Judging works of art is one thing. Loving a work of art is something else. When you visit a museum like the Louvre you make hundreds of judgements in the space of just a couple of hours. But you may grow to love only one or a handful of works over the course of your entire life. Depending on the art form you are most aligned with, this can be a painting, a novel, a poem, a song, a work of (...) architecture, or some other art object or performance. As it happens, however, we have fallen in love with a series of films: Before Sunrise, Before Sunset, and Before Midnight. But what does it mean to love a film? What’s the difference between liking a film, loving a film, and being a film lover? How rational or irrational is it to fall in love with a film? What are the constitutive elements of such a love? These are the questions we seek to address in this paper. -/- . (shrink)
ABSTRACTIs the question ‘will you regret it if you do this?’ helpful when people face difficult life decisions, such as terminating a pregnancy if a disability is detected or deciding to become a parent? Despite the commonness of the question in daily life, several philosophers have argued lately against its usefulness. We reconstruct four arguments from recent literature on regret, transformative experience and the use of imagination in deliberation. After analysis of these arguments we conclude that the prospect of regret (...) remains a useful deliberative heuristic, provided four conditions are fulfilled. If the prospect of regret is arrived at via reflection on one’s values, in a non-coercive context, when well-informed about factual circumstances, and in a process of self-commitment, the question of what one will regret is a helpful device to get in touch with one’s deepest concerns that give reasons to act in a particular way. (shrink)
In this paper, we aim to show that there is a particular kind of bullshit that is not dealt with in Harry Frankfurt’s and G.A. Cohen’s critiques of bullshit. We also point out the evaluative complexity of bullshit. Frankfurt and Cohen both stress its negative and possibly destructive aspects, but one might wonder whether bullshit need always and necessarily be reprehensible. We will argue that there are positive or at least neutral aspects to some kinds of bullshit.
Current and past pandemics have several aspects in common. It is expected that all members of society contribute to beat it. But it is also clear that the risks associated with the pandemic are different for different groups. This makes that appeals to solidarity based on technocratic risk calculations are only partially successful. Objective ‘risks of transmission’ may, for example, be trumped by risks of letting down people in need of help or by missing out certain opportunities in life. In (...) this paper we argue that a rapprochement of the insights of standpoint epistemology with pandemic science and pandemic policy making may be an important step toward making pandemic science more accurate and pandemic calls for solidarity more effective. (shrink)
Using Rational Choice Theory to account for moral agency has always had some uncomfortable aspect to it. Economists’ attempts to include the moral dimension of behaviour either as a preference for moral behaviour or as an external constraint on self-interested choice, have been criticized for relying on tautologies or lacking a realistic picture of motivation. Homo Oeconomicus, even when conceptually enriched by all kinds of motivations, is ultimately still characterized as caring only for what lies in his interest. Amartya Sen (...) has drawn the economists’ attention to a specific blind spot in rational choice theory, i.e. the idea of commitment. By starting from the premise that the human capacity to commit is a necessary precondition for moral behaviour, our aim in this paper is twofold: first, we argue that taking the idea of commitment seriously in economics requires an enriched concept of rationality. Second, we reject a Kantian interpretation of Sen’s concept of commitment and argue that Harry Frankfurt’s views about caring can be used to develop the concept of commitment in a direction that is compatible with Rational Choice Theory. (shrink)
"Richard Linklater's trilogy of critically-acclaimed 'Before' films - Before Sunrise, Before Sunset and Before Midnight - depict the ongoing relationship and romantic destiny of two characters played by Julie Delpy and Ethan Hawke. This collection of specially commissioned chapters explores the many philosophical issues raised in the films, including: the nature of love, romanticism and marriage the meaning of life the passage and experience of time the narrative self gender death. Including an introduction by the editors summarising the trilogy, and (...) an interview with Julie Delpy in which she discusses the key themes of the films and the importance of studying philosophy, The Philosophy of Richard Linklater's Before Trilogy is essential reading for students of philosophy, aesthetics and film studies, and also of interest to those in closely related subjects such as literature and gender studies"--. (shrink)
Richard Linklater’s celebrated Before trilogy chronicles the love of Jesse (Ethan Hawke) and Céline (Julie Delpy) who first meet up in Before Sunrise, later reconnect in Before Sunset and finally experience a fall-out in Before Midnight. Not only do these films present storylines and dilemmas that invite philosophical discussion, but philosophical discussion itself is at the very heart of the trilogy. This book, containing specially commissioned chapters by a roster of international contributors, explores the many philosophical themes that feature so (...) vividly in the interactions between Céline and Jesse, including: the nature of love, romanticism and marriage the passage and experience of time the meaning of life the art of conversation the narrative self gender death Including an interview with Julie Delpy in which she discusses her involvement in the films and the importance of studying philosophy. (shrink)
This book brings together new essays that explore the connection between love and reasons. The observation that considerations of love carry significant weight in the deliberative process opens up new perspectives in the classic discussion about practical reasons, and gives rise to many interesting questions about the nature of love’s reasons, about their source and legitimacy, about their relation to moral and epistemic reasons, and about the extent to which love is sensitive to reasons. The contributors to this volume orient (...) questions related to love within the broader context of the contemporary discussion on practical reasons, and move forward the conversation about the normative dimensions of love. _Love, Reason and Morality _will be of interest to philosophers working on issues of normativity, meta-ethics and moral psychology, and especially those interested in the source of practical reasons and the role of attachments in practical deliberation. (shrink)
Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Internalism and externalism: some terminology 1.1 Introduction 5 1.2 Falk and Frankena 5 1.3 The internalist position modified 9 1.4 The externalist position elaborated 12 1.5 Judgment internalism/externalism versus existence internalism/externalism 15 1.6 Other kinds of internalism and externalism 17 1.7 Varieties of existence internalism and externalism 19 1.8 Conclusion 26 Chapter 2 Bernard Williams on practical reasons 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 The internal reason theory 27 2.3 Refining the sub-Humean model 29 2.4 Objections against (...) external reasons 40 2.4.1 The no-explanatory-force objection 41 2.4.2 The no-motivational-fuel objection 44 2.4.3 The obscurity objection 55 2.5 Conclusion 59 Chapter 3 Michael Smith on practical reasons 3.1 Introduction 60 3.2 The moral problem 60 3.3 Cognitivism, internalism, and Humean motivation 65 3.3.1 The objectivity of moral obligations 65 3.3.2 The practicality of moral judgments 67 3.3.3 The Humean theory of motivation 70 3.4 The conceptual analysis of normative reasons 73 3.4.1 Platitudes about normative reasons 73 3.4.2 The advice model 76 3.4.3 ‘If fully rational’-condition: Smith versus Williams 79 3.4.4 The analysis captures the platitudes 84 3.5 Moral rationalism: the solution to the moral problem 88 3.6 Smith’s analysis of normative reasons evaluated 91 3.6.1 The analysis trivializes convergence 92 3.6.2 Why do reasons have to be objective? 94 3.6.3 The analysis does not guarantee practicality 96 3.6.4 The analysis rests on a false platitude 98 3.6.5 Normative reasons and what I would desire if I were fully rational 100 3.6.6 The advice model is inconsistent with the convergence thesis 102 3.7 Conclusion 106 Appendix 1: Michael Smith between moral realism and moral nihilism 107 Appendix 2: Michael Smith’s fetishism objection against judgment externalism 111 Chapter 4 Derek Parfit on practical reasons 4.1 Introduction 132 4.2 Parfit’s externalism 132 4.2.1 The obscurity objection rejected 133 4.2.2 The no-explanatory-force objection rejected 135 4.2.3 The no-motivation-fuel objection rejected 136 4.3 Parfit’s value-based reason theory 139 4.3.1 Internalism and the desire-based reason theory 139 4.3.2 Parfit’s argument against reductive desire-based reason views 143 4.3.3 Parfit’s argument against non-reductive desire-based reason views 148 4.3.4 Arguments in favour of the value-based reason theory 154 4.4 Parfit’s normative non-naturalism 161 4.4.1 Korsgaard’s criticism of realism 163 4.4.2 Korsgaard’s constructivism 166 4.4.3 Parfit’s criticism of constructivism 168 4.4.4 The non-naturalist account of normativity evaluated 174 4.5 Conclusion 179 Appendix: Varieties of moral realism 180 Chapter 5 Harry Frankfurt on practical reasons 5.1 Introduction 194 5.2 Frankfurt’s theory of care and love 194 5.2.1 The hierarchical model 195 5.2.2 Care 200 5.2.3 Love 211 5.3 The love-based reason theory 215 5.4 The love-based reason theory evaluated 225 5.4.1 Love and desire: both motivating, both natural 225 5.4.2 The groundlessness objection 227 5.4.3 The authority of love 239 5.4.4 The objection of normative triviality 244 5.4.5 The love-based reason theory and morality 248 5.5. Conclusion 254 Bibliography 256. (shrink)
Though a recent phenomenon, philosophical counseling has a long history. Secularization and the remaining influence of the Enlightenment motto 'think for yourself' are only two of the factors that facilitate the current revival of the ancient Greek view of philosophy as a way of life. Despite its worldwide success, philosophical counseling lacks a clear profile. There is surprisingly little consensus among counselors about the aim or method of their practice. The authors of this article claim that the ambiguous relation to (...) psychotherapy and the one-dimensional relation to academic philosophy jeopardize the future of philosophical counseling. After providing a historical background and a critical description of current practices within philosophical counseling, they suggest a way out of its identity crisis. (shrink)
We don’t always know why we do the things we do. Some of the greatest stories in the history of mankind are built on that tragic fact of human life . A first important theoretical account of this fact was given by ‘les maîtres du soupçon’ at the end of the 19th century . They argued that unconscious motives, social structures and cultural particularities guide our actions beyond our knowledge, a fortiori beyond our control. The last three decades have witnessed (...) the rise of a new generation of masters of suspicion, this time with a background in experimental psychology. Many of these suspicion-inducing experiments will be discussed throughout the special issue. Let us just mention one paradigmatic study by the psychologists Nisbett and Wilson from 1977. One study will suffice to open up the full range of philosophical questions addressed in the contributions to follow.In the Nisbett and Wilson study people are invited .. (shrink)
Procreation in the face of an apocalypse: Some ethical considerationsIn the field of procreation ethics both Kantian and consequentialist arguments have been developed purporting to show the moral impermissibility of having children. A survey of the most important arguments leaves us wondering whether one could derive general obligations or prohibitions from abstract principles and apply them to deeply personal decisions about whether or not to have children. At the same time it is undeniably true that having children, however private the (...) decision to procreate may feel, has an impact far beyond the private sphere. While we argue that the answer to the question whether or not to have a child cannot be derived from moral principles, we recognize that moral considerations about global and intergenerational justice do pertain to the question. We therefore develop an alternative framework for traditional Kantian and consequentialist approaches in procreation ethics, which we call holistic virtue ethics. (shrink)
Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.
Reasons for love: why we can’t do otherwise than love what is lovableHarry Frankfurt famously argues that loving someone is not done for reasons. While focusing on the claims that parents need no reasons for loving their children and that it is absurd to ascribe a duty to love X to someone who does not happen to love X, he overlooks an aspect of love that does connect it to reasons in a particular way: in daily conversation human beings spend (...) enormous amounts of time and reflection to explaining and trying to understand love. I interpret the omnipresence of ‘love-talk’ as an indication of the nature of love in human beings: we love someone or something for reasons. Drawing on insights from the guise of the good-debate on the nature of desire, I argue that regardless of the infinite variety of things and persons that can be loved, the objects are all loved under the same form: the form of being lovable. The notion of a ‘lovability characterization’ entails a notion of ‘reasons’ that does not require reasons to be universalisable and that allows the loving-for-reasons view to avoid the fungibility-objection. In reply to the objection that the loving-for-reasons view makes love overly rationalistic, I point out that reason should not be understood as an external authority that commands us to do certain things, but as an internal power, integral to who we are, that shapes our conscious life, our mental attitudes and their objects. (shrink)
Martha Nussbaum defends the use of narratives, especially novels, in moral education. Reading novels not only stimulates the moral imagination, she claims, but also provides moral insights which cannot be conveyed in any other way. This paper questions several aspects of Nussbaum’s theory. First, by assuming a straightforward connection between reading fiction and moral behaviour, Nussbaum neglects a crucial distinction between emotional and real identification. Second, in stressing the importance of imagination, Nussbaum ignores love as a more genuine source of (...) altruism. Third, a system that censors literature in the name of moral education involves some risks which this paper will explore. Fourth, it is argued that Nussbaum’s preference for fiction above real-life experience is a little awkward. And finally, Nussbaum’s model for moral education turns out to be problematic not only in theory but also in practice. (shrink)
Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.
Martha Nussbaum defends the use of narratives, especially novels, in moral education. Reading novels not only stimulates the moral imagination, she claims, but also provides moral insights which cannot be conveyed in any other way. This paper questions several aspects of Nussbaum’s theory. First, by assuming a straightforward connection between reading fiction and moral behaviour, Nussbaum neglects a crucial distinction between emotional and real identification. Second, in stressing the importance of imagination, Nussbaum ignores love as a more genuine source of (...) altruism. Third, a system that censors literature in the name of moral education involves some risks which this paper will explore. Fourth, it is argued that Nussbaum’s preference for fiction above real-life experience is a little awkward. And finally, Nussbaum’s model for moral education turns out to be problematic not only in theory but also in practice. (shrink)
