A number of logicians and philosophers have turned their attention in recent years to the problem of developing a logic of interrogatives. Their work has thrown a great deal of light on the formal properties of questions and question-sentences and has led also to interesting innovations in our understanding of the structures of performatives in general and, for example, in the theory of presuppositions. When, however, we examine the attempts of logicians such as Belnap or Åqvist to specify what, precisely, (...) a question is, or what it is to ask or raise a question, then what we are offered is somewhat less illuminating. Two alternative reductionist accounts seem in particular to have gained most favor: questions are identified either as special sorts of statements, or as special sorts of requests. As we hope will become clear in what follows, neither of these accounts is even nearly adequate; and matters are not improved if questions are identified, by force majeure, as combinations of statements and requests. (shrink)
In manuscripts of 1930-1 Johannes Daubert, principal member of the Munich board of realist phenomenologists, put forward a series of detailed criticisms of the idealism of Husserl’s Ideas I. The paper provides a sketch of these criticisms and of Daubert’s own alternative conceptions of consciousness and reality, as also of Daubert’s views on perception, similar, in many respects, to those of J. J. Gibson.
The last decade has witnessed the beginnings of a remarkable convergence of Husserlian phenonenology and analytic philosophy of language, and the present volumes provide original and important texts of the phenomenological philosophy of language. Powerfully influenced by the writings of the early Husserl, Reinach fashioned Husserl’s ideas into a rigorous analytical methodology of his own, which he applied in particular to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge, and to the philosophies of law and psychology. The central role of (...) the concept of state of affairs in Reinach’s philosophy will bring to mind immediately the formal ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Reinach’s most significant contribution, however, is contained in his The a priori foundations of civil law (1913), above all in the detailed analysis of the a priori structure of the act of promising. This amounts to an elaborate phenomenological theory of speech acts which anticipates, and in some respects goes beyond, the later theories of Austin and Searle. The present edition is in two volumes. Volume 1, which includes a biographical and thematic introduction by the editors, contains critical editions of those pieces published by Reinach himself. Volume II is a collection of all those items in Reinach’s surviving Nachlass which are in publishable form, including a number of important pieces not hitherto obtainable on such themes as ethical predicates, speech acts (“soziale Akte”), perception and the theory of number, together with a comprehensive sketch of the problems in the theory of knowledge, logic and ethics. Appended to this is a text-critical apparatus which also contains extensive discussions of the origins and sources of the materials in question. (shrink)
Neo-Kantianism is common conceived as a philosophy ‘from above’, excelling in speculative constructions – as opposed to the attitude of patient description which is exemplified by the phenomenological turn ‘to the things themselves’. When we study the work of Emil Lask in its relation to that of Husserl and the phenomenologists, however, and when we examine the influences moving in both directions, then we discover that this idea of a radical opposition is misconceived. Lask himself was influenced especially by Husserl’s (...) Logical Investigations, and Husserl, especially in his later writings, was in some respects closer to Kant than were the Neo-Kantians. The contrast between the two philosophers can be illustrated by looking at their view of the objects of judgment; for Lask, as for Kant, judgment can relate to the thing as such only in an indirect way. The world of judgment is a collection of ‘imitations holding a secondary position’. It is cut apart from the plain world of real things by what Lask calls a ‘chasm of artificiality and imagery’. For Husserl, in contrast, the object of judgment is a ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, something ontologically ‘positive’ in the sense that it is an entity in its own right and does not point beyond itself in the manner of a mere sign or proxy for something else. (shrink)
Historical research has recently made it clear that, prior to Austin and Searle, the phenomenologist Adolf Reinach (1884-1917) developed a full-fledged theory of speech acts under the heading of what he called "social acts". He we consider a second instance of a speech act theory avant la lettre, which is to be found in the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Reid’s s work, in contrast to that of Reinach, lacks both a unified approach and the detailed analyses of (...) pertinent examples. But his writings leave no doubt that he is acutely aware of the very problems concerning language structure and use out of which contemporary speech act theory has evolved and that he goes a good way towards solving these problems in the spirit of the modern theory. (shrink)
Neo-Kantianism is common conceived as a philosophy ‘from above’, excelling in speculative constructions – as opposed to the attitude of patient description which is exemplified by the phenomenological turn ‘to the things themselves’. When we study the work of Emil Lask in its relation to that of Husserl and the phenomenologists, however, and when we examine the influences moving in both directions, then we discover that this idea of a radical opposition is misconceived. Lask himself was influenced especially by Husserl’s (...) Logical Investigations, and Husserl, especially in his later writings, was in some respects closer to Kant than were the Neo-Kantians. The contrast between the two philosophers can be illustrated by looking at their view of the objects of judgment; for Lask, as for Kant, judgment can relate to the thing as such only in an indirect way. The world of judgment is a collection of ‘imitations holding a secondary position’. It is cut apart from the plain world of real things by what Lask calls a ‘chasm of artificiality and imagery’. For Husserl, in contrast, the object of judgment is a ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, something ontologically ‘positive’ in the sense that it is an entity in its own right and does not point beyond itself in the manner of a mere sign or proxy for something else. (shrink)
To seek to elucidate Husserl's phenomenology by contrasting it with that of the Munich phenomenologist Johannes Daubert (1877-1947) is to betray an intention to explain something well-known by reference to something that is wholly obscure. Thus most philosophers are somehow aware of Edmund Husserl. But Johannes Daubert?
Johannes Daubert he was an acknowledged leader, and in some respects the founder, of the early phenomenological movement, and was considered – as much by its members as by Husserl himself – the most brilliant member of the group. In Daubert’s unpublished writings we find a series of reflections on Lask, and on Neo-Kantianism, which form the subject-matter of this paper. They range over topics such as the ontology of the ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, truthvalues (Wahrheitswerte) and the value (...) of truth, negative judgments and the copula, and the relation between perception and judgment. (shrink)
The essay provides an account of the development of Reinach’s philosophy of “Sachverhalte” (states of affairs) and on problems in the philosophy of law, leading up to his discovery of the theory of speech acts in 1913. Reinach’s relations to Edmund Husserl and to the Munich phenomenologists are also dealt with.
Für den frühen Meinong gilt das „Prinzip der Relativität des Werts": Werte sind nicht Eigenschaften von Gegenständen, sondern subjektive Gefühlsantworten auf solche Eigenschaften. Dabei ist es nicht so sehr der einzelne Gefühlsakt, sondern die ihm zugrundeliegende Gefühlsdisposition des Individuums oder sogar der Gemeinschaft, welche den Wert von etwas ausmacht. Die Beziehung der Gefühlsdisposition zum Objekt wird durch das darauf bezügUche Urteil vermittelt. Sofern Meinong im Lauf seiner Entwicklung nicht das Objekt, sondern das Objektiv als den eigentlichen Urteilsgegenstand herausstellt, bedarf weniger (...) der subjektive und relative Ansatz seiner Werttheorie einer Revision, sondern ist diese als Lehre von den Werten als Sachverhaltselementen weiter auszubauen. (shrink)
Die Idee des absoluten Wissens schließt die Idee der Begründung dieses Wissens durch und aus sich selbst ein. Das absolute Wissen unterscheidet sich in sich selber in den Grund des Wissens und dessen Folge, eben das Wissen. Das Wissen ist also die Identität des Wissens mit seiner Negation, dem Sein an sich. Husserls Phänomenologie will die radikale Ausführung der als absolutes Wissen oder Wahrheit strenge Wissenschaft verstandenen Philosophie sein. Sofern das absolute Wissen ein Wissen ist, muß die Phänomenologie deshalb die (...) Identität seiner beiden Pole herausstellen ; d.h. durch die phänomenologische Reduktion darf nichts vom Ansichsein oder der Welt verloren gehen. Sofern das Wissen dagegen absolut ist, muß das negative Verhältnis zwischen den Polen Welt und Bewußtsein einen Abgrund aufreißen ; der wechselseitige Ausschluß beider nimmt die absolute Form des schlechthinnigen Widerspruchs an. Durch die Konstitution der Bewußtseinsgegenständlichkeiten kommt also etwas vom Bewußtsein völlig Verschiedenes, eben die Welt, zustande. Die Form der phänomenologischen Grundbegriffe Intentionalität, Reduktion und Konstitution ist demnach die der wechselseitigen Implikation zweier sich gegenseitig zugleich auch aufhebender Momente. Da diese Aufhebung zugleich auch die Beständigung und Bestätigung des Aufgehobenen ist, bleibt als ihr Resultat nicht nichts übrig, sondern eine in ihren Grundlagen verworrene und doppelgesichtige Philosophie. Die Grundstruktur der Phänomenologie äußert sich in Paradoxien, deren Ursprung und Notwendigkeit Husserl nicht mehr aufgeklärt hat. Der Rechtsgrund zu diesem Unaufgeklärtlassen liegt darin, daß erst nach der Aufrichtung und Durchführung der Phänomenologie, d.h. an ihrem Ende, eine Reflexion auf die Phänomenologie als solche und im Ganzen vollzogen werden konnte. Der Rechtsgrund für diese Totalreflexion liegt aber seinerseits ebenfalls und in gleichem Maße in der Idee des absoluten Wissens beschlossen, welche die absolute Selbstbegründung des Wissens fordert oder, wie Husserl sagt, die Reduktion auf die äußersten Horizonte. Der äußerste Horizont der Phänomenologie (als des absoluten Wissens) ist aber die Phänomenologie selbst. So ist die Reflexion auf die Grundlagen der Phänomenologie einerseits ein Unternehmen innerhalb des absoluten Wissens und der Phänomenologie, wie sie andererseits auch erst an derem Ende, also jenseits der Phänomenologie, vollzogen werden kann. Dieser Widerspruch im Bestimmen des Wesens der Phänomenologie bewahrheitet die Bestimmung dieses Wesens als des Widerspruchswesens schlechthin. Die Phänomenologie bildet demnach die Bewegung, sich bzw. die Idee des absoluten Wissens selber aufzuheben. Dies ist aber nicht die Feststellung eines „Scheiterns” des phänomenologischen Projekts. Vielmehr hat dieser Sachverhalt positive Bedeutung : Die Phänomenologie verendlicht sich selber zu einer Philosophie, um sich selbst zu überleben in der Aufhebung dieser ihrer Endlichkeit auf die Philosophie als solche hin. Durch das Übergehen der unendlichen Idee in die Endlichkeit entfaltet diese sich in sich selber zu ihrer wahren Unendlichkeit. Die Idee des absoluten Wissens ist also nicht eine abstrakte und leblose Chimäre, welcher Husserl in seiner Phänomenologie nachgejagt wäre. Sie bildet im Gegenteil die Bewegung der inneren Selbstveränderung des Absoluten und ist die Selbstbewegung seiner Idee. (shrink)
