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Katsunori Miyahara
Hokkaido University
Katsunori Miyahara
University of Wollongong
  1.  81
    Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
    In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...)
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  2.  57
    Neo-Pragmatism and Enactive Intentionality.Shaun Gallagher & Katsunori Miyahara - 2012 - In Jay Schulkin (ed.), New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Adaptation and Cephalic Expression. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  3.  5
    Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):695-714.
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  4.  89
    Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds.Katsunori Miyahara - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
    The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, (...)
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  5.  24
    The Integrated Structure of Consciousness: Phenomenal Content, Subjective Attitude, and Noetic Complex.Katsunori Miyahara & Olaf Witkowski - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):731-758.
    We explore the integrated structure of consciousness by examining the “phenomenological axioms” of the “integrated information theory of consciousness ” from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, we develop a critique of the integration axiom by drawing on phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty. This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal content of conscious experience (...)
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  6.  9
    Enactive Pain and its Sociocultural Embeddedness.Katsunori Miyahara - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    This paper disputes the theoretical assumptions of mainstream approaches in philosophy of pain, representationalism and imperativism, and advances an enactive approach as an alternative. It begins by identifying three shared assumptions in the mainstream approaches: the internalist assumption, the brain-body assumption, and the semantic assumption. It then articulates an alternative, enactive approach that considers pain as an embodied response to the situation. This approach entails the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain, which states against the brain-body assumption that the (...)
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  7.  1
    Social Perception and the Problem of Other Minds.Katsunori Miyahara - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 45:21-26.
    How do we understand other people’s minds? This is a descriptive problem of other minds, a question concerning the descriptive nature of social cognition or interpersonal understanding. There are currently three prominent approaches to this problem, namely, the theory theory approach, the simulation theory approach and the direct perception approach. Instead of trying to resolve the conflict between them, I will conduct a preliminary exploration concerning the nature of social perception or the experience of seeing other people. TT, ST and (...)
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  8.  20
    Missing Out On the Radicalism of Neurophenomenology?Katsunori Miyahara - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):368-370.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: An exegetical worry about Kirchhoff and Hutto’s exposition of neurophenomenology is pointed out. Combining this exegetical critique with an examination of the “strict identity” in the strict identity thesis, I argue that there is more affinity between neurophenomenology and REC than they think.
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