There is, to all appearances, a philosophic hostility to fashionable dress. Studying this contempt, this paper examines likely sources in philosophy's suspicion of change; anxiety about surfaces and the inessential; failures in the face of death; and the philosophic disdain for, denial of, the human body and human passivity. If there are feminist concerns about fashion, they should be radically different from those of traditional philosophy. Whatever our ineluctable worries about desire and death, whatever our appropriate anger and impatience with (...) the merely superficial, whatever our genuine need to mark off the serious from the trivial, feminism may be a corrective therapy for philosophy's bad humor and self-deception, as these manifest themselves when the subject turns to beautiful clothes. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Gilbert Ryle notes that '"mental" is occasionally used as a synonym of "imaginary" . . . [and] there exists a quite general tendency among ...

Organizational demands for loyalty often profit from a certain vagueness. This profit is probably a product of both nature and design.

Portrayals of humanoid robots in television series draw heavily from the historical and cultural mythology of robots. This mythology is expressed in two contemporary television series, Almost Human and Humans, in which robots are depicted as closely resembling humans in physical appearance and behavior and as fulfilling social roles usually occupied by humans. The robots are imagined with characteristics associated with human consciousness, such as emotions, individuality, and free will. An analysis of the robots in these series, using Jean Paul (...) Sartre’s theories of consciousness and the Other, demonstrates that when the robots are depicted as conscious, the relationship between a human and robot is portrayed as one of human-to-human (or human-to-Other), not human-to-technology. Sartre’s philosophy helps describe the human characters’ fascination and fear of the robots as resulting from their perceptions of the Other’s shifting status of object and subject and the unpredictability associated with the Other’s freedom. Thus, it is not the machine aspects of the robot that are desired and feared, but the humanness within the machine. Viewed in this way, the humanoid robot as depicted these television series represents a continuing effort to define and describe the essence of humanity in a society where the boundaries between machines and humans are becomingly increasingly blurred. (shrink)

This paper explores and criticizes Henry Sidgwick’s conception of the ethical societies he helped found at the end of the nineteenth century. I argue that the societies were not as involved in practical and political problems as one might have expected, and that the theoretical justification offered by Sidgwick -- that the primary obstacles to “right living” lie in our minds and hearts -- is not altogether satisfying. Sidgwick’s nearly exclusive emphasis on the problem of moral knowledge is then contrasted (...) with John Dewey’s attention to moral motivation; and Dewey’s more energetic involvement in current affairs and social issues is set in the context of his distinctive view of the relation between theory and practice. Finally, Sidgwick’s modest hopes for the ethical societies, and the reasons for that modesty, are compared with the confidence that permeated an earlier incarnation of the ethical society, Ben Franklin’s Junto club. (shrink)

Portrayals of humanoid robots in television series draw heavily from the historical and cultural mythology of robots. This mythology is expressed in two contemporary television series, Almost Human and Humans, in which robots are depicted as closely resembling humans in physical appearance and behavior and as fulfilling social roles usually occupied by humans. The robots are imagined with characteristics associated with human consciousness, such as emotions, individuality, and free will. An analysis of the robots in these series, using Jean Paul (...) Sartre’s theories of consciousness and the Other, demonstrates that when the robots are depicted as conscious, the relationship between a human and robot is portrayed as one of human-to-human (or human-to-Other), not human-to-technology. Sartre’s philosophy helps describe the human characters’ fascination and fear of the robots as resulting from their perceptions of the Other’s shifting status of object and subject and the unpredictability associated with the Other’s freedom. Thus, it is not the machine aspects of the robot that are desired and feared, but the humanness within the machine. Viewed in this way, the humanoid robot as depicted these television series represents a continuing effort to define and describe the essence of humanity in a society where the boundaries between machines and humans are becomingly increasingly blurred. (shrink)

At the turn of the nineteenth century, American pragmatists claimed that philosophy rests on experience. Variations of their empiricism persist at the beginning ofthe twenty-first century, but, I argue, the notion of experience remains under-analyzed. In this paper I examine Peirce’s and James’s contrasting views of the relation between experience and philosophy, comparing their views with Descartes’s, and I re-enter Dewey’s question, “What are the data of philosophy?” Do different individuals have different data? As it is a commonplace of the (...) twenty-first century that our experiences vary widely with our individual life circumstances and that there are fault lines in human experience that can be organized by notions of gender, race, ethnicity and culture, and historical and economic circumstances, I also consider whether that commonplace has any import for philosophy. (shrink)

: Can pragmatism account for the private aspect of the self? The classical pragmatists - Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey - mount various attacks on the Cartesian view of the self, and they offer varied and attractive positive accounts of the person. But does pragmatism adequately acknowledge privacy or personal "inwardness"? I explore here the pragmatic picture of the self, drawing on all the classical sources, and I assess the adequacy of pragmatic resources for describing and explaining the puzzles of (...) personal privacy.Resumo: Pode o pragmatismo dar conta do aspecto privado do self? Os pragmatistas clássicos - Peirce, James, Mead e Dewey - desferem diversos ataques à visão cartesiana do self, e oferecem versões positivas, variadas e atrativas da pessoa. Mas pode o pragmatismo adequadamente reconhecer a privacidade ou a 'interioridade' pessoal? Eu exploro aqui a figura pragmática do self, bebendo em todas as fontes clássicas, e avalio a adequação dos recursos pragmáticos para descrever e explicar os quebra-cabeças da privacidade pessoal. (shrink)