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  1. Does the Paradox of Fiction Exist?Katherine Tullmann & Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):779-796.
    Many philosophers have attempted to provide a solution to the paradox of fiction, a triad of sentences that lead to the conclusion that genuine emotional responses to fiction are irrational. We suggest that disagreement over the best response to this paradox stems directly from the formulation of the paradox itself. Our main goal is to show that there is an ambiguity regarding the word ‘exist’ throughout the premises of the paradox. To reveal this ambiguity, we display the diverse existential commitments (...)
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  2.  46
    The Genuine Attitude View of Fictional Belief.Wesley Buckwalter & Katherine Tullmann - 2017 - In Bradley H., Sullivan-Bissett E. & Noordhof P. (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
    The distinct-attitude view of fictional narratives is a standard position in contemporary aesthetics. This is the view that cognitive attitudes formed in response to fictions are a distinct kind of mental state from beliefs formed in response to non-fictional scenarios, such as pretend or imaginary states. In this paper we argue that the balance of functional, behavioral, and neuroscientific evidence best supports the genuine-attitude view of belief. According to the genuine-attitude view, cognitive responses to fictions are genuine beliefs that are (...)
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  3.  4
    The contents of racialized seeing.Katherine Tullmann - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    This paper explores the conscious visual experience of seeing race. In everyday occurrences, racialized seeing involves the capacity for a subject to simply “see” that someone she encounters belongs to a racial category. I bridge research in analytic philosophy of perception and accounts from phenomenologists and critical race theorists on the lived experience of racialized seeing. I contend that we should not trust our visual experiences of racialized seeing because they provide, at best, incomplete information on a target’s racial identity. (...)
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    Varieties of Pictorial Illusion.Katherine Tullmann - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (3):265-278.
    This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations : in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually (...)
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  5.  14
    The Problem of Other Minds.Katherine Tullmann - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):708-728.
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    Experiencing Gendered Seeing.Katherine Tullmann - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):475-499.
    This paper explores the concept of “gendered seeing”: the capacity to visually perceive another person's gender and the role that one's own gender plays in that perception. Assuming that gendered properties are actually perceptible, my goal is to provide some support from the philosophy of perception on how gendered visual experiences are possible. I begin by exploring the ways in which sociologists and psychologists study how we perceive one's sex and the implications of these studies for the sex/gender distinction. I (...)
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    Sympathy and Fascination.Katherine Tullmann - 2016 - British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2):115-129.
    Why do we form strong emotional attachments to unlikeable and immoral characters during our engagements with fictions? These pro-attitudes persist even as we realize that we would loathe these people if we were to encounter them in real-life. In this paper, I explore the implications of the sympathy for the devil phenomenon. I begin by considering several popular explanations, including simulation, aesthetic distancing, pre-focusing, and the ‘best of all characters’. I conclude that each one is inadequate. I then propose my (...)
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    Empathy, Power, and Social Difference.Katherine Tullmann - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):203-225.
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    Taking the Fictional Stance.Katherine Tullmann - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (6):766-792.
    In this paper, I set out to answer two foundational questions concerning our psychological engagements with fictions. The first is the question of fictional transformation: How we can see fictional media while also ‘seeing’ those objects as fictional ones? The second is the question of fictional response: How and why we take the objects of fiction to be the types of things that we can respond to and judge? Standard responses to these questions rely on distinct cognitive attitudes like pretense, (...)
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  10.  12
    Questioning the Necessity of the Aesthetic Modes.Katherine Tullmann - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (2):160 - 161.
    I question both the necessity and the sufficiency of Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) aesthetic modes. I argue that they have not shown how the aesthetic modes are truly – how they concern our experience of artworks as opposed to other kinds of experiences or why the modes are individually necessary for one. I suggest the causal dependence of the modes should be modified.
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