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Profile: Keith A. Wilson (Glasgow University, University of Edinburgh)
  1. Perception Without Representation.Roberta Locatelli & Keith A. Wilson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.
  2. Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument From Looks.Keith A. Wilson - forthcoming - In Tamara Dobler & John Collins (eds.), Charles Travis on Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers and scientists take perceptual experience, whatever else it involves, to be representational. That is, to perceive an object via one or more of our senses is to represent it as being some particular way: that tomato is red, round, sweet, and so on. In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Charles Travis argues that this view involves a kind of category mistake, and consequently that perceptual experiences are non-representational. However, the details of this argument are somewhat obscure, and have (...)
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  3. Reid's Direct Realism and Visible Figure.Keith A. Wilson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):783-803.
    In his account of visual perception, Thomas Reid describes visible figure as both ‘real and external’ to the eye and as the ‘immediate object of sight’. These claims appear to conflict with Reid's direct realism, since if the ‘immediate’ object of vision is also its direct object, then sight would be perceptually indirect due to the role of visible figure as a perceptual intermediary. I argue that this apparent threat to Reid's direct realism may be resolved by understanding visible figure (...)
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    Erratum To: Perception Without Representation.Roberta Locatelli & Keith A. Wilson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):213-213.
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    Review of Charles Travis, Perception: Essays After Frege. [REVIEW]Keith A. Wilson - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (April).
    Charles Travis’s new collection on perception brings together eleven of his previously published essays on this topic, some of which are substantially revised, plus one new essay. The intentionally ambiguous subtitle hints at the author’s endorsement of Fregean anti-psychologism, though influences from Wittgenstein and Austin are equally apparent. The work centres around two major questions in the philosophy of mind and perception. First, Travis argues against the view that perceptual experience, as distinct from perceptual judgement or belief, is representational, and (...)
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    Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.Keith A. Wilson - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this thesis I argue that the case against representationalism — the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational — that is set out in Charles Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004) constitutes a powerful, (...)
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