oriented form, (...) such that lying consists in presenting a pseudo-commitment with the intention for it to be attributed as a standard commitment. Importantly, this can be articulated in our scorekeeping practices, which is demonstrated with three example exchanges – one featuring an undetected lie, one featuring a detected lie, and one featuring a bald-faced lie. Though simple, the account works and invites extension to other similar phenomena, like sarcasm, acting, bullshit, etc. The notion of pseudo-commitment may also find application outside of the inferentialist context. (shrink)

Robots are becoming more visible parts of our life, a situation which prompts questions about their place in our society. One group of issues that is widely discussed is connected with robots’ moral and legal status as well as their potential rights. The question of granting robots rights is polarizing. Some positions accept the possibility of granting them human rights whereas others reject the notion that robots can be considered potential rights holders. In this paper, I claim that robots will (...) never have all human rights, even if we accept that they are morally equal to humans. I focus on the role of embodiment in the content of the law. I claim that even relatively small differences in the ontologies of entities could lead to the need to create new sets of rights. I use the example of Neanderthals to illustrate that entities similar to us might have required different legal statuses. Then, I discuss the potential legal status of human-like robots. (shrink)

Whether or not we call a love-like relationship with robots true love, some people may feel and claim that, for them, it is a sufficient substitute for love relationship. The love relationship between humans has a special place in our social life. On the grounds of both morality and law, our significant other can expect special treatment. It is understandable that, precisely because of this kind of relationship, we save our significant other instead of others or will not testify against (...) her/him. How as a society should we treat love-like relationships humans with robots? Based on the assumption that robots do not have an inner life and are not moral patients, I defend the thesis that this kind of relationship should be protected by criminal law. (shrink)

The paper examines Walter Chatton’s rejection of final causality. At the core of Chatton’s theory lies the claim that there are four kinds of cause, but only three kinds of causality, because final causality should in a sense be reduced to efficient causality. The author begins by situating Chatton’s theory in the context of the fourteenth-century discussions concerning the problematic status of ends as causes. After that, the paper reconstructs Chatton’s rejection of the opinio communis of his time, according to (...) which both final causes and final causality must be posited. The author claims that Chatton’s objections employ three main arguments, based on ontological parsimony, possible non-existence of ends, and the efficient character of love and desire. Then, Chatton’s own theory is presented. The author’s exposition is focused on Chatton’s thesis that final causes are said to be causes only in a metaphorical sense. The final part of the article examines William of Ockham’s reaction to Chatton’s theory. Arguing against Chatton’s teleology, Ockham wants to prove that we have good reasons to retain both final causes and final causality. (shrink)

İslam tarihinde Müslüman topluluk içinde ilk fikrî ve fiilî anlaşmazlıklar Hz. Peygamberin (s.a.v.) vefatının ardından başlamış daha sonra Hz. Osman ve ardından Hz. Ali döneminde olayların büyümesiyle Hâricîlik mezhebi tarih sahnesine çıkmıştır. Sıffîn savaşını bitirmeyi ve Müslümanlar arasında barışı temin etmeyi hedefleyen Tahkîm olayı başka bir ayrılıkla neticelenmiş, Kur’ân’ı-Kerîm’in hükümlerine uyulmadığı gerekçesiyle Müslüman topluluktan büyük bir grup ayrılarak Nehrevan’a çekilmiştir. Çoğu taşradan gelmiş, eğitim seviyesi düşük askerlerinden oluşan ve daha sonra Hâricîler diye isimlendirilen bu grup, kendi içlerinde de anlaşamamış pek (...) çoğu aşırılık yanlısı bir tavırla Emevî ve Abbasî Devletleri döneminde isyan etmiş ve muhtelif şiddet olaylarına karışmıştır. Hicrî üçüncü asrın sonlarında İbâdiyye hariç, başta Ezârika olmak üzere aşırılığa meyleden veya şiddete başvuran Hâricî gruplar dağılıp yok olmuştur. Hâricî kitleler içerisinde ortaya çıkmış olan İbâdiyye kendi dönüşümünü sağlayarak ve hatta fikir ve yöntemlerindeki yumuşaklık sebebiyle halktan gerekli desteği alarak bir yandan Kuzey Afrika’da 132 yıl hüküm süren Rüstemîler Devletini kurarken diğer yandan da fikrî bünyesini inşa etmiştir. Günümüzde Kuzey Afrika, Umman ve Zanzibar’da yedi milyona yakın nüfusa sahip olan bu mezhep pek çok açıdan etüt edilmeyi hak eden bir topluluk ve bir fikir akımıdır. İbâdiyye, hicrî ikinci asra dayanan yazılı eserleri ve yüzyıllarca biriktirdiği deneyimi ile İslam dininin inanç, davranış ve siyaset esaslarının tedvini için sosyo-politik zeminin anlaşılmasında değerli verilere sahiptir. Öte yandan mezhebin her açıdan objektif olarak ele alındığını söylemek mümkün görünmemektedir. Hicrî üçüncü asrın sonlarından itibaren yazılan fırak ve makālât türü eserlerde çeşitli gerekçelerle Hâricîlik için kullanılan pek çok yerici ifade, aidiyeti iyice araştırılmadan İbâdiyye’yi teşmil edecek şekilde kullanılmıştır ve halen de kullanılmaya devam etmektedir. Burada asıl dikkat edilmesi gereken önemli bir husus, ehl-i biꜤdat yahut ehl-i küfre ait olduğu değerlendirilen pek çok şahıs, düşünce veya ekolün ilmi açıdan tevsiki yapılmadan İbâdiyye’ye nispet edilmiş olabileceğidir. Bu makalede İbâdiyye’nin tarihi derinliklerine inilerek hem inanç sahasına yeni birtakım fikir veya tespitleri kazandırmak hem de mezhebin doğru bir şekilde anlaşılmasına katkı sunmak için İbâdiyye’ye nispet edilen bazı fikir, şahıs yahut alt grupların durumu ele alınmıştır. Bu amaçla temel fırak ve makālât eserleri, İbâdiyye’nin muteber klasik ve çağdaş kaynaklarıyla mukayeseli olarak kullanılmış ve İbâdiyye’ye nispeti tartışmalı olan alt grupların mezhebe aidiyeti tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

This article examines the topic of approaches to personal development that aim at achieving the highest possible level. Such approaches are considered here in the context of Kazimierz Dąbrowski “Theory of Positive Disintegration”. The shaping of the personality is accomplished by the dynamic integration and disintegration of the individual, and also by considering his/her five levels of development. The first level is called the stage of primary integration, whilst harmonious secondary integration refers to the highest level of development itself. The (...) discovery of the highest level of personal value in one’s progress is one of the most effective stages in protecting the individual from any unacceptable moral or ethical standards present in society. It is also effective in the resocialisation of cases involving social pathology. Each person has the task of promoting their personal values to the highest level of development. When the individual conclusively fulfils this task, he/she reaches an optimal stage of harmoniousness and peacefulness. (shrink)

Předkládaná esej se snaží představit koncept identity v kritické perspektivě a v širším kontextu problému demarkace v sociálních vědách. V souladu se známou statí Beyond "Identity" (Brubaker, Cooper) si pokládám otázku, zda je koncept identity nadále užitečný a vhodný coby analytický nástroj ve společenských vědách. Pozornost věnuji jak samotnému zanesení konceptu na pole sociálních věd, tak i srovnání a zhodnocení esencialistického, konstruktivistického a dekonstruktivistického pojetí, přičemž tyto tři způsoby uchopení daného pojmu vnímám zároveň jako reprezentace různých postojů k sociální realitě, (...) k možnosti skutečného poznání (episteme/doxa) a ke vztahu vědeckého a nevědeckého pole. Kriticky reflektuji všechna tři pojetí a argumentuji ve prospěch nahrazení konceptu identity, avšak také ve prospěch posílení (auto)kritického vnímání ve spojitosti k užívaným vědeckým konceptům a nástrojům, jakožto i k vědcům samotným. (shrink)

At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures `wrong'. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are `wrong' when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason“) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.

Using robots in the military contexts is problematic at many levels. There are social, legal, and ethical issues that should be discussed first before their wider deployment. In this paper, we focus on an additional problem: their human likeness. We claim that military robots should not look like humans. That design choice may bring additional risks that endanger human lives and by that contradicts the very justification for deploying robots at war, which is decreasing human deaths and injuries. We discuss (...) two threats—epistemological and patient. Epistemological one is connected with the risk of mistaking robots for humans due to the limited ways of getting information about the external world, which may be amplified by the rush and need to fight with robots in distance. The patient threat is related to the developing attachment to robots, that in military contexts may cause additional deaths by the hesitance to sacrifice robots in order to save humans in peril or risking human life to save robots. (shrink)

Profesor Ryszard Panasiuk przez ostatnich kilka dekad należał do grona wiodących polskich filozofów. Jego książki na temat Hegla, ruchu młodoheglowskiego czy Marksa należą do kanonu historiografii idei. Publikowany tutaj obszerny wywiad z Profesorem może stanowić wartościowe i oryginalne źródło do historii inteligencji i humanistyki w tzw. Polsce Ludowej. Profesor Panasiuk opowiada w nim o swojej karierze naukowej, jednocześnie kreśląc obraz przemian akademickiego środowiska filozoficznego w powojennej Polsce. Wiele uwagi poświęca również swojej relacji z Bronisławem Baczką i innymi wybitnym reprezentantami Warszawskiej (...) Szkoły Historii Idei. Ponadto Profesor analizuje proces narastania prądów dysydenckich wśród zwolenników marksizmu po Październiku ’56 i wyjaśnia ostateczny rozkład post-stalinowskiej ortodoksji w polskim życiu intelektualnym tego okresu. Jak również dowodzi, że choć Marks stanowi ważny i wciąż warty badania rozdział w historii filozofii europejskiej, to marksizm, z uwagi na zawarty w nim koncept „radykalnej wspólnoty”, jest ideologią z gruntu utopijną. (shrink)

Richard Rorty był intelektualistą zdecydowanie świeckim, zdeklarowanym ateistą i antyklerykałem. Pomimo tego w jego wizji utopii liberalnej odnaleźć można pewne tropy, które wskazują na jej związki z religią. W niniejszym artykule staram się zrekonstruować powody, dla których Rorty tak krytycznie ocenia rolę religii w demokracji liberalnej. Podkreślam przy tym, że są one osadzone głównie w specyficznie rozumianym antyautorytaryzmie amerykańskiego filozofa. Następnie zaś przechodzę do wskazania powiązań między projektem liberalnej utopii Rorty’ego a religią, szczególnie chrześcijańską. Argumentuję, że liberalna utopia Rorty’ego jest (...) czymś w rodzaju religii obywatelskiej. Dlatego nieprzypadkowe wydaje się to, że w ostatnim okresie twórczości amerykańskiego neopragmatysty problematyka nadziei społecznej urasta do rangi jednego z głównych tematów. (shrink)

Amerykański filozof Richard Rorty wytrwale pracował na etykietkę intelektualnego enfant terrible. Jednym z przejawów jego oryginalności w akademickim milieu była zdecydowana obrona amerykańskiego patriotyzmu przedstawiona w Spełnianiu obietnicy naszego kraju i innych pismach. W niniejszym artykule staram się uwypuklić pewne cechy Rortiańskiego patriotyzmu oraz powiązać je z jego krytyką lewicy kulturowej. Jego zdaniem utraciła ona polityczne wpływy i uczyniła swoim fetyszem radykalne teoretyzowanie właśnie na skutek swojego antyamerykanizmu. Na koniec stawiam pytanie o to, czy wzrost znaczenia lewicy kulturowej w USA (...) w ostatnich latach nie poddaje w wątpliwość diagnozy Rorty’ego. (shrink)

Sharing on social media has become a daily routine for millions of users worldwide. Sharing transforms the experience of international migration as it enables migrants to maintain social relations and adapt to a new socioeconomic environment. But what does the term “sharing” mean for migrants active on Facebook? What are the contemporary meanings of sharing encouraged by Facebook’s affordances? This paper explores individual sharing strategies on Facebook among Polish migrants in Germany and the UK. On the basis of the material (...) collected through in-depth interviews (N=17) with Poles who have settled in Germany and the UK, it is proposed that the contemporary meaning of sharing has five dimensions: commercial, altruistic, social, connective and addictive. Different compositions of these dimensions can be found in most sharing practices on social media. Following a critique of commercial sharing on social media, it is further established that selling and other profit-driven activities are rather well recognized by the interviewees. However, some of them engage in commercial sharing with no direct selling intention. The article emphasizes that sharing practices help Polish migrants adapt to their bicultural reality in Germany and the UK. (shrink)

Book review: Dominique Lambert, Ryzykowne spotkanie teologii z nauką, przeł. P. Korycińska, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2018, ss. 268.

Book review: Oblicza filozofii w nauce, P. Polak, J. Mączka, W.P. Grygiel, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2017, pp. 386.

We examine how social diversity and inclusiveness on corporate boards affect corporate performance and monitoring in Sri Lanka, a country subject to decades of polarization, civil war, and even genocide. Barely more than a decade after the civil war, we find that board social diversity on the basis of ethnicity, religion, language, gender, and nationality of the board members is positively related to corporate performance, both in terms of stock market performance and accounting returns, and to corporate financial stability. The (...) main positive effects of social diversity derive from ethno-linguistic inclusiveness. The results are confirmed by an instrumental variable approach that addresses endogeneity issues. We find no evidence that inter-personal and moral conflicts or communication problems among board members negatively affect firm performance. (shrink)

This paper is focused on one of the key questions constituting the medieval debate about the ontological status of artefacts, which has to do with the productivity of art. We ordinarily speak about artefacts, such as statues or chairs, as produced by their artificers, and Aristotle describes art in general as a productive habit. In the first part of the paper, I look at how the proponents of the realist view of artefacts argue that the productivity of art can only (...) be explained if we endorse their view, on which by producing an artefact an artificer brings about a new thing in the world, which is distinct from the natural things used in its production. I then turn to the reductionist account of artefacts and examine how its proponents want to show that the productivity of art can be preserved without positing that an artefact must be a new thing in the world, distinct from its natural components. In the final part of the paper, I look at one of the further corollaries of this debate, which has to do with the connection between the productivity of art and natural change. (shrink)

The paper examines the theoretical merit of “semantic molecules” in Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM). Although semantic molecules are said to trace semantic dependence and necessity, compress complexity, and to account for what I call its productivity, that doesn't appear to be the case. This can be illustrated on the basis of a comparison of two explications for the same complex meaning—one containing a molecule and the other its decomposed elements. Counterfactual considerations suggest that the latter is not semantically dependent on (...) the lexicalized molecule and that it is, in turn, not necessary. The other side of the comparison cements the point. This leaves the issue of compression, complexity, and productivity—none of which are helped by semantic molecules, as they appear to do little more than conceal complexity. Meanwhile, they are not required to account for productivity. It seems that molecules may need to be rethought. (shrink)

Artykuł ten stanowi omówienie koncepcji szczęścia, którą można wywieść z pism św. Augustyna z Hippony. Autor podejmuje się systematycznej rekonstrukcji poglądów tego myśliciela, argumentując na rzecz tego, iż dokonanie jej jest możliwe, i twierdząc, iż pewne podstawowe wątki w jego myśli pozostały takie same w ciągu całej jego działalności intelektualnej. Są nimi przede wszystkim: twierdzenie, iż dążenie człowieka do osiągnięcia szczęścia jest dla niego naturalne; twierdzenie, że istotą szczęścia jest osiągnięcie Boga; oraz twierdzenie, że droga do owego szczęścia wiedzie przez (...) zyskiwanie przez człowieka mądrości. Autor przedstawia również główną zmianę w Augustyńskiej wizji szczęścia, którą stanowi „przeniesienie” możliwości jego osiągnięcia z życia obecnego na przyszłe. (shrink)

Artykuł ten stanowi próbę omówienia wpływu, jaki poglądy Williama Ockhama wywarły na przejście od średniowiecznego do nowożytnego rozumienia celowości świata natury. Rozważeniu poddaje się sposób, w jaki do idei celowości świata natury odnosili się wybrani autorzy nowożytni. Krytyce poddaje się „tradycyjną” interpretację przejścia, jakie dokonać miało się w tym aspekcie między średniowieczem a nowożytnością, podług której nowożytność miała przynieść całkowity kres posługiwaniu się celowością w filozofii natury, zastępując ją odwołaniami do przyczynowości sprawczej. Następnie wskazuje się na nowsze, bardziej subtelne próby (...) podejścia do tego zagadnienia, wskazujące na to, iż w filozofii nowożytnej mamy raczej do czynienia z reinterpretacją, a nie porzuceniem idei przyczynowości celowej. W związku z tym autor artykułu proponuje wyróżnienie w obrębie owej filozofii dwóch głównych nurtów. Dalszą część stanowi analiza koncepcji Ockhama, polegająca na wskazaniu w niej tych wątków, które – jak się twierdzi – mogły wywrzeć szczególny wpływ na narodziny nowożytnego rozumienia celowości świata natury. Autor wymienia cztery takie wątki, próbując je powiązać z wyróżnionymi wcześniej dwoma nurtami nowożytnego rozumienia teleologii natury. (shrink)