12 found
Order:
  1.  62
    Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (2):154-166.
    A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  71
    Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2021 - Utilitas:1-13.
    A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  18
    Responding to the Timing Argument.Karl Ekendahl - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):753-771.
    According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4.  28
    Death, Badness, and Well-Being at a Time.Karl Ekendahl - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-18.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Epicureanism, Extrinsic Value, and Prudence.Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman & Littlefield.
  6.  28
    Abortion and the Epicurean challenge.Karl Ekendahl - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (4):273-274.
    In a recent article in this journal, Anna Christensen raises an ‘Epicurean challenge’ to Don Marquis’ much-discussed argument for the immorality of abortion. According to Marquis’ argument, abortion is pro tanto morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of ‘a future like ours’. Drawing on the Epicurean idea that death cannot harm its victim because there is no subject to be harmed, Christensen argues that neither fetuses nor anyone else can be deprived of a future like ours by dying. Thus, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  9
    Saving People From the Harm of Death. Edited by Gamlund Espen & Solberg Carl Tollef.Karl Ekendahl - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):871-873.
    Saving People From the Harm of Death. Edited by Gamlund Espen, Solberg Carl Tollef.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  16
    Death and Other Untimely Events.Karl Ekendahl - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:253-257.
    Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that his attempt to address the challenge (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  27
    Death and Other Untimely Events.Karl Ekendahl - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:253-257.
    Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that his attempt to address the challenge (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins.Jens Johansson & Karl Ekendahl - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (2):1-3.
    In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's approach collapses into the view she aims to avoid.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness.Erik Carlson, Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-10.
    In a recent article in this journal, John Martin Fischer defends the view that death harms its victim after she dies. More specifically, he develops a “truthmaking” account in order to solve what he calls the Problem of Predication for this view. In this reply, we argue that Fischer’s proposed solution to this problem is unsuccessful.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  81
    Personal Value – By Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen.Karl Ekendahl - 2012 - Theoria 78 (3):268-272.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark