To understand human action in general we must look toward its determinants in the agent's cognitive assessment of an existing situation and in the attitudes this has prompted. But we cannot fully determine why a deed is done without reference also to evaluative appraisal which reveals basic commitment to prescripts. Naturalism either overlooks the autonomy of commitment vis- -vis attitude and cognitive assessment or, erroneously assimilating it to attitude, wholly distorts the plain fact of the clash of duty and inclination. (...) Since the roots of conflict derive from the same source as those of action we respond to it appropriately only if we first identify its components. To ignore commitment distorts conflict as grievously as it does action. (shrink)
Terms for the pitch of tones, such as 'high-low' do not describe pitch and can interfere with our apprehending such data for what they are in their sensuous uniqueness. Very different alternatives such as 'narrow-broad' or French aigu-grave serve equally well. In listening to music the first requisite is the apprehension of 'uncategorized' tones, the words for them serving only as a way of marking the fact of their differences. This must lead us to reaffirm what was said by Gorgias (...) about what language can and cannot do in respect of such data. (shrink)
Provides comment on the first of the three primary sections of Kant's Critique; the analytical, the dialectical, and the methodological. The analytical section runs from Kant's Introduction to nearly the end of the Analytic of Principles, and is concerned with the nature, foundations, and the limits of empirical knowledge.