There exists a limited pluralist model of regulating or `managing' religious diversity in contemporary Europe. This pluralist model, however, is in contrast to the limitations that appear at the state level, which reflect an increasingly illiberal, secular Europe. Such contrast stems historically from tensions that exist between the national and transnational aspects of the model itself, but it also reflects the emerging debates on religious pluralism and the democratic state. With the settlement of post-colonial migrants a public debate on the (...) role of religion in Europe has resurfaced as these communities exist outside the historical formation of Western church-state relations and are challenging the very underpinning of what comprises a `liberal' democratic state. In particular, it is the role of Islam in secular Europe that frames several questions in this debate: to what extent is it necessary to regulate religious freedoms in the `public sphere' in order to protect the democratic state? What restrictions on minority religions should be considered `necessary in a democratic society and what limitations should be placed on state interference in minority religions as protection against the undue influence of a dominant social group? Against this backdrop, this article explores the historical social formation of religious pluralism in the European context and examines the legal and political frameworks at the national and regional levels to `regulate' diversity. (shrink)
Since its foundation, militant democratic arguments have underpinned an enforced secularism in Turkey. The 2002 election of the AKP, described as a “moderate Islamist party”, has challenged Turkey’s secular identity. In the more than twelve years since the AKP has been in power, Turkey’s political landscape has experienced significant changes, with periods of extensive democratic reforms punctuated by regression in certain areas, notably freedom of expression and the right to protest. State repressive measures coupled with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reluctance to (...) exit the political stage have been the focus of much commentary and analysis. This article argues, however, that under AKP rule the Kurdish issue – critical to ensuring the normalization of politics and democratization in Turkey – has been brought in from the political cold and assesses the creation and role of the HDP, a Kurdish political party that is endeavoring to situate itself in the mainstream of Turkey’s political landscape. We posit that the HDP can be viewed as the offspring of this “democratic opening,” a project that was meant to ensure a radical transformation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Through analysing the historical trajectory of both AKP and HDP and the militant democratic arguments that led to their predecessors’ exclusion from the public sphere, this article engages with the key question of the extent to which the AKP’s treatment of the Kurdish issue has provided a vehicle for broader democratisation and facilitated a reconsideration of the Kurdish question in Turkey. (shrink)
T. A. Cavanaugh defends double-effect reasoning (DER), also known as the principle of double effect. DER plays a role in anti-consequentialist ethics (such as deontology), in hard cases in which one cannot realize a good without also causing a foreseen, but not intended, bad effect (for example, killing non-combatants when bombing a military target). This study is the first book-length account of the history and issues surrounding this controversial approach to hard cases. It will be indispensable in theoretical ethics, (...) applied ethics (especially medical and military), and moral theology. It will also interest legal and public policy scholars. (shrink)
Double-effect reasoning (DER) is attributed to Aquinas "tout court". Aquinas's account, however, differs from contemporary DER insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of "risking" an assailant's life while contemporary accounts focus on actions causing harm inevitably. Since one cannot claim to risk the inevitable, and since there is a significant difference between risking harm and causing harm inevitably. Thomas's account does not extend to cases of inevitable harm. Thus, the received understanding of Aquinas's account is flawed and leads to (...) untenable attributions of the direction of intention to Aquinas and to misunderstandings of contemporary DER. (shrink)
This paper argues that the current stock of anti-personnel cluster bombs are temporally indiscriminate, and, therefore, unjust weapons. The paper introduces and explains the idea of temporal indiscriminateness. It argues that to honor non-combatant immunity—in addition to not targeting civilians—one must adequately target combatants. Due to their high dud rate, cluster submunitions fail to target combatants with sufficient temporal accuracy, and, thereby, result in avoidable serious harm to non-combatants. The paper concludes that non-combatant immunity and the principle of discrimination require (...) a moratorium on the use of current cluster munitions. (shrink)
Much of Roman Catholic discussion concerning bioethical controversies, such as the surgical removal of a life-threatening cancerous uterus when the fetus is not viable, has focused on the employment of double-effect reasoning. While double-effect reasoning has been the subject of much debate, this paper argues first, that there is a distinction between the intended and the foreseen; second, that this distinction applies to the contrasted cases in such a way as to categorize foreseen but not intended consequences; and third, that (...) this intended/foreseen distinction has essential ethical significance. (shrink)
A number of common and generally noncontroversial practices in the care of patients at the end of life lead to their deaths. For example, physicians honor a patient's refusal of medical intervention even when doing so leads to the patient's death. Similarly, with a patient's or surrogate's consent, physicians administer sedatives in order to relieve pain and distress at the end of life, even when it is known that doing so will cause the patient's death. In contemporary U.S. public policy, (...) these practices are accepted as ethical and legal while physician-assisted suicide (PAS) isrejected in current U.S. law and public policy. Some think, however, that if one accepts practices that are known to lead to a patient's death, then one cannot reasonably reject a patient's request for a lethal dose of medication so that she may kill herself (PAS). (shrink)
Religious naturalism is an emerging construct that relies greatly on science and yet affirms attitudes and practices that are distinctly religious in nature. This article explores the meaning of the term as it is used by various proponents, contrasts it to some similar constructs , and examines some objections andoutstanding issues from within the science‐religion community: postmodernist objections; whether religious naturalism is sufficiently respectful of traditional religious expression; and whether religious naturalism seeks to be a descriptive or a prescriptive enterprise (...) or both. Overall, religious naturalism is affirmed as a potentially productive new variant of naturaltheology, one that can preserve religious sensibilities without relying on supernatural constructs while maintaining a basic affirmation of other religious traditions. (shrink)
Understanding cultural evolution is one of the most challenging and indispensable scientific tasks for the survival of humankind on our planet. This task demands, besides an adoption of theories and models from biological evolution, theories for culture-specific processes as well. Language evolution and language acquisition offer interesting objects of study in this respect. (Published Online November 9 2006).
Proponents commonly justify the legalization of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in terms of a patient's wanting to die (autonomy) and the patient's having a medically established good reason for suicide. These are the common elements of the standard justification offered for the legalization of PAS. In what follows, I argue that these two conditions exist in significant tension with one another, operating according to distinct dynamics that render the justification for PAS an unstable basis for public policy. Moreover, no natural connection (...) keeps these two criteria united. Indeedthe two elements of the justification oppose and threaten to exclude one another. Thus, the PAS justification is too labile a basis for sound public policy. (shrink)
By analogy to justifications offered for craniotomy by Catholic moralists, a recent instance of casuistry attempts to apply double-effect reasoning and, separately, the concept of a vital conflict to justify dilation and curettage in order to preserve the life of a pregnant woman. This paper examines and rejects these bases for justifying craniotomy and D&C. It concludes with a consideration of Pope John Paul II’s discussion of moral martyrdom in Veritatis splendor. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 : 453–463.
Laudan's "progress and its problems" is of two, incompatible, minds. proto-laudan argues that science is indexed to historical contexts, such that scientific rationality depends on progress and not vice-versa. deutero-laudan claims that sociology assumes "a rationality" and so misunderstands science. the latter is confused and offers no argument against sociology which does not also apply against historical approaches to philosophy of science, proto-laudan included. such tribal warfare is unprogressive, and best abandoned.
This paper concerns the deficiencies of currentlyaccepted principles governing the fair use ofelectronically recorded data when applied to geneticinformation. Principles are proposed by which to dealwith the unique group-characteristics of geneticinformation.
Itself a topic of constant comment, the Internet's implications for healthcare remain unclear even while its boundaries incessantly expand. The WorldWide Web and allied technologies such as telephony are clearly permanent fixtures of our world. These technologies have changed our ways of life and demonstrate further dynamic capacities to do so. They speak of what we shall be, but know not.
Suzanne Uniacke has written an adventurous and philosophically elegant work in which she justifies the intentional use of necessary and proportionate lethal force in private homicidal self-defense. Her contribution will interest those engaged in discussions concerning the ethics of homicide.
In the wake of the Lutheran‐Catholic Joint Declaration on Justification, this essay attempts to explore ecumenical convergences in the writings of Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther on the question of justification. Specifically, this essay takes the recent Finnish uncovering of the theme of theosis in Luther's work and probes Aquinas' Summa Theologiae for similar themes of ontological participation of the human in the divine. I first display Aquinas' doctrine of God and show how human participation in the Trinitarian life is (...) written into the structure of his account of God. I then show how Aquinas' understanding of participation informs his analysis of the virtues. Finally, I present some of the Finns' findings on Luther and examine covergences with Aquinas. Overall, I suggest that language of participation can help overcome the overdrawn contrast between Aquinas' account of the virtues and the forensic interpretation of Luther. (shrink)
A popular approach to defining fictive utterance says that, necessarily, it is intended to produce imagining. I shall argue that this is not falsified by the fact that some fictive utterances are intended to be believed, or are non-accidentally true. That this is so becomes apparent given a proper understanding of the relation of what one imagines to one's belief set. In light of this understanding, I shall then argue that being intended to produce imagining is sufficient for fictive utterance (...) as well. (shrink)
As philosophers of mind we seem to hold in common no very clear view about the relevance that work in psychology or the neurosciences may or may not have to our own favourite questions—even if we call the subject ‘philosophical psychology’. For example, in the literature we find articles on pain some of which do, some of which don't, rely more or less heavily on, for example, the work of Melzack and Wall; the puzzle cases used so extensively in discussions (...) of personal identity are drawn sometimes from the pleasant exercise of scientific fantasy, at times from surprising reports of scientific fact; and there are those who deny, as well as those who affirm, the importance of the discovery of rapid-eye-movement sleep to the philosophical treatment of dreaming. A general account of the relation between scientific, and philosophical, psychology is long overdue and of the first importance. Here I shall limit myself to just one area where the two seem to connect, discussing one type of neuropsychological research and its relevance to questions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. (shrink)
I am grateful to the editors of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for inviting me to write a comment on Kathleen Gill’s ‘On the Metaphysical Distinction Between Processes and Events’. I readily concede that she is right in the central criticism she makes of my 1978 paper: that a properly metaphysical or ontological distinction between processes and events, if it is to be made at all, cannot be sustained on the basis of the informal linguistic criteria I offered in (...) ‘Events, Processes, and States.’ My main concern in that paper was to show that discussions of the Kenny-Vendler typology of activities, performances, and states had focused too narrowly on verb types, on adverbial phrases, on the domain of human action, and on English-language intuitions. Mine was one of several voices urging in the late 1970s that issues of tense logic and of the logic of verb types had to be placed in the broader context of verb aspect — a salient and pervasive structure in natural languages generally, and one that had been studied by philologists and linguists since the nineteenth century. Captivated, as I and others had become at the time, by evidence that the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns appears to be mirrored in verb predications, I went on to make some rather venturesome ‘ontological’ claims. It is satisfying, of course, that Gill accepts not only that there is ‘substantial evidence in favor of recognizing a grammatical distinction between the language of processes and [the language of] events’ but also that ‘similarities with count and mass expressions will allow us to apply techniques for han dling nominal expressions to verbal expressions’. It is more than satisfying that the phenomenon of verb aspect is now noticed and investigated by philosophers as well as by linguists. (shrink)