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Keith Simmons [22]Keith Eric George Simmons [1]
  1. The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2007 - In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 61--89.
  2. Truth.Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favor 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given. The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they look at how the debates relate to further issues, such as the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
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  3.  42
    Deflationary Truth and the Liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
  4.  30
    Paradoxes of Denotation.Keith Simmons - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (1):71 - 106.
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  5.  22
    Three Questions for Minimalism.Keith Simmons - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    In this paper, I raise some interconnected concerns for Paul Horwich’s minimal theory of truth, framed by these three questions: How should the minimal theory be formulated? How does the minimal theory address the liar paradox? What is the explanatory role of the concept of truth? I conclude that we cannot be linguistic or conceptual deflationists about truth.
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  6.  34
    A Berry and A Russell Without Self-Reference.Keith Simmons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):253-261.
    In this paper I present two new paradoxes, a definability paradox (related to the paradoxes of Berry, Richard and König), and a paradox about extensions (related to Russell’s paradox). However, unlike the familiar definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, these new paradoxes involve no self-reference or circularity.
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  7.  19
    On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox.Keith Simmons - 1987 - History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
    In this paper, I examine a solution to the Liar paradox found in the work of Ockham, Burley, and Pseudo-Sherwood. I reject the accounts of this solution offered by modern commentators. I argue that this medieval line suggests a non-hierarchical solution to the Liar, according to which ?true? is analysed as an indexical term, and paradox is avoided by minimal restrictions on tokens of ?true?. In certain respects, this solution resembles the recent approaches of Charles Parsons and Tyler Burge; in (...)
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  8. A Critique of Dialetheism.Greg Littman & Keith Simmons - 2004 - In G. Priest, J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-226.
    This dissertation is a critical examination of dialetheism, the view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism's proponents argue that adopting the view will allow us to solve hitherto unsolved problems, including the well-known logical paradoxes. ;Dialetheism faces three kinds of challenge. Challenges of the first kind put in doubt the intrinsic coherence of dialetheism. It can be claimed, for example, that it is incoherent for a claim to be both true and false; that claims known to be false cannot be (...)
     
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  9.  42
    The Diagonal Argument and the Liar.Keith Simmons - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (3):277 - 303.
  10.  40
    Paradox, Repetition, Revenge.Keith Simmons - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):121-131.
    I argue for an account of semantic paradox that requires minimal logical revision. I first consider a phenomenon that is common to the paradoxes of definability, Russell’s paradox and the Liar. The phenomenon—which I call Repetition—is this: given a paradoxical expression, we can go on to produce a semantically unproblematic expression composed of the very same words. I argue that Kripke’s and Field’s theories of truth make heavy weather of Repetition, and suggest a simpler contextual account. I go on to (...)
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  11.  12
    A Paradox of Definability: Richard'S and poincaré'S Ways Out.Keith Simmons - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):33-44.
    In 1905, Richard discovered his paradox of definability, and in a letter written that year he presented both the paradox and a solution to it.Soon afterwards, Poincaré endorsed a variant of Richard?s solution.In this paper, I critically examine Richard?s and Poincaré?s ways out.I draw on an objection of Peano?s, and argue that their stated solutions do not work.But I also claim that their writings suggest another way out, different from their stated solutions, and different from the orthodox Tarskian approach.I argue (...)
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  12.  18
    Kant on Moral Worth.Keith Simmons - 1989 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 6 (1):85 - 100.
  13.  33
    On an Argument Against Omniscience.Keith Simmons - 1993 - Noûs 27 (1):22-33.
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  14.  3
    Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument.Patrick Grim & Keith Simmons - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (3):467.
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  15.  48
    Varieties of Deflationism.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    There is a core metaphysical claim shared by all deflationists: truth is not a genuine, substantive property. But anyone who denies that truth is a genuine property must still make sense of our pervasive truth talk. In addressing questions about the meaning and function of ‘true’, deflationists engage in a linguistic or semantic project, a project that typically goes hand-in-hand with a deflationary account of the concept of truth. A thoroughgoing deflationary account of truth will go beyond the negative metaphysical (...)
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  16.  54
    A Logico-Philosophical Tour: A Critical Study of M. Giaquinto, The Search for Certainty: A Philosophical Account of Foundations of Mathematics[REVIEW]Keith Simmons - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2):162-175.
  17.  40
    Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth. [REVIEW]Keith Simmons - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):196–205.
  18.  11
    Tarski's Logic.Keith Simmons - 2009 - In Dov Gabbay (ed.), The Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. pp. 5--511.
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  19. Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth.Keith Simmons - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):196-204.
  20. Revenge and Context.Keith Simmons - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
     
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  21. Reference and Paradox.Keith Simmons - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 230--252.
     
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  22.  38
    Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument.Keith Simmons - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is about one of the most baffling of all paradoxes – the famous Liar paradox. Suppose we say: 'We are lying now'. Then if we are lying, we are telling the truth; and if we are telling the truth we are lying. This paradox is more than an intriguing puzzle, since it involves the concept of truth. Thus any coherent theory of truth must deal with the Liar. Keith Simmons discusses the solutions proposed by medieval philosophers and offers (...)
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