Results for 'Kathleen Macintosh'

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  1.  3
    Cheryl Dissanayake.Kathleen Macintosh - 2003 - In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press. pp. 213.
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  2.  45
    Reincarnation and Relativized Identity1: J. J. MACINTOSH.J. J. MacIntosh - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):153-165.
    There are five main claims that may be made about life after death: We are reincarnated in the self-same body we had in life. We are reincarnated in another body. We are revived, or continue to live in a disembodied form.
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  3.  15
    Spinoza's Epistemological Views: J. J. MacIntosh.J. J. Macintosh - 1971 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 5:28-48.
    I propose, in this paper, to offer a simple, even perhaps a simplified, version of Spinoza's metaphysical views, and to show how these views sometimes affected his epistemological views. When they did affect his epistemological views the effect was always a bad one, since Spinoza's metaphysical system is quite unworkable. It is helpful, and sometimes even inspiring, but it is wrong. In the end, with the epistemology as with the metaphysics, nothing of substance will be salvageable, but Spinoza's new and (...)
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  4.  11
    Belief-In Revisited: A Reply To Williams: J. J. MACINTOSH.J. J. Macintosh - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (4):487-503.
    In ‘Belief-In and Belief in God’ , J. N. Williams suggests that belief in God cannot be rational unless one has rational beliefs that God exists. While agreeing with his conclusion , I disagree at almost every step with his method of arriving at it. In particular I suggest that Williams goes astray concerning the dual aspect of belief in , the nature of performatives, the arousal of belief states, and the correct account of belief in God.
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  5.  10
    Reincarnation, Closest Continuers, and the Three Card Trick: A Reply to Noonan and Daniels1: J. J. MACINTOSH.J. J. Macintosh - 1992 - Religious Studies 28 (2):235-251.
    In Religious Studies xxvi Harold W. Noonan and Charles B. Daniels severally take issue with my ‘Reincarnation and Relativized Identity’. Both make valuable points but both, I think, have somewhat missed the point of my original article. In that paper I singled out five different views on the possibility of life after death: that we are reincarnated in the self-same body we had in our pre-mortem state; that we are reincarnated in another — in a different — body; that we (...)
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  6. The Nature of Religious Experience Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh.Douglas Clyde Macintosh & Eugene Garrett Bewkes - 1971
     
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  7. The Philosophical Zombie Versus The Tennis Playing Zombie: An Explanation of Consciousness.David B. Macintosh - manuscript
  8. Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1998 - In Peter Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution; Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Volume 7. Oxford University Press.
    David Gauthier suggested that all genuine moral problems are Prisoners Dilemmas (PDs), and that the morally and rationally required solution to a PD is to co-operate. I say there are four other forms of moral problem, each a different way of agents failing to be in PDs because of the agents’ preferences. This occurs when agents have preferences that are malevolent, self-enslaving, stingy, or bullying. I then analyze preferences as reasons for action, claiming that this means they must not target (...)
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  9. Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...)
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  10. Assuring, Threatening, a Fully Maximizing Theory of Practical Rationality, and the Practical Duties of Agents.Duncan MacIntosh - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):625-656.
    Theories of practical rationality say when it is rational to form and fulfill intentions to do actions. David Gauthier says the correct theory would be the one our obeying would best advance the aim of rationality, something Humeans take to be the satisfaction of one’s desires. I use this test to evaluate the received theory and Gauthier’s 1984 and 1994 theories. I find problems with the theories and then offer a theory superior by Gauthier’s test and immune to the problems. (...)
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  11. Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.
    To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the preference (...)
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  12. Gerald Vision and Indexicals.Julia Colterjohn & Duncan MacIntosh - 1986 - Analysis 47 (1):58-60.
    The indexical thesis says that the indexical terms, “I”, “here” and “now” necessarily refer to the person, place and time of utterance, respectively, with the result that the sentence, “I am here now” cannot express a false proposition. Gerald Vision offers supposed counter-examples: he says, “I am here now”, while pointing to the wrong place on a map; or he says it in a note he puts in the kitchen for his wife so she’ll know he’s home even though he’s (...)
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  13. Intransitive Preferences, Vagueness, and the Structure of Procrastination.Duncan MacIntosh - 2010 - In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press.
    Chrisoula Andreou says procrastination qua imprudent delay is modeled by Warren Quinn’s self-torturer, who supposedly has intransitive preferences that rank each indulgence in something that delays his global goals over working toward those goals and who finds it vague where best to stop indulging. His pair-wise choices to indulge result in his failing the goals, which he then regrets. This chapter argues, contra the money-pump argument, that it is not irrational to have or choose from intransitive preferences; so the agent’s (...)
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  14. Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):9-32.
    Gauthier claims: (1) a non-maximizing action is rational if it maximized to intend it. If one intended to retaliate in order to deter an attack, (2) retaliation is rational, for it maximized to intend it. I argue that even on sympathetic theories of intentions, actions and choices, (1) is incoherent. But I defend (2) by arguing that an action is rational if it maximizes on preferences it maximized to adopt given one's antecedent preferences. (2) is true because it maximized to (...)
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  15.  8
    Does Anyone Have a Band-Aid? Anti-Homophobia Discourses and Pedagogical Impossibilities.Lori Macintosh - 2007 - Educational Studies 41 (1):33-43.
    This article focuses on the effectiveness of antihomophobia discourses and explores the process of teaching and learning about heteronormativity. The author offers an interrogation of the regulatory fictions within heteronormativity and frameworks of resistance and examines attempts to move beyond established views of sexual minority students and explore the ways in which queer research has, and continues to, bring a counternarrative to staid liberal notions of reform and the well-intentioned rhetoric of diversity and difference. This analysis raises critical questions about (...)
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  16.  27
    Sceptical Ultimism, or Not so Sceptical Atheism?J. J. MacIntosh - 2011 - Philo 14 (1):66-76.
    In John Schellenberg’s important trilogy he offers us reasons, individually and cumulatively impressive, for adopting a sceptical attitude towards religious claims, both positive and negative. Part of Schellenberg’s argument consists in reminding us of the necessity of not overestimating our present state of intellectual development. In this paper, while allowing the force of the overestimation points, I consider the very real strength of the arguments he develops for atheism, and suggest that they outweigh his sceptical arguments in favour of non-commitment.Whenever (...)
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  17. McClennen’s Early Cooperative Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):341-358.
  18. Persons and the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the Rational Kinematics of Values.Duncan MacIntosh - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):163-180.
    If one can get the targets of one's current wants only by acquiring new wants (as in the Prisoner's Dilemma), is it rational to do so? Arguably not. For this could justify adopting unsatisfiable wants, violating the rational duty to maximize one's utility. Further, why cause a want's target if one will not then want it? And people "are" their wants. So if these change, people will not survive to enjoy their wants' targets. I reply that one rationally need not (...)
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  19. Who Owns Me: Me Or My Mother? How To Escape Okin's Problem For Nozick's And Narveson's Theory Of Entitlement.Duncan MacIntosh - 2007 - In Malcolm Murray (ed.), Liberty, Games And Contracts: Jan Narveson And The Defense Of Libertarianism. Ashgate.
    Susan Okin read Robert Nozick as taking it to be fundamental to his Libertarianism that people own themselves, and that they can acquire entitlement to other things by making them. But she thinks that, since mothers make people, all people must then be owned by their mothers, a consequence Okin finds absurd. She sees no way for Nozick to make a principled exception to the idea that people own what they make when what they make is people, concluding that Nozick’s (...)
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  20. Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Soution of the Compliance Problem.Duncan MacIntosh - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):499-525.
    David Gauthier thinks agents facing a prisoner's dilemma ('pd') should find it rational to dispose themselves to co-operate with those inclined to reciprocate (i.e., to acquire a constrained maximizer--'cm'--disposition), and to co-operate with other 'cmers'. Richmond Campbell argues that since dominance reasoning shows it remains to the agent's advantage to defect, his co-operation is only rational if cm "determines" him to co-operate, forcing him not to cheat. I argue that if cm "forces" the agent to co-operate, he is not acting (...)
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  21.  72
    Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321.
    For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" preferences. (...)
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  22.  25
    Two Gauthiers?Duncan MacIntosh - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (1):43-.
    David Gauthier claims that it can be rational to co-operate in a prisoner's dilemma if one has adopted a disposition constraining one's self from maximizing one's individual expected utility, i.e., a constrained maximizer disposition. But I claim cooperation cannot be both voluntary and constrained. In resolving this tension I ask what constrained maximizer dispositions might be. One possibility is that they are rationally acquired, irrevocable psychological mechanisms which determine but do not rationalize cooperation. Another possibility is that they are rationally (...)
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  23. Could God Have Made the Big Bang? (On Theistic Counterfactuals).Duncan Macintosh - 1994 - Dialogue 33 (1):3-20.
    Quentin Smith argues that if God exists, He had a duty to ensure life's existence; and He couldn't rationally have done so and made a big bang unless a counter-factual like "If God had made a big bang, there would have been life," was true pre-creation. But such counter-factuals are not true pre-creation. I argue that God could have made a big bang without irrationality; and that He could have ensured life without making big bangs non-random. Further, a proper understanding (...)
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  24. Ideal Moral Codes.Duncan MacIntosh - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):389-408.
    Ideal rule utilitarianism says that a moral code C is correct if its acceptance maximizes utility; and that right action is compliance with C. But what if we cannot accept C? Rawls and L. Whitt suggest that C is correct if accepting C maximizes among codes we can accept; and that right action is compliance with C. But what if merely reinforcing a code we can't accept would maximize? G. Trianosky suggests that C is correct if reinforcing it maximizes; and (...)
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  25. Buridan and the Circumstances of Justice (On the Implications of the Rational Unsolvability of Certain Co-Ordination Problems).Duncan MacIntosh - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):150-173.
    Gauthier and Hobbes reduce Prisoners Dilemmas to co-ordination problems (CPs). Many think rational, face-to-face agents can solve any CP by agreed fiat. But though an agent can rationally use a symmetry-breaking technique (ST) to decide between equal options, groups cannot unless their members' STs luckily converge. Failing this, the CP is escapable only by one agent's non-rational stubbornness, or by the group's "conquest" by an outside force. Implications: one's strategic rationality is group-relative; there are some optimums groups in principle cannot (...)
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  26. 4. The Mutual Limitation of Needs as Bases of Moral Entitlements: A Solution to Braybrooke’s Problem.Duncan Macintosh - 2006 - In Susan Sherwin & Peter Schotch (eds.), Engaged Philosophy: Essays in Honour of David Braybrooke. University of Toronto Press. pp. 77-100.
    David Braybrooke argues that meeting people’s needs ought to be the primary goal of social policy. But he then faces the problem of how to deal with the fact that our most pressing needs, needs to be kept alive with resource-draining medical technology, threaten to exhaust our resources for meeting all other needs. I consider several solutions to this problem, eventually suggesting that the need to be kept alive is no different in kind from needs to fulfill various projects, and (...)
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  27. Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth.Duncan Macintosh - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.
    Scientific Realists argue that it would be a miracle if scientific theories were getting more predictive without getting closer to the truth; so they must be getting closer to the truth. Van Fraassen, Laudan et al. argue that owing to the underdetermination of theory by data (UDT) for all we know, it is a miracle, a fluke. So we should not believe in even the approximate truth of theories. I argue that there is a test for who is right: suppose (...)
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  28.  25
    Ethical Considerations for Clinical Photography in the Global South.Tracy Macintosh - 2006 - Developing World Bioethics 6 (2):81–88.
    Clinical photography is an important tool for teaching practitioners and field workers about the clinical manifestations of famine an.
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  29.  37
    Perception and Imagination in Descartes, Boyle and Hooke.J. J. MacIntosh - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):327 - 352.
  30.  54
    Boyle and Locke on Observation, Testimony, Demonstration and Experience.J. J. MacIntosh - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):275-288.
    In Warranted Christian Beliet Alvin Plantinga claims that “The Enlightenment looked askance at testimony and tradition; Locke saw them as a preeminent source of error.” Locke, Plantinga suggests, is the “fountainhead” of this stance. This is importantly wrong about Locke and Locke”s views, and an examination of the views of Locke’s much admired friend and slightly older contemporary, Robert Boyle, reveals that the claim is mistaken about him as well, reinforcing the view that Plantinga is in general mistaken about the (...)
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  31.  91
    Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
    Hume said that the reasons that determine the rationality of one's actions are the desires one has when acting: one's actions are rational iff they advance these desires. Thomas Nagel says this entails calling rational, actions absurdly conflicting in aims over time. For one might have reason, in one's current desires, to begin trying to cause states one foresees having reason, in one's foreseen desires, to prevent. Instead, then, real reasons must be timeless, so that current and foreseen reasons cannot (...)
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  32.  54
    An Extension of a Proof of Prior's or When Thinking Makes It So.J. J. MacIntosh - 1980 - Analysis 40 (2):86 - 89.
  33.  51
    Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 230--250.
    I reject three theories of practical reason according to which a rational agent's ultimate reasons for acting must be unchanging: that one is rationally obliged in each choice (1) to be prudent--to advance all the desires one foresees ever having (the self-interest theory), rather than just those one has at the time of choice, or (2) to cause states of affairs that are good by some timeless, impersonal measure (Thomas Nagel), or (3) to obey permanent, universalizable deontic principles (Kant). Whether (...)
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  34.  38
    Aquinas on Necessity.J. J. Macintosh - 1998 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):371-403.
  35.  55
    Is Pascal's Wager Self-Defeating?J. J. MacIntosh - 2000 - Sophia 39 (2):1-30.
  36.  87
    The Errors of Atheism * by J. Angelo Corlett.J. MacIntosh - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):410-413.
  37.  14
    A Problem About Identity.J. J. MacIntosh - 1974 - Dialogue 13 (3):455-474.
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  38.  39
    A Long Way to Understanding Cultural Evolution.Mende Werner & Wermke Kathleen - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):359.
    Understanding cultural evolution is one of the most challenging and indispensable scientific tasks for the survival of humankind on our planet. This task demands, besides an adoption of theories and models from biological evolution, theories for culture-specific processes as well. Language evolution and language acquisition offer interesting objects of study in this respect. (Published Online November 9 2006).
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  39.  39
    Robert Boyle's Epistemology: The Interaction Between Scientific and Religious Knowledge.J. J. MacIntosh - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):91 – 121.
    Abstract Boyle distinguished clearly between the areas which we would call scientific and theological. However, he felt that they overlapped seamlessly, and that the truths we discovered (or which were revealed to us) in one of these areas would be relevant to us in the other. In this paper I outline and discuss Boyle's views on the limitations of human knowing, Boyle's arguments in favour of accepting the revelations of the Christian faith, and his views on the kind of epistomological (...)
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  40.  65
    New Books. [REVIEW]J. J. Macintosh - 1967 - Mind 76 (301):148-149.
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  41.  27
    Theological Question-Begging.J. J. MacIntosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (4):531-.
  42.  57
    Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action - By G.F. Schueler.Duncan Macintosh - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (1):86-88.
  43.  61
    Responsibility, Freedom and Causality: Or, the Dilemma of Determinism or Indeterminism.Douglas Clyde Macintosh - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (January):42-51.
  44.  32
    Adverbs, Identity, and Multiple Personalities.J. J. MacIntosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):301 - 321.
  45.  45
    Representational Pragmatism.Douglas C. Macintosh - 1912 - Mind 21 (82):167-181.
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  46.  45
    Modality, Mechanism and Translational Indeterminacy.Duncan MacIntosh - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (3):391-.
    Ken Warmbrod thinks Quine agrees that translation is determinate if it is determinate what speakers would say in all possible circumstances; that what things would do in merely possible circumstances is determined by what their subvisible constituent mechanisms would dispose them to do on the evidence of what alike actual mechanisms make alike actual things do actually; and that what speakers say is determined by their neural mechanisms. Warmbrod infers that people's neural mechanisms make translation of what people say determinate. (...)
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  47.  21
    Introduction: Investigating the Mind.Jillian S. MacIntosh - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (Supplement):1-15.
    Setting aside what might seem to be an overly pious and self-congratulatory tone in the above quotation, we are left with Aristotle’s expression of a sense of wonder and curiosity with regard to the human mind. Many things are worthy of investigation, but our own intellectual nature holds a special place, and this, urges Aristotle, is not simply narcissism. We are interesting. This volume seeks to celebrate and emulate Aristotle’s enthusiasm and sense of reverence, while recognizing, perhaps to an even (...)
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  48.  12
    The Impossibility of Kantian Immortality.J. J. Macintosh - 1980 - Dialogue 19 (2):219-234.
  49.  21
    Belief-In.J. J. MacIntosh - 1970 - Mind 79 (315):395-407.
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  50.  15
    Leibniz and Berkeley.J. J. MacIntosh - 1970 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71:147 - 163.
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