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Katie Steele [22]Katie Siobhan Steele [5]
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Profile: Katie Steele (Australian National University)
  1. Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga , that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. (...)
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  2.  29
    The Scientist Qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments.Katie Steele - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):893-904.
    Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that science advisors must, for deep-seated pragmatic reasons, make value judgments is further (...)
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  3. Environmental Ethics and Decision Theory: Fellow Travellers or Bitter Enemies?Mark Colyvan & Katie Steele - unknown
    On the face of it, ethics and decision theory give quite different advice about what the best course of action is in a given situation. In this paper we examine this alleged conflict in the realm of environmental decision-making. We focus on a couple of places where ethics and decision theory might be thought to be offering conflicting advice: environmental triage and carbon trading. We argue that the conflict can be seen as conflicts about other things (like appropriate temporal scales (...)
     
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  4. Making Climate Decisions.Richard Bradley & Katie Steele - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):799-810.
    Many fine-grained decisions concerning climate change involve significant, even severe, uncertainty. Here, we focus on modelling the decisions of single agents, whether individual persons or groups perceived as corporate entities. We offer a taxonomy of the sources and kinds of uncertainty that arise in framing these decision problems, as well as strategies for making a choice in spite of uncertainty. The aim is to facilitate a more transparent and structured treatment of uncertainty in climate decision making.
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  5. Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions.Mark Colyvan, Damian Cox & Katie Steele - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):503-529.
  6. Choice Models.Katie Siobhan Steele - unknown
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  7.  27
    Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw024.
    This article argues that common intuitions regarding the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our strategy is to analyse the intuitive claims in light of prominent (...)
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  8.  41
    What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.
    There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, decision and rationality, 1988b; Theory Decis 25:25–78, 1988c) ‘consequentialist’ argument for the SEU (...)
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  9.  49
    Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2015 - In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10.  30
    Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation.Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1287-1303.
    Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.
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  11.  23
    Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist.Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):1-28.
    This paper considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid `free' evidence before making a decision, and rational agents may have imprecise beliefs and/or desires. Indeed, we show that Good's theorem concerning the invariable choice-worthiness of free evidence does not generalise to the imprecise realm, given the plausible existing decision theories for handling imprecision. A key ingredient in the analysis, and a potential source of controversy, is the (...)
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  12.  15
    Right Decisions or Happy Decision-Makers?Katie Steele, Helen M. Regan, Mark Colyvan & Mark A. Burgman - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (4):349 – 368.
    Group decisions raise a number of substantial philosophical and methodological issues. We focus on the goal of the group decision exercise itself. We ask: What should be counted as a good group decision-making result? The right decision might not be accessible to, or please, any of the group members. Conversely, a popular decision can fail to be the correct decision. In this paper we discuss what it means for a decision to be "right" and what components are required in a (...)
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  13.  21
    Daniel Steel Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle: Science, Evidence, and Environmental Policy.Camilla Colombo & Katie Steele - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1195-1200.
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  14.  58
    Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief From “Risk-Averse” Preferences.Katie Steele - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):189-205.
    I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief, such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain how an agent may come to have (...)
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  15.  27
    Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw024.
    This paper argues that common intuitions regarding a) the specialness of "use-novel" data for confirmation, and b) that this specialness implies the "no-double-counting rule", which says that data used in "constructing" a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model's predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our strategy is to analyse the intuitive claims in light (...)
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  16.  9
    Assessing Ethical Trade-Offs in Ecological Field Studies.Kirsten M. Parris, Sarah C. McCall, Michael A. McCarthy, Ben A. Minteer, Katie Steele, Sarah Bekessy & Fabien Medvecky - 2010 - Journal of Applied Ecology 47 (1):227-234.
    Summary 1. Ecologists and conservation biologists consider many issues when designing a field study, such as the expected value of the data, the interests of the study species, the welfare of individual organisms and the cost of the project. These different issues or values often conflict; however, neither animal ethics nor environmental ethics provides practical guidance on how to assess trade-offs between them. -/- 2. We developed a decision framework for considering trade-offs between values in ecological research, drawing on the (...)
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  17.  18
    Model Tuning in Engineering: Uncovering the Logic.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - unknown
    In engineering, as in other scientific fields, researchers seek to confirm their models with real-world data. It is common practice to assess models in terms of the distance between the model outputs and the corresponding experimental observations. An important question that arises is whether the model should then be ‘tuned’, in the sense of estimating the values of free parameters to get a better fit with the data, and furthermore whether the tuned model can be confirmed with the same data (...)
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  18.  24
    Climate Models, Confirmation and Calibration.Charlotte Werndl & Katie Siobhan Steele - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    We argue that concerns about double-counting -- using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate --deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelihood approach (...)
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  19.  30
    Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. [REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):983-999.
    This paper considers a special case of belief updating—when an agent learns testimonial data, or in other words, the beliefs of others on some issue. The interest in this case is twofold: (1) the linear averaging method for updating on testimony is somewhat popular in epistemology circles, and it is important to assess its normative acceptability, and (2) this facilitates a more general investigation of what it means/requires for an updating method to have a suitable Bayesian representation (taken here as (...)
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  20.  14
    Challenges to Decision Theory.Katie Steele - 2010 - Metascience 19 (3):449-451.
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  21.  19
    Persistent Experimenters, Stopping Rules, and Statistical Inference.Katie Steele - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):937-961.
    This paper considers a key point of contention between classical and Bayesian statistics that is brought to the fore when examining so-called ‘persistent experimenters’—the issue of stopping rules, or more accurately, outcome spaces, and their influence on statistical analysis. First, a working definition of classical and Bayesian statistical tests is given, which makes clear that (1) once an experimental outcome is recorded, other possible outcomes matter only for classical inference, and (2) full outcome spaces are nevertheless relevant to both the (...)
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  22.  29
    Preference and Information , Dan Egonsson. Ashgate, 2007, XI+163 Pp. [REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):236-242.
  23.  12
    Review of Husain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research[REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).
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  24.  1
    Uses and Misuses of Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in Environmental Decision Making.Katie Siobhan Steele, Yohay Carmel, Jean Cross & Chris Wilcox - unknown
    We focus on a class of multicriteria methods that are commonly used in environmental decision making--those that employ the weighted linear average algorithm (and this includes the popular analytic hierarchy process (AHP)). While we do not doubt the potential benefits of using formal decision methods of this type, we draw attention to the consequences of not using them well. In particular, we highlight a property of these methods that should not be overlooked when they are applied in environmental and wider (...)
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  25. Bayesians Care About Stopping Rules Too.Katie Siobhan Steele - forthcoming - European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
  26. No Title Available: Reviews.Katie Steele - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):236-242.
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  27. Review of Preference and Information. [REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):236-242.
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