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Katsunori Miyahara
Hokkaido University
Katsunori Miyahara
University of Wollongong
  1.  61
    Wax On, Wax Off! Habits, Sport Skills, and Motor Intentionality.Massimiliano Lorenzo Cappuccio, Katsunori Miyahara & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2020 - Topoi 40 (3):609-622.
    What role does habit formation play in the development of sport skills? We argue that motor habits are both necessary for and constitutive of sensorimotor skill as they support an automatic, yet inherently intelligent and flexible, form of action control. Intellectualists about skills generally assume that what makes action intelligent and flexible is its intentionality, and that intentionality must be necessarily cognitive in nature to allow for both deliberation and explicit goal-representation. Against Intellectualism we argue that the habitual behaviours that (...)
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  2.  88
    Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
    In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...)
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  3.  63
    Neo-Pragmatism and Enactive Intentionality.Shaun Gallagher & Katsunori Miyahara - 2012 - In Jay Schulkin (ed.), New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Adaptation and Cephalic Expression. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  4.  39
    The Integrated Structure of Consciousness: Phenomenal Content, Subjective Attitude, and Noetic Complex.Katsunori Miyahara & Olaf Witkowski - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):731-758.
    We explore the integrated structure of consciousness by examining the “phenomenological axioms” of the “integrated information theory of consciousness ” from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, we develop a critique of the integration axiom by drawing on phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty. This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal content of conscious experience (...)
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  5.  11
    Enactive Pain and its Sociocultural Embeddedness.Katsunori Miyahara - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):871-886.
    This paper disputes the theoretical assumptions of mainstream approaches in philosophy of pain, representationalism and imperativism, and advances an enactive approach as an alternative. It begins by identifying three shared assumptions in the mainstream approaches: the internalist assumption, the brain-body assumption, and the semantic assumption. It then articulates an alternative, enactive approach that considers pain as an embodied response to the situation. This approach entails the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain, which states against the brain-body assumption that the (...)
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  6.  7
    Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):695-714.
  7.  99
    Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds.Katsunori Miyahara - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
    The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, (...)
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  8.  29
    Anchoring Empathy in Receptivity.Seisuke Hayakawa & Katsunori Miyahara - manuscript
    In one sense of the term, empathy refers to the act of sharing in another person’s experience of and perspective on the world. According to simulation accounts of empathy, we achieve this by replicating the other’s mind in our imagination. We explore a form of empathy, empathic perspective-taking, that is not adequately captured by existing simulationist approaches. We begin by pointing out that we often achieve empathy (or share in another’s perspective) by listening to the other person. This form of (...)
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  9.  25
    Missing Out On the Radicalism of Neurophenomenology?Katsunori Miyahara - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):368-370.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: An exegetical worry about Kirchhoff and Hutto’s exposition of neurophenomenology is pointed out. Combining this exegetical critique with an examination of the “strict identity” in the strict identity thesis, I argue that there is more affinity between neurophenomenology and REC than they think.
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  10.  3
    Social Perception and the Problem of Other Minds.Katsunori Miyahara - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 45:21-26.
    How do we understand other people’s minds? This is a descriptive problem of other minds, a question concerning the descriptive nature of social cognition or interpersonal understanding. There are currently three prominent approaches to this problem, namely, the theory theory approach, the simulation theory approach and the direct perception approach. Instead of trying to resolve the conflict between them, I will conduct a preliminary exploration concerning the nature of social perception or the experience of seeing other people. TT, ST and (...)
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  11.  71
    The Pragmatic Intelligence of Habits.Katsunori Miyahara & Ian Robertson - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):597-608.
    Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because (...)
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  12.  10
    A New Experimental Phenomenological Method to Explore the Subjective Features of Psychological Phenomena: Its Application to Binocular Rivalry.Takuya Niikawa, Katsunori Miyahara, Nishida Satoshi & Hamada Hiro Taiyo - 2020 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 (1).
    The subjective features of psychological phenomena have been studied intensively in experimental science in recent years. Although various methods have been proposed to identify subjective features of psychological phenomena, there are elusive subjective features such as the spatiotemporal structure of experience, which are difficult to capture without some additional methodological tools. We propose a new experimental method to address this challenge, which we call the contrast-based experimental phenomenological method (CEP). CEP proceeds in four steps: (i) front-loading phenomenology, (ii) online second-personal (...)
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