Social activism against companies has evolved in the 50 years since Rachel Carson first put the US chemical industry under pressure to halt the indiscriminate use of the chemical DDT. Many more companies have come under the spotlight of activist attention as the agenda social activists address has expanded, provoked in part by the internationalization of business. During the past fifteen years, companies have begun to formulate corporate responsibility (CR) policies and appointed management teams dedicated to CR, resulting in a (...) change in the way companies interact with social activists. This paper presents findings from a longitudinal case study of managerial responses to social activism targeted at a company with relatively well-advanced CR practices and reputation. The case describes the unfolding of the internal processes over an 8-year period, including the role played by different managers and the tensions in the decision-making processes. The findings emphasize how values and beliefs in the company interact with economic arguments and how those are mediated through functions and relationships in the company and beyond. The paper shows how critical managers’ understanding of the motivations of activists behind the campaign is in shaping their actions. It reveals the paradoxical outcomes that can result from social activism at the level of the firm, the industry, and the field. (shrink)

This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models (...) for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper I first argue that the objection which is most commonly levelled against the coarse-graining approach-viz. that it introduces an element of subjectivity into what ought to be a purely objective formalism-is ultimately unfounded. I then proceed to argue that two different objections to the coarse-graining approach indicate that it is an inadequate approach to statistical mechanics. The first objection is based on the fact that the appeal to appearances by the coarse-graining approach fails to justify the coarse-graining (...) strategy of ignoring the physical differences between so-called quasi-equilibrium distributions and equilibrium distributions. The second objection is centred on the notion of a coarse-grained entropy. I will argue that the required increase in the coarse-grained entropy is obtained by disregarding the dynamical constraints on the system. This undermines the very task statistical mechanics has set out to accomplish, viz. to provide a microdynamical underpinning of thermodynamics. (shrink)

In contemporary Science, Technology and Society studies, Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory is often used to study how social change arises from interaction between people and technologies. Though Latour’s approach is rich in the sense of enabling scholars to appreciate the complexity of many relevant technological, environmental, and social factors in their studies, the approach is poor from an ethical point of view: the doings of things and people are couched in one and the same behaviorist vocabulary without giving due (...) recognition to the ethical relevance of human intelligence, sympathy and reflection in making responsible choices. This article argues that two other naturalist projects, the non-teleological virtue ethics of Charles Darwin and the pragmatist instrumentalism of John Dewey can enrich ANT-based STS studies, both, in a descriptive and in a normative sense. (shrink)

In What Things Do , Verbeek (What things do: philosophical reflections on technology, agency and design. Penn State University Press, University Park, 2005a ) develops a vocabulary for understanding the social role of technological artifacts in our culture and in our daily lives. He understands this role in terms of the technological mediation of human behavior and perception. To explain mediation, he levels out the modernist separation of subjects and objects by decreasing the autonomy of humans and increasing the activity (...) of things. His approach consists primarily within a clever integration of the theories of Latour and Ihde, which provides a comprehensive understanding of the social role of technological artifacts. Despite the fact that Verbeek’s book is carefully thought out and already quite influential in the field of philosophy of technology, his approach raises some conceptual and pragmatic questions. The conceptual questions concern (a) the precise meaning of the concept of mediation and the possibility of distinguishing between different forms of mediation, and (b) the differences and similarities between human and technological agency and intentionality. The pragmatic questions concern the application of his theory to the realm of engineering ethics. Particularly pressing is the question of how to assign (moral) responsibility to humans when technological artifacts are mediating the outcomes of human actions. With this article, I will raise these issues, and look forward to Verbeek’s reply. (shrink)

One of the questions that is addressed, from various perspectives, is the origin of time-asymmetry. Given the time-symmetry of the dynamical laws, all inferences about the future that are derivable from a dynamical theory are matched by inferences about the past. For Huw Price, who discusses the origins of cosmological time asymmetry, this is reason to treat all time-asymmetric cosmological theories with caution. He dismisses both the inflationary model and Stephen Hawking’s proposal to account for time-asymmetry with his famous “no (...) boundary condition.” Instead, on the basis of the fact that we have no a priori reasons to distinguish between initial and final conditions, he advocates Gold’s time-symmetric model for the universe, in which the thermodynamical arrow of time is tied to the expansion of the universe, so that in the contracting phase towards the big crunch, entropy decreases. (shrink)

Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and (...) empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future. (shrink)

The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, (...) we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights. (shrink)

I analyse two different methods for the retrieval of a classical notion of spacetime from the theory of quantum cosmology in terms of the different means they employ to bring about the necessary loss of coherence. One method employs a direct coarse graining of the appropriate phase space, whereas the other method is based on decohering the system by the interaction with an environment. Although these methods are equivalent on a phenomenological level, I argue that conceptually the decoherence approach is (...) superior. The coarse graining approach construes the necessary loss of coherence in epistemic terms, whereas the method based on decohering the system by interaction with an environment provides a dynamical explanation for the emergence of classical notions of spacetime. On the latter account the emergence of classical behaviour is an objective property of the physical system under consideration, in contradistinction with the subjective coarse graining account of the retrieval of a classical spacetime in terms of measurements made by an observer. (shrink)

I analyse two different methods for the retrieval of a classical notion of spacetime from the theory of quantum cosmology in terms of the different means they employ to bring about the necessary loss of coherence. One method employs a direct coarse graining of the appropriate phase space, whereas the other method is based on decohering the system by the interaction with an environment. Although these methods are equivalent on a phenomenological level, I argue that conceptually the decoherence approach is (...) superior. The coarse graining approach construes the necessary loss of coherence in epistemic terms, whereas the method based on decohering the system by interaction with an environment provides a dynamical explanation for the emergence of classical notions of spacetime. On the latter account the emergence of classical behaviour is an objective property of the physical system under consideration, in contradistinction with the subjective coarse graining account of the retrieval of a classical spacetime in terms of measurements made by an observer. (shrink)

The Netherlands is a small country with many people and much livestock. As a result, animals in nature reservations are often living near cattle farms. Therefore, people from the agricultural practices are afraid that wild animals will infect domestic livestock with diseases like Swine Fever and Foot and Mouth Disease. To protect agriculture (considered as an important economic practice), very strict regulations have been made for minimizing this risk. In this way, the practice of animal farming has been dominating the (...) practices of nature management completely. If, for instance, Foot and Mouth Disease strikes an agricultural area, all wild pigs and cattle living in the nearby nature reservations have to be killed, whether infected or not. This dominant position of one practice over the other has now become problematic. While the morality of the practice of nature management seems to be very different from the morality of agriculture and agriculture has become less important from an economic point of view, the public as well as those involved in nature management no longer seem to accept the dominant position of agriculture. Besides a literature study, we performed a field study with in-depth interviews with experts from both practices to analyze the dynamics of the internal moralities of both practices in the previous century, in order to clarify the contemporary situation. The conclusion was that the traditionally strong position of agriculture is not only weakening; it also appears that the internal values of agriculture are changing. The experts from both sides agreed that, in case of a disease outbreak, it is neither ethically justified nor necessary (because of the estimated low risk of disease transfer) to destroy the animals in nature reservations as a routine preventive measure. This is a major shift in morality. (shrink)

There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts: on the one hand, acts that are generalisably wrong because they go against universal principles of harm, justice, or rights; on the other hand, acts that are variably right or wrong depending on the social context. In this paper we criticise existing methods that measure generalisability. We report new findings indicating that a modification of generalisability measures is in order. We discuss our findings in light of recent criticisms (...) of moral/conventional research. (shrink)

Are citizens of contemporary technological society authors of their own lives? With Alasdair MacIntyre, Bruno Latour and Albert Borgmann, we discuss the shortcomings of traditional liberalism in terms of its ability to answer this question. MacIntyre argues that biological vulnerabilities and social interdependencies establish meaningful parameters within which reason and willing emerge. But MacIntyre ignores technologies as a third parameter. Latour defines humans as nodes in a socio-technical network, in which technologies are actors on par with humans. However, Latour adopts (...) a purely external perspective, ignoring human intentions, desires, and reasons. Borgmann argues that although freedom of choice is severely restricted, sometimes one can still resist the rule of technology. But Borgmann denies the pluralism of modern societies. Although all three schools have their shortcomings, combined, they provide us with a valuable palette of insights on human agency in a technological culture. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: From Cultural Criticism to Cultural Lag Dramatic Tensions Dramatic Theory Theory and Description Description Plus References and Further Reading.

Individual differences in moral views are often explained as the downstream effect of ideological commitments, such as political orientation and religiosity. Recent studies in the U.S. suggest that moral views about recreational drug use are also influenced by attitudes toward sex and that this relationship cannot be explained by ideological commitments. In this study, we investigate student samples from Belgium, The Netherlands, and Japan. We find that, in all samples, sexual attitudes are strongly related to views about recreational drug use, (...) even after controlling for various ideological variables. We discuss our results in light of reproductive strategies as determinants of moral views. (shrink)

Can business humanize its stakeholders? And if so, how does this relate to moral consideration for stakeholders? In this paper we compare two business orientations that are relevant for current business theory and practice: a stakeholder orientation and a profit orientation. We empirically investigate the causal relationships between business orientation, humanization, and moral consideration. We report the results of six experiments, making use of different operationalizations of a stakeholder and profit orientation, different stakeholders, and different participant samples. Our findings support (...) the prediction that individual stakeholders observing a stakeholder-oriented firm see the firm’s other stakeholders as more human than individual stakeholders observing a profit-oriented firm. This humanization, in turn, increases individual stakeholders’ moral consideration for the firm’s other stakeholders. Our findings underscore the importance of humanization for stakeholders’ moral consideration for each other. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the firm as a moral community of stakeholders. Specifically, we move away from a focus on managers, and how they can make business more moral. Instead we direct attention to stakeholders, and how business can make these stakeholders more moral. (shrink)

Technologies fulfill a social role in the sense that they influence the moral actions of people, often in unintended and unforeseen ways. Scientists and engineers are already accepting much responsibility for the technological, economical and environmental aspects of their work. This article asks them to take an extra step, and now also consider the social role of their products. The aim is to enable engineers to take a prospective responsibility for the future social roles of their technologies by providing them (...) with a matrix that helps to explore in advance how emerging technologies might plausibly affect the reasons behind people’s (moral) actions. On the horizontal axis of the matrix, we distinguished the three basic types of reasons that play a role in practical judgment: what is the case, what can be done and what should be done. On the vertical axis we distinguished the morally relevant classes of issues: stakeholders, consequences and the good life. To illustrate how this matrix may work in practice, the final section applies the matrix to the case of the Google PowerMeter. (shrink)

This case study illustrates the dilemmas facing multinational companies in meeting social challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. It also discusses the purpose, responsibilities and limitations of business involvement in social development. From a business standpoint, social challenges in developing countries differ greatly from those in nations where governments or markets effectively provide for the population’s health needs. The case illustrates what led a multinational to set up a corporate foundation and focuses on three strategic and operational dilemmas it ran up against. (...) The case discussion shows that the ethical issues intertwined with these dilemmas are best understood using a variety of ethical approaches. We also show that Ethics of Care are just as relevant to analysing corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy as the Deontological and Utilitarianism theories commonly used in business ethics. (shrink)

Certain researchers in the field of moral psychology, following Turiel, argue that children and adults in different cultures make a distinction between moral and conventional transgressions. One interpretation of the theory holds that moral transgressions elicit a signature moral response pattern while conventional transgressions elicit a signature conventional response pattern. Four dimensions distinguish the moral response pattern from the conventional response pattern. 1. HARM/JUSTICE/RIGHTS – Subjects justify the wrongness of moral transgressions by stating that they involve a victim that is (...) harmed, whose rights have been violated or who has been subject to an injustice. Conventional transgressions do not involve a victim that is harmed, whose rights have been violated or who has been subject to an injustice. 2. AUTHORITY – Subjects judge moral transgressions as wrong independent of structures of authority while the wrongness of conventional transgressions can be changed by an authority. 3. GENERALIZABILITY – Subjects judge moral transgressions as generalizably wrong, i.e., independent of time and place, while conventional transgressions’ wrongness depends on time and place. 4. SERIOUSNESS – Subjects judge moral transgressions as more seriously wrong than conventional transgressions. Others have criticized this view for a diversity of reasons. Relevant for our purposes is that, first, there appear to be cultural differences in what constitutes a moral transgression and second, it is unclear what the exact hypotheses are, surrounding this supposed moral/conventional distinction. I will present planned and ongoing experimental research that investigates two specific problems we encountered in the moral-conventional literature. First of all, we cannot draw reliable conclusions from previous work about the generalizability of the wrongness of different kinds of transgressions. In previous experiments, differences in time and place are often but not always confounded with a variety of other differences. For example, Huebner et al. ask participants if the depicted act would be OK for someone who lived elsewhere where everyone else did this. Moreover, when varying time and/or place, participants are likely to assume that other things differ as well. In our study, we vary time and/or place in a variety of scenarios in order to investigate what assumptions participants make when confronted with the generalizability question. Second, it is an open question as to what extent any transgression will universally elicit one of the two signature response patterns. In our study, we make use of existing differences in participants’ value hierarchy to test this. For one and the same scenario, we compare the response of participants for whom authority is an important value with the results of participants for whom authority is not an important value, in order to see if there are differences in the two groups’ response patterns. References: Haidt J., Koller S. & Dias M. 1993. Affect, culture and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65:613-628. Huebner B., Lee, J.L. & Hauser, M.D. 2010. The Moral-Conventional Distinction in Mature Moral Competence. Journal of Cognition and Culture 10: 1-26. Kelly D., Stich S., Haley K.J., Eng S.J. & Fessler D.M.T. 2007. Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. Mind & Language 22:117-131. Nichols S. 2004. Sentimental Rules: on the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford University Press. Stich S., Fessler, D.M.T. & Kelly D. 2009. On the Morality of Harm: A response to Sousa, Holbrook and Piazza. Cognition 113:93-97. Turiel E. 1983. The Development of Social Knowledge. Morality & Convention. Cambridge University Press. (shrink)

Recent developments in moral psychology and in evolutionary theories of moral behavior focus on individual and group differences in morality. Moral intuitions may differ depending on sex, age, ecology and evolutionary strategy of the individual. Within the individual, different and mutually incompatible moral intuitions are triggered depending on specific aspects of the situation. Thus there exist interindividual and intraindividual differences in moral intuitions. This diversity of our moral intuitions has led naturalistic and evolutionary ethicists to question normative theories that articulate (...) universal and mutually consistent moral principles. For example, E.O. Wilson has suggested that we cannot impose a single set of moral standards on all human populations or sex-age classes, for this would “create complex, intractable moral dilemmas”. On the other hand, if we are not all in the same game, living together may not work very well, especially if we conceive of moral principles as universally valid. There seems to be a trade-off between moral principles that are intuitively acceptable and moral principles that are universally valid. The literature on naturalistic and evolutionary ethics discusses which implications scientific data can and cannot have on normative questions. I critically apply this discussion to the topic of normative implications of inter- and intraindividual differences in moral intuitions. (shrink)

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between and Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.

Elqayam & Evans suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between and Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.

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A central claim in stakeholder theory is that, if we see stakeholders as human beings, we will attribute higher moral standing or show more moral consideration to stakeholders. But would the same hold for firms? In this paper, I apply the concepts of humanization and moral standing to firms, and I predict that individuals attribute higher moral standing to stakeholder-oriented than to profit-oriented firms, because individuals attribute more experience to stakeholder-oriented than to profit-oriented firms. Five experiments support these predictions across (...) different operationalizations of stakeholder and profit orientations. The analyses show that moral standing attributions are not fully explained by attributions of agency to firms, or by attributions of experience or agency to human stakeholders. By unearthing the importance of experience attributions for moral standing attributions to firms, this work provides novel insights in ongoing legal, philosophical and public debates related to firms’ moral standing. The findings also bring the debate about firms’ moral standing to the heart of stakeholder theory, and lead to new normative and descriptive research questions about the interests of firms and their stakeholders. (shrink)

Social activism against companies has evolved in the 50 years since Rachel Carson first put the US chemical industry under pressure to halt the indiscriminate use of the chemical DDT. Many more companies have come under the spotlight of activist attention as the agenda social activists address has expanded, provoked in part by the internationalization of business. During the past fifteen years, companies have begun to formulate corporate responsibility policies and appointed management teams dedicated to CR, resulting in a change (...) in the way companies interact with social activists. This paper presents findings from a longitudinal case study of managerial responses to social activism targeted at a company with relatively well-advanced CR practices and reputation. The case describes the unfolding of the internal processes over an 8-year period, including the role played by different managers and the tensions in the decision-making processes. The findings emphasize how values and beliefs in the company interact with economic arguments and how those are mediated through functions and relationships in the company and beyond. The paper shows how critical managers’ understanding of the motivations of activists behind the campaign is in shaping their actions. It reveals the paradoxical outcomes that can result from social activism at the level of the firm, the industry, and the field. (shrink)

Description Logics (DLs) are a family of well-known terminological knowledge representation formalisms in modern semantics-based systems. This research focuses on analysing how our developed Occurrence Logic (OccL) can conceptually and logically support the development of a description logic. OccL is integrated into the alternative theory of natural language syntax in `Deviational Syntactic Structures' under the label `EFA(X)3' (or the third version of Epi-Formal Analysis in Syntax, EFA(X), which is a radical linguistic theory). From the logical point of view, OccL is (...) a formal logic that mainly deals with the occurrences of symbols as well as with their priorities within linguistic descriptions, i.e. natural language syntax, semantics and phonology. In this article---based on our OccL-based definitions of the concepts of `strong implication' and `occurrence value' as well as of the logical concept `identical occurrence constructor (IDOC)' that is the most fundamental logical concept in our formalism---we will model Occurrence Description Logic ($\mathcal{ODL}$). Accordingly, we will formally-logically analyse `occurrence(s) of symbol(s)' within descriptions of the world in $\mathcal{ODL}$. In addition, we will analyse and assess the logical concepts of `occurrence' and `occurrence priority' in $\mathcal{ODL}$. This research can make a strong logical background for our future research in the development of a Modal Occurrence Description Logic. (shrink)

The aim of this volume is to explore new approaches to the problem of the constitution of the various aspects of sociality and to confront these with received ideas. Therefore many of the contributions to this volume are devoted to a rather holistic and antireductionist conception of social objects, groups, joint actions and collective knowledge. The topics, that are dealt with are: a) the question of the ontological status of social objects and their relation to physical objects, b) collective agency (...) and c) the question whether there can be shared knowledge and shared beliefs - a rather new topic in the discussion of the social aspects of personal life. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Untersuchung ist eine Auseinandersetzung mit der kausalen Handlungstheorie. Der These, dass Handlungen entweder unmittelbar durch einen Akteur oder durch seine mentalen Zustande verursacht werden, wird entgegengehalten, dass bisher keine Handlungstheorie vorliegt, die dieses kausale Verhaltnis zu belegen vermag und dass es auch bisher in der Philosophie des Geistes keinen Ansatz gibt, der erklart wie mentale Verursachung moglich ist. Eine Alternative wird in einer Handlungstheorie gefunden, der eine monistische Ontologie zugrunde liegt. Im ihrem Zentrum steht die Person. Personsein wird (...) als die Erfahrung der Einheit von Mentalem und Physischem im Handeln gedeutet. Das Verhaltnis von Akteur zur Handlung wird daher als ein normatives und nicht als ein kausales aufgefasst.". (shrink)

One of the questions that is addressed, from various perspectives, is the origin of time-asymmetry. Given the time-symmetry of the dynamical laws, all inferences about the future that are derivable from a dynamical theory are matched by inferences about the past. For Huw Price, who discusses the origins of cosmological time asymmetry, this is reason to treat all time-asymmetric cosmological theories with caution. He dismisses both the inflationary model and Stephen Hawking’s proposal to account for time-asymmetry with his famous “no (...) boundary condition.” Instead, on the basis of the fact that we have no a priori reasons to distinguish between initial and final conditions, he advocates Gold’s time-symmetric model for the universe, in which the thermodynamical arrow of time is tied to the expansion of the universe, so that in the contracting phase towards the big crunch, entropy decreases. (shrink)