The last decade has witnessed the beginnings of a remarkable convergence of Husserlian phenonenology and analytic philosophy of language, and the present volumes provide original and important texts of the phenomenological philosophy of language. Powerfully influenced by the writings of the early Husserl, Reinach fashioned Husserl’s ideas into a rigorous analytical methodology of his own, which he applied in particular to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge, and to the philosophies of law and psychology. The central role of (...) the concept of state of affairs in Reinach’s philosophy will bring to mind immediately the formal ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Reinach’s most significant contribution, however, is contained in his The a priori foundations of civil law (1913), above all in the detailed analysis of the a priori structure of the act of promising. This amounts to an elaborate phenomenological theory of speech acts which anticipates, and in some respects goes beyond, the later theories of Austin and Searle. The present edition is in two volumes. Volume 1, which includes a biographical and thematic introduction by the editors, contains critical editions of those pieces published by Reinach himself. Volume II is a collection of all those items in Reinach’s surviving Nachlass which are in publishable form, including a number of important pieces not hitherto obtainable on such themes as ethical predicates, speech acts (“soziale Akte”), perception and the theory of number, together with a comprehensive sketch of the problems in the theory of knowledge, logic and ethics. Appended to this is a text-critical apparatus which also contains extensive discussions of the origins and sources of the materials in question. (shrink)
A number of logicians and philosophers have turned their attention in recent years to the problem of developing a logic of interrogatives. Their work has thrown a great deal of light on the formal properties of questions and question-sentences and has led also to interesting innovations in our understanding of the structures of performatives in general and, for example, in the theory of presuppositions. When, however, we examine the attempts of logicians such as Belnap or Åqvist to specify what, precisely, (...) a question is, or what it is to ask or raise a question, then what we are offered is somewhat less illuminating. Two alternative reductionist accounts seem in particular to have gained most favor: questions are identified either as special sorts of statements, or as special sorts of requests. As we hope will become clear in what follows, neither of these accounts is even nearly adequate; and matters are not improved if questions are identified, by force majeure, as combinations of statements and requests. (shrink)
Historical research has recently made it clear that, prior to Austin and Searle, the phenomenologist Adolf Reinach (1884-1917) developed a full-fledged theory of speech acts under the heading of what he called "social acts". He we consider a second instance of a speech act theory avant la lettre, which is to be found in the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Reid’s s work, in contrast to that of Reinach, lacks both a unified approach and the detailed analyses of (...) pertinent examples. But his writings leave no doubt that he is acutely aware of the very problems concerning language structure and use out of which contemporary speech act theory has evolved and that he goes a good way towards solving these problems in the spirit of the modern theory. (shrink)
The essay provides an account of the development of Reinach’s philosophy of “Sachverhalte” (states of affairs) and on problems in the philosophy of law, leading up to his discovery of the theory of speech acts in 1913. Reinach’s relations to Edmund Husserl and to the Munich phenomenologists are also dealt with.
Neo-Kantianism is common conceived as a philosophy ‘from above’, excelling in speculative constructions – as opposed to the attitude of patient description which is exemplified by the phenomenological turn ‘to the things themselves’. When we study the work of Emil Lask in its relation to that of Husserl and the phenomenologists, however, and when we examine the influences moving in both directions, then we discover that this idea of a radical opposition is misconceived. Lask himself was influenced especially by Husserl’s (...) Logical Investigations, and Husserl, especially in his later writings, was in some respects closer to Kant than were the Neo-Kantians. The contrast between the two philosophers can be illustrated by looking at their view of the objects of judgment; for Lask, as for Kant, judgment can relate to the thing as such only in an indirect way. The world of judgment is a collection of ‘imitations holding a secondary position’. It is cut apart from the plain world of real things by what Lask calls a ‘chasm of artificiality and imagery’. For Husserl, in contrast, the object of judgment is a ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, something ontologically ‘positive’ in the sense that it is an entity in its own right and does not point beyond itself in the manner of a mere sign or proxy for something else. (shrink)
In manuscripts of 1930-1 Johannes Daubert, principal member of the Munich board of realist phenomenologists, put forward a series of detailed criticisms of the idealism of Husserl’s Ideas I. The paper provides a sketch of these criticisms and of Daubert’s own alternative conceptions of consciousness and reality, as also of Daubert’s views on perception, similar, in many respects, to those of J. J. Gibson.
Johannes Daubert he was an acknowledged leader, and in some respects the founder, of the early phenomenological movement, and was considered – as much by its members as by Husserl himself – the most brilliant member of the group. In Daubert’s unpublished writings we find a series of reflections on Lask, and on Neo-Kantianism, which form the subject-matter of this paper. They range over topics such as the ontology of the ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, truthvalues (Wahrheitswerte) and the value (...) of truth, negative judgments and the copula, and the relation between perception and judgment. (shrink)
Cette chronique est le recueil des textes relatifs à la vie et à la pensée de Hobbes, restitués dans l’ordre de leur succession historique. L’auteur reconstruit les aspects les moins visibles du cheminement philosophique de Hobbes, c’est-à-dire qu’il recompose le tissu contextuel qui est à l’arrière-plan des grandes œuvres. Il mobilise non seulement toute la documentation imprimée et manuscrite connue mais également de nombreux documents jusqu’à présent inconnus, pour exhumer des témoignages oubliés, déceler des rapports nouveaux et reconstituer des textes (...) perdus.La chronique est donc un véritable laboratoire d’historien de la philosophie. On y voit, pour ainsi dire, à l’œil nu, le travail de reconstruction des textes. La recherche sur Hobbes atteint ici un niveau de rigueur et de scientificité inconnu jusqu’à ce jour. (shrink)
Für den frühen Meinong gilt das „Prinzip der Relativität des Werts": Werte sind nicht Eigenschaften von Gegenständen, sondern subjektive Gefühlsantworten auf solche Eigenschaften. Dabei ist es nicht so sehr der einzelne Gefühlsakt, sondern die ihm zugrundeliegende Gefühlsdisposition des Individuums oder sogar der Gemeinschaft, welche den Wert von etwas ausmacht. Die Beziehung der Gefühlsdisposition zum Objekt wird durch das darauf bezügUche Urteil vermittelt. Sofern Meinong im Lauf seiner Entwicklung nicht das Objekt, sondern das Objektiv als den eigentlichen Urteilsgegenstand herausstellt, bedarf weniger (...) der subjektive und relative Ansatz seiner Werttheorie einer Revision, sondern ist diese als Lehre von den Werten als Sachverhaltselementen weiter auszubauen. (shrink)
Neo-Kantianism is common conceived as a philosophy ‘from above’, excelling in speculative constructions – as opposed to the attitude of patient description which is exemplified by the phenomenological turn ‘to the things themselves’. When we study the work of Emil Lask in its relation to that of Husserl and the phenomenologists, however, and when we examine the influences moving in both directions, then we discover that this idea of a radical opposition is misconceived. Lask himself was influenced especially by Husserl’s (...) Logical Investigations, and Husserl, especially in his later writings, was in some respects closer to Kant than were the Neo-Kantians. The contrast between the two philosophers can be illustrated by looking at their view of the objects of judgment; for Lask, as for Kant, judgment can relate to the thing as such only in an indirect way. The world of judgment is a collection of ‘imitations holding a secondary position’. It is cut apart from the plain world of real things by what Lask calls a ‘chasm of artificiality and imagery’. For Husserl, in contrast, the object of judgment is a ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, something ontologically ‘positive’ in the sense that it is an entity in its own right and does not point beyond itself in the manner of a mere sign or proxy for something else. (shrink)
Celia Wolf‐Devine: Descartes on Seeing: Epistemology and Visual Perception. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993, pp. viii + 121. ISBN 0–8093–1838–5. Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan with selected variants front the Latin edition of 1668. Edited, with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Curley. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis/cambridge 1994, pp. lxxx‐584. ISBN 0–87220–178–3, £27.95, 0–87220–177–5, £6.95. Allison Coudert: Leibniz and the Kabbalah. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 218. £68.00. ISBN 0–7923–3114–1. Richard Price: The Correspondence. [Edited by D. O. Thomas (...) and W. Bernard Peach]. Vol. III. February 1786‐February 1791. Edited by W. Bernard Peach.. ISBN 0–8223–1327–8. Henry Allison: Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1996. xxi + 217 pp. £30, £10.95. ISBN 0–521–48295‐X, 0–521–48337–9. Terry Pinkard: Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 4451 pp. £40.00 hb. ISBN 0–521–45300–3. Mary Anne Perkins: Coleridge's Philosophy, The Logos as Unifying Principle. pp. 310. £30.00. ISBN 0–19–824075–9. Elzbieta Ettinger: Hannah Arendt ‐ Martin Heidegger £10.95 ISBN 0–300–06407–1 Dana R. Villa: Arendt and Heidegger ‐ The Fate of the Political ISBN 0–691–04400–7. (shrink)
Cette chronique est le recueil des textes relatifs a la vie et a la pensee de Hobbes, restitues dans l'ordre de leur succession historique. L'auteur reconstruit les aspects les moins visibles du cheminement philosophique de Hobbes, c'est-a-dire qu'il recompose le tissu contextuel qui est a l'arriere-plan des grandes oeuvres. Il mobilise non seulement toute la documentation imprimee et manuscrite connue mais egalement de nombreux documents jusqu'a present inconnus, pour exhumer des temoignages oublies, deceler des rapports nouveaux et reconstituer des textes (...) perdus. La chronique est donc un veritable laboratoire d'historien de la philosophie. On y voit, pour ainsi dire, a l'oeil nu, le travail de reconstruction des textes. La recherche sur Hobbes atteint ici un niveau de rigueur et de scientificite inconnu jusqu'a ce jour. (shrink)
