13 found
Order:
See also
Katharine Jenkins
University of Glasgow
  1. Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman.Katharine Jenkins - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):394-421.
    Feminist analyses of gender concepts must avoid the inclusion problem, the fault of marginalizing or excluding some prima facie women. Sally Haslanger’s ‘ameliorative’ analysis of gender concepts seeks to do so by defining woman by reference to subordination. I argue that Haslanger’s analysis problematically marginalizes trans women, thereby failing to avoid the inclusion problem. I propose an improved ameliorative analysis that ensures the inclusion of trans women. This analysis yields ‘twin’ target concepts of woman, one concerning gender as class and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  2. Ontic Injustice.Katharine Jenkins - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):188-205.
    In this article, I identify a distinctive form of injustice—ontic injustice—in which an individual is wronged by the very fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind. To be a member of a certain social kind is, at least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements, and these constraints and enablements can be wrongful to the individual who is subjected to them, in the sense that they inflict a moral injury. The (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  3. Toward an Account of Gender Identity.Katharine Jenkins - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    Although the concept of gender identity plays a prominent role in campaigns for trans rights, it is not well understood, and common definitions suffer from a problematic circularity. This paper undertakes an ameliorative inquiry into the concept of gender identity, taking as a starting point the ways in which trans rights movements seek to use the concept. First, I set out six desiderata that a target concept of gender identity should meet. I then consider three analytic accounts of gender identity: (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  4. Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices.Katharine Jenkins - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):191-205.
    This article argues that rape myths and domestic abuse myths constitute hermeneutical injustices. Drawing on empirical research, I show that the prevalence of these myths makes victims of rape and of domestic abuse less likely to apply those terms to their experiences. Using Sally Haslanger's distinction between manifest and operative concepts, I argue that in these cases, myths mean that victims hold a problematic operative concept, or working understanding, which prevents them from identifying their experience as one of rape or (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  5. Disability, Impairment, and Marginalised Functioning.Katharine Jenkins & Aness Kim Webster - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):730-747.
    One challenge in providing an adequate definition of physical disability is unifying the heterogeneous bodily conditions that count as disabilities. We examine recent proposals by Elizabeth Barnes (2016), and Dana Howard and Sean Aas (2018), and show how this debate has reached an impasse. Barnes’ account struggles to deliver principled unification of the category of disability, whilst Howard and Aas’ account risks inappropriately sidelining the body. We argue that this impasse can be broken using a novel concept: marginalised functioning. Marginalised (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6.  46
    How To Be A Pluralist About Gender Categories.Katharine Jenkins - 2022 - In Raja Halwani, Jacob M. Held, Natasha McKeever & Alan Soble (eds.), The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. 8th Edition. pp. 233-259.
    To investigate the metaphysics of gender categories—categories like “woman,” “genderqueer,” and “man”—is to ask questions about what gender categories are and how they exist. This chapter offers a pluralist account of the metaphysics of gender categories, according to which there are several different varieties of gender categories. I begin by giving a brief overview of some feminist accounts of the metaphysics of gender categories and illustrating how certain moral and political considerations have been in play in these discussions as constraints (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7.  38
    Conferralism and Intersectionality: A Response to Ásta’s Categories We Live By.Katharine Jenkins - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (2):261-272.
    The conferralist account of social properties that Ásta develops and defends in Categories We Live By is persuasive in many ways. Conferralism could however do better, by its own lights, at handling the phenomenon of intersectionality. This paper first suggests a friendly amendment to the schema for conferrals that Asta offers. This helps to explain the difficulty concerning intersectionality. Finally, the paper suggests a way of developing the conferralist account that would resolve this difficulty.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  37
    Categories We Live By. [REVIEW]Katharine Jenkins - 2018 - The Philosophers' Magazine 83:107-108.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  37
    Rape Myths: What Are They and What Can We Do About Them?Katharine Jenkins - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:37-49.
    In this paper, I aim to shed some light on what rape myths are and what we can do about them. I start by giving a brief overview of some common rape myths. I then use two philosophical tools to offer a perspective on rape myths. First, I show that we can usefully see rape myths as an example of what Miranda Fricker has termed ‘epistemic injustice’, which is a type of wrong that concerns our role as knowers. Then, I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  26
    A productive exchange of views on race: Joshua Glasgow, Sally Haslanger, Chike Jeffers, Quayshawn Spencer: What is race? Four philosophical views. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, 283 pp, £64.00. [REVIEW]Katharine Jenkins - 2021 - Metascience 30 (2):239-242.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  80
    The Wrong of Injustice, by Mari Mikkola. [REVIEW]Katharine Jenkins - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):618-627.
    The Wrong of Injustice, by MikkolaMari. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 285.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  10
    Pornography, Social Ontology, and Feminist Philosophy.Katharine Jenkins - 2020 - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 20 (1):18-22.
    Mari Mikkola’s Pornography: A Philosophical Introduction is a rich, thorough, and important book. With great skill and precision, Mikkola maps the conceptual terrain of pornography; summarises and assesses key debates in the existing literature; and contributes her own insights – chiefly, in my view, an appealing artefactual definition of pornography, and a strong case for a methodological commitment to discussing pornography in a way that is grounded in empirical reality. The result is much more than the promised ‘introduction’: it is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  35
    II—Two Routes to Radical Racial Pluralism.Katharine Jenkins - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):49-68.
    Quayshawn Spencer argues for radical racial pluralism, the position that there is a plurality of natures and realities for race in the United States. In this paper, I raise two difficulties for Spencer’s argument. The first is targeted narrowly at his response to a potential objection to his argument, and the second is a more general difficulty to do with how the argument handles the social consequences of the authoritative categorization of people. Although the second difficulty is more serious than (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark