Results for 'Katalin Bombó'

190 found
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  1.  19
    Illusionism's Discontent.Balog Katalin - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):40-51.
    Frankish positions his view, illusionism about qualia (a.k.a. eliminativist physicalism), in opposition to what he calls radical realism (dualism and neutral monism) and conservative realism (a.k.a. non-eliminativist physicalism). Against radical realism, he upholds physicalism. But he goes along with key premises of the Gap Arguments for radical realism, namely, 1) that epistemic/explanatory gaps exist between the physical and the phenomenal, and 2) that every truth should be perspicuously explicable from the fundamental truth about the world; and he concludes that because (...)
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  2.  6
    1. Magyar sors Csehszlovákiában, 1945-47.Vadkerty Katalin - forthcoming - História.
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  3.  4
    Vidularia: Outlines Of A Reconstruction.Dér Katalin - 1987 - Classical Quarterly 37 (02):432-.
    The last play of the Varronian canon, Vidularia, is transmitted to us through two different channels. Some pages of it survive in the Codex Ambrosianus, containing the prologue and a couple of scenes from the beginning of the play. On the other hand grammarians quote fragments of a few lines out of context, as examples of idiosyncratic Latin syntax and morphology. From the combination of these two disparate sources classical scholars have reconstructed a Vidularia that is parallel to Rudens on (...)
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  4. Hungarian Rhapsodies. Essays on Ethnicity, Identity and Culture. By Richard Teleky.K. Katalin - 2001 - The European Legacy 6 (5):673-673.
     
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  5. The Subject's Point of View – Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.
  6.  54
    The Subject's Point of View * by Katalin Farkas.A. Avramides - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):791-794.
    On the dust jacket of The Subject's Point of View there is a detail from Vilhelm Hammershoi's Interior with Sitting Woman. It is hard to think of a painter who better captures the inner in his work. From the monochrome colour, to the back that faces us, to the door swung open to reveal yet another doorway, we are led to interiority – to the inner. This is a perfect image for a book whose author wants to persuade us to (...)
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  7.  38
    The Subject's Point of View, by Katalin Farkas.W. Fish - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1161-1165.
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  8.  13
    Nyíri, J.C., Tradition and Individuality: Philosophical Essays, “Synthese Library”; Nyíri, Kristóf, A Hagyomány Filozófiája (The Philosophy of Tradition); Neumer, Katalin, Gondolkodás, Beszéd, Írás (Thought, Language, and Writing). [REVIEW]Tamás Demeter - 1999 - Studies in East European Thought 51 (4):329-340.
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  9.  9
    Katalin Makkai, Ed. , Vertigo: Philosophers on Film . Reviewed By.Erin Bradfield - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (5):384-387.
  10. Katalin Farkas: un punto de vista cartesiano sobre el contenido mental.Andrés Luis Jaume Rodríguez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):169-177.
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  11.  12
    Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View[REVIEW]Sandy Goldberg - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5).
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  12.  2
    Chrétien de Troyes: An Analytic Bibliography, Supplement 1Douglas Kelly Maciej Abramowicz Katalin Halász Ceridwen Lloyd-Morgan.Roberta L. Krueger - 2004 - Speculum 79 (3):777-779.
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  13.  1
    The Subject's Point of View – Katalin Farkas.Gertler Brie - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.
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  14. Katalin Neumer: Die Relativität der Grenzen. Studien zur Philosophie Wittgensteins. [REVIEW]Tamas Demeter - 2001 - Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 54 (3).
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  15. Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas, Eds., Metaphysics, a Guide and Anthology Reviewed By.Robert Fahrnkopf - 2005 - Philosophy in Review 25 (4):247-250.
     
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  16. Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas, Eds., Metaphysics, a Guide and Anthology. [REVIEW]Robert Fahrnkopf - 2005 - Philosophy in Review 25:247-250.
     
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  17. Katalin Halász, Images d'auteur dans le roman médiéval (XIIe–XIIIe siècles).(Studia Romanica, Series Litteraria, 17.) Debrecen, Hungary: Kossuth Lajos Tudományegyetem, 1992. Paper. Pp. 131; errata sheet. [REVIEW]Robert Giannasi - 1995 - Speculum 70 (4):913-914.
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  18. Douglas Kelly, with Maciej Abramowicz, Katalin Halàsz, Ceridwen Lloyd-Morgan, Et Al., Chrétien de Troyes: An Analytic Bibliography, Supplement 1. Woodbridge, Eng., and Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell and Brewer, 2002. Paper. Pp. Ix, 582. $85. [REVIEW]Roberta L. Krueger - 2004 - Speculum 79 (3):777-779.
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  19. Alboran Is and Is Not Dry: Katalin Havas on Logic and Dialectic.Lorenzo PeÑa - 1990 - Logique Et Analyse 33 (31):331.
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  20. Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem, Katalin Balog.A. Rational Superego - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4).
  21. Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View.János Tőzsér - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):243-251.
     
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  22.  97
    The Subject's Point of View.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  23. In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...)
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  24. Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  25. Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  26. Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  27. A Sense of Reality.Katalin Farkas - 2014 - In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucinations. MIT Press. pp. 399-417.
    Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...)
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  28. Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  29. Which Causes of an Experience Are Also Objects of the Experience?Tomasz Budek & Katalin Farkas - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 351-370.
    It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the (...)
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  30. Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis.Katalin Farkas - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...)
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  31. Practical Know‐Wh.Katalin Farkas - 2017 - Noûs:855-870.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...)
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  32. Generalized Galois Logics: Relational Semantics of Nonclassical Logical Calculi.Katalin Bimbo & J. Michael Dunn - 2008 - Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
    Nonclassical logics have played an increasing role in recent years in disciplines ranging from mathematics and computer science to linguistics and philosophy. _Generalized Galois Logics_ develops a uniform framework of relational semantics to mediate between logical calculi and their semantics through algebra. This volume addresses normal modal logics such as K and S5, and substructural logics, including relevance logics, linear logic, and Lambek calculi. The authors also treat less-familiar and new logical systems with equal deftness.
     
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  33. Know-Wh Does Not Reduce to Know That.Katalin Farkas - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):109-122.
    Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of (...)
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  34. Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 99.
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...)
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  35. Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - manuscript
    In this paper I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is epistemological, and it concerns whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is a problem (...)
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  36. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument.Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr - 2015 - Kemanusiaan 22 (1):53-74.
    The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is widely regarded as the most promising physicalist defence against the so-called epistemic arguments—the anti-physicalist arguments that establish an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal facts on the basis of the occurrence of epistemic gaps in our descriptions of these facts. The PCS tries to undercut the force of the epistemic arguments by attributing the occurrence of the epistemic gaps to the special character of phenomenal concepts—the concepts by means of which we think about our (...)
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  37. Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  38.  8
    New Consecution Calculi for $R^{T}_{\To}$.Katalin Bimbó & J. Michael Dunn - 2012 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (4):491-509.
    The implicational fragment of the logic of relevant implication, $R_{\to}$ is one of the oldest relevance logics and in 1959 was shown by Kripke to be decidable. The proof is based on $LR_{\to}$ , a Gentzen-style calculus. In this paper, we add the truth constant $\mathbf{t}$ to $LR_{\to}$ , but more importantly we show how to reshape the sequent calculus as a consecution calculus containing a binary structural connective, in which permutation is replaced by two structural rules that involve $\mathbf{t}$ (...)
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  39.  6
    On the Decidability of Implicational Ticket Entailment.Katalin Bimbó & J. Michael Dunn - 2013 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 78 (1):214-236.
    The implicational fragment of the logic of relevant implication, $R_\to$ is known to be decidable. We show that the implicational fragment of the logic of ticket entailment, $T_\to$ is decidable. Our proof is based on the consecution calculus that we introduced specifically to solve this 50-year old open problem. We reduce the decidability problem of $T_\to$ to the decidability problem of $R_\to$. The decidability of $T_\to$ is equivalent to the decidability of the inhabitation problem of implicational types by combinators over (...)
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  40. What is Externalism?Katalin Farkas - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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  41. Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content.Katalin Balog - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...)
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  42.  1
    Lack of Correlation Between Hypnotic Susceptibility and Various Components of Attention.Katalin Varga, Zoltán Németh & Anna Szekely - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1872-1881.
    The purpose of our study was to measure the relationship between performance on various attentional tasks and hypnotic susceptibility. Healthy volunteers participated in a study, where they had to perform several tasks measuring various attention components in a waking state: sustained attention, selective or focused attention, divided attention and executive attention in task switching. Hypnotic susceptibility was measured in a separate setting by the Waterloo-Stanford Groups Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C .We found no significant correlation between any of the (...)
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  43. Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  44. Stor®.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4).
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  45. Semantic Internalism and Externalism.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
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  46. Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...)
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  47.  25
    Symmetric Generalized Galois Logics.Katalin Bimbó & J. Michael Dunn - 2009 - Logica Universalis 3 (1):125-152.
    Symmetric generalized Galois logics (i.e., symmetric gGl s) are distributive gGl s that include weak distributivity laws between some operations such as fusion and fission. Motivations for considering distribution between such operations include the provability of cut for binary consequence relations, abstract algebraic considerations and modeling linguistic phenomena in categorial grammars. We represent symmetric gGl s by models on topological relational structures. On the other hand, topological relational structures are realized by structures of symmetric gGl s. We generalize the weak (...)
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  48.  10
    Max Cresswell, Edwin Mares, and Adriane Rini, Eds., Logical Modalities From Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity. Reviewed By.Katalin Bimbo - 2017 - Philosophy in Review 37 (3):100-102.
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  49. Physicalism, Dualism, and Metaphysical Gridlock.Katalin Balog - manuscript
    In this paper I survey the landscape of anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses to them. The anti-physicalist arguments I discuss start from a premise about a conceptual, epistemic, or explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions and conclude from this – on a priori grounds – that physicalism is false. My primary aim is to develop a master argument to counter these arguments. With this master argument in place, it is apparent that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks (...)
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  50. Kant on Recognizing Beauty.Katalin Makkai - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):385-413.
    Abstract: Kant declares the judgment of beauty to be neither ‘objective’ nor ‘merely subjective’. This essay takes up the question of what this might mean and whether it can be taken seriously. It is often supposed that Kant's denials of ‘objectivity’ to the judgment of beauty express a rejection of realism about beauty. I suggest that Kant's thought is not to be understood in these terms—that it does not properly belong in the arena of debates about the constituents of ‘reality’—motivating (...)
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