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Profile: Keith Frankish (University of Sheffield, University of Crete)
  1. In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes (...)
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  2. Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.
    Dual-process theories hold that there are two distinct processing modes available for many cognitive tasks: one that is fast, automatic and non-conscious, and another that is slow, controlled and conscious. Typically, cognitive biases are attributed to type 1 processes, which are held to be heuristic or associative, and logical responses to type 2 processes, which are characterised as rule-based or analytical. Dual-system theories go further and assign these two types of process to two separate reasoning systems, System 1 and System (...)
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  3. Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 75--93.
    There is a duality in our everyday view of belief. On the one hand, we sometimes speak of credence as a matter of degree. We talk of having some level of confidence in a claim (that a certain course of action is safe, for example, or that a desired event will occur) and explain our actions by reference to these degrees of confidence – tacitly appealing, it seems, to a probabilistic calculus such as that formalized in Bayesian decision theory. On (...)
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  4. Systems and Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal-Subpersonal Distinction.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
    About the book: This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within (...)
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  5. Deciding to Believe Again.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.
    This paper defends direct activism-the view that it is possible to form beliefs in a causally direct way. In particular, it addresses the charge that direct activism entails voluntarism-the thesis that we can form beliefs at will. It distinguishes weak and strong varieties of voluntarism and argues that, although direct activism may entail the weak variety, it does not entail the strong one. The paper goes on to argue that strong voluntarism is non-contingently false, sketching a new argument for that (...)
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  6.  68
    Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-Doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.
    In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs , Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. (...)
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  7. Delusions: A Two-Level Framework.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 269--284.
    [About the book]: Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in the study of psychopathology. (...)
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  8.  65
    Quining Diet Qualia.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):667-676.
    This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The ‘classic’ conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down ‘diet’ conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. (...)
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  9. The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence.Keith Frankish & William M. Ramsey (eds.) - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    Artificial intelligence, or AI, is a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding, modeling, and creating intelligence of various forms. It is a critical branch of cognitive science, and its influence is increasingly being felt in other areas, including the humanities. AI applications are transforming the way we interact with each other and with our environment, and work in artificially modeling intelligence is offering new insights into the human mind and revealing new forms mentality can take. This volume of original essays presents the (...)
     
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  10. The Anti-Zombie Argument.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.
    In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers (...)
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  11.  75
    The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective.Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - unknown
    [About the book] This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within (...)
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  12. Natural Language and Virtual Belief.Keith Frankish - 1998 - In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press. pp. 248.
    This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (_virtual beliefs_, as I call them) can be identified with _premising policies_, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs.
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  13. The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective.Keith Frankish & Jsbt Evans - 2009 - In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
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  14. A Matter of Opinion.Keith Frankish - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442.
    This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett.
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  15.  32
    Dual Systems and Dual Attitudes.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51.
    It can be argued that dual-system theorists should adopt an action - based view of System 2 (S2), on which S2 reasoning is an intentional activity. It can also be argued that they should adopt a dual - attitude theory, on which the two systems have distinct sets of propositional attitudes. However, Peter Carruthers has argued that on the action-based view there are no S2 attitudes. This paper replies to Carruthers, proposing a view of S2 attitudes as virtual ones, which (...)
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  16.  91
    How We Know Our Conscious Minds: Introspective Access to Conscious Thoughts.Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.
    Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
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  17. How Should We Revise the Paratactic Theory?Keith Frankish - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):251–262.
    This paper takes another look at Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse and evaluates some revisions to it, proposed recently by Ian Rumfitt (Mind, 1993). Davidson's original version of the theory – according to which indirect speech reports refer to token utterances – has a problem dealing with ambiguity. Rumfitt suggests that we can solve this problem by supposing that the immediate objects of verbs in indirect speech are token representations of disambiguated LF tree-structures. I argue that this proposal is (...)
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  18.  83
    Qualia: The Real Thing.Keith Frankish - unknown
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  19.  36
    Mind and Supermind.Keith Frankish - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number (...)
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  20.  61
    Language, Consciousness, and Cross-Modular Thought.Keith Frankish - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):685-686.
    Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.
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  21.  48
    Evolving the Linguistic Mind.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 9:206-214.
    It is sometimes suggested that we can think “in” natural language. According to this “cognitive” conception of language, we have a linguistic mind, or level of mentality, which operates by manipulating representations of natural language sentences. This paper outlines two evolutionary questions that the cognitive conception must address and looks at some versions of it to see which provides the best answers to them. The most plausible version, I argue, is the view that the linguistic mind is a virtual system, (...)
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  22.  44
    Non-Monotonic Inference.Keith Frankish - 2005 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier.
    In most logical systems, inferences cannot be invalidated simply by the addition of new premises. If an inference can be drawn from a set of premises S, then it can also be drawn from any larger set incorporrating S. The truth of the original premises guarantees the truth of the inferred conclusion, and the addition of extra premises cannot undermine it. This property is known as monotonicity. Nonmonotonic inference lacks this property. The conclusions drawn are provisional, and new information may (...)
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  23.  28
    A Diet, but Not the Qualia Plan: Reply to Amy Kind.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):679-680.
  24.  16
    Conscious Thinking, Acceptance, and Self-Deception.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):20-21.
    This commentary describes another variety of self-deception, highly relevant to von Hippel & Trivers's (VH&T's) project. Drawing on dual-process theories, I propose that conscious thinking is a voluntary activity motivated by metacognitive attitudes, and that our choice of reasoning strategies and premises may be biased by unconscious desires to self-deceive. Such biased reasoning could facilitate interpersonal deception, in line with VH&T's view.
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  25.  10
    Reasoning, Argumentation, and Cognition.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):79-80.
    This commentary does three things. First, it offers further support for the view that explicit reasoning evolved for public argumentation. Second, it suggests that promoting effective communication may not be the only, or even the main, function of public argumentation. Third, it argues that the data Mercier and Sperber (M&S) cite are compatible with the view that reasoning has subsequently been co-opted to play a role in individual cognition.
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  26.  7
    The Anti-Zombie Argument for Physicalism.Keith Frankish - unknown
  27.  25
    Cognitive Capacities, Mental Modules, and Neural Regions.Keith Frankish - unknown
    Dan lloyd (2011) issues a salutary warning against the assumption of what I shall call neural modularity—the view that there is a one-to-one mapping between cognitive functions and distinct brain regions. He shows how the assumption can distort the interpretation of neuroimaging studies and blind researchers to global structures and activity patterns that may be crucial to many aspects of cognitive function and dysfunction.In this note, I want to add a further dimension to the discussion by making connections with the (...)
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  28.  21
    Mind and Consciousness.Keith Frankish & Maria Kasmirli - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 107--120.
    This chapter contains sections titled: The Mind-Body Problem: Old and New Property Dualism Physicalist Approaches Conclusion: A Matter of Perspective? Further Reading References.
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  29.  17
    Adaptive Misbelief or Judicious Pragmatic Acceptance?Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):520.
    This commentary highlights the distinction between belief and pragmatic acceptance, and asks whether the positive illusions discussed in section 13 of the target article may be judicious pragmatic acceptances rather than adaptive misbeliefs. I discuss the characteristics of pragmatic acceptance and make suggestions about how to determine whether positive illusions are attitudes of this type.
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  30.  20
    The Architecture of the Mind – Peter Carruthers.Keith Frankish - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):371-375.
  31.  4
    Consciousness.Keith Frankish - unknown
    This book deals with the nature of consciousness. Many philosophers and psychologists today believe that the mind is a physical phenomenon, whose processes can be explained in scientific terms. Consciousness presents the biggest challenge to this view. Can the physical sciences really explain the nature of conscious experience—the way it feels to have a throbbing headache, or see a sunset, or smell freshly ground coffee? Or is there more to these experiences than a physical account can ever capture? If consciousness (...)
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  32.  6
    Mind - by Eric Matthews.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (2):185-187.
    A review of Eric Matthews' *Mind: Key Concepts in Philosophy* (Bloomsbury 2005).
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  33. New Waves in Philosophy of Action.Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  34. In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.Jonathan St Evans & Keith Frankish - 2010 - Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 42 (125):104-114.
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  35. Consciousness: The Basics.Keith Frankish - 2019 - Routledge.
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  36. Review of Consciousness in Action, by Susan Hurley. [REVIEW]Keith Frankish - 2006 - Mind 115:156-9.
    Questions about the relation between mind and world have long occupied philosophers of mind. In _Consciousness in Action_ Susan Hurley invites us to adopt a ninety-degree shift and consider the relation between perception and action. The central theme of the book is an attack on what Hurley dubs the _Input-Output Picture_ of perception and actionthe picture of perceptions as sensory inputs to the cognitive system and intentions as motor outputs from it, with the mind occupying the buffer zone in between. (...)
     
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  37. The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science.Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Cognitive science is a cross-disciplinary enterprise devoted to understanding the nature of the mind. In recent years, investigators in philosophy, psychology, the neurosciences, artificial intelligence, and a host of other disciplines have come to appreciate how much they can learn from one another about the various dimensions of cognition. The result has been the emergence of one of the most exciting and fruitful areas of inter-disciplinary research in the history of science. This volume of original essays surveys foundational, theoretical, and (...)
     
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