In the late summer of 1998, the authors, a cognitive scientist and a logician, started talking about the relevance of modern mathematical logic to the study of human reasoning, and we have been talking ever since. This book is an interim report of that conversation. It argues that results such as those on the Wason selection task, purportedly showing the irrelevance of formal logic to actual human reasoning, have been widely misinterpreted, mainly because the picture of logic current in psychology (...) and cognitive science is completely mistaken. We aim to give the reader a more accurate picture of mathematical logic and, in doing so, hope to show that logic, properly conceived, is still a very helpful tool in cognitive science. The main thrust of the book is therefore constructive. We give a number of examples in which logical theorizing helps in understanding and modeling observed behavior in reasoning tasks, deviations of that behavior in a psychiatric disorder (autism), and even the roots of that behavior in the evolution of the brain. (shrink)

In an age of information glut, knowledge can be hard to come by. Education must equip us to transform information for our own individual requirements. Full citizenship of the world requires that we learn to reason and communicate. So how do we do it? This book shares new insights into how people process information, and how we use that information to reason, make decisions, and develop theories about the world in which we live.

We review the various explanations that have been offered toaccount for subjects'' behaviour in Wason ''s famous selection task. Weargue that one element that is lacking is a good understanding ofsubjects'' semantics for the key expressions involved, and anunderstanding of how this semantics is affected by the demands the taskputs upon the subject''s cognitive system. We make novel proposals inthese terms for explaining the major content effects of deonticmaterials. Throughout we illustrate with excerpts from tutorialdialogues which motivate the kinds of (...) analysis proposed. Our long termgoal is an integration of the various insights about conditionalreasoning on offer from different cognitive science methodologies. Thepurpose of this paper is to try to draw the attention of logicians andsemanticists to this area, since we believe that empirical investigationof the cognitive processes involved could benefit from semanticanalyses. (shrink)

Existing accounts of syllogistic reasoning oppose rule-based and model-based methods. Stenning \& Oberlander show that the latter are isomorphic to well-known graphical methods, when these are correctly interpreted. We here extend these results by showing that equivalent sentential implementations exist, thus revealing that all these theories are members of a family of abstract {\it individual identification algorithms} variously implemented in diagrams or sentences. This abstract logical analysis suggests a novel {\it individual identification task} for observing syllogistic reasoning processes. Comparison of (...) the results of this task with the Standard Task confirms that the tasks are psychologically closely related, throwing light on sources of error, on subjects' sensitivity to metalogical properties, and on term ordering phenomena. Since it avoids posing the sub-task of formulating a quantified conclusion, the new task allows comparison of explanations of problem difficulty in terms of the number of models with alternatives in terms of the difficulty of choosing a quantifier for the conclusion. Logical concepts of {\it source} and {\it conditional} premisses provide a comprehensive account of term order data, including figural effects, at a level abstract with regard to imagistic or sentential representations. These results argue that much richer empirical evidence will be required to discriminate phenomenologically distinct reasoning processes than has hitherto been supposed. (shrink)

This reply to Oaksford and Chater’s ’s critical discussion of our use of logic programming to model and predict patterns of conditional reasoning will frame the dispute in terms of the semantics of the conditional. We begin by outlining some common features of LP and probabilistic conditionals in knowledge-rich reasoning over long-term memory knowledge bases. For both, context determines causal strength; there are inferences from the absence of certain evidence; and both have analogues of the Ramsey test. Some current work (...) shows how a combination of counting defeaters and statistics from network monitoring can provide the information for graded responses from LP reasoning. With this much introduction, we then respond to O&C’s specific criticisms and misunderstandings. (shrink)

Several of Beller, Bender, and Medin’s (2012) issues are as relevant within cognitive science as between it and anthropology. Knowledge-rich human mental processes impose hermeneutic tasks, both on subjects and researchers. Psychology's current philosophy of science is ill suited to analyzing these: Its demand for ‘‘stimulus control’’ needs to give way to ‘‘negotiation of mutual interpretation.’’ Cognitive science has ways to address these issues, as does anthropology. An example from my own work is about how defeasible logics are mathematical models (...) of some aspects of simple hermeneutic processes. They explain processing relative to databases of knowledge and belief—that is, content. A specific example is syllogistic reasoning, which raises issues of experimenters’ interpretations of subjects’ reasoning. Science, especially since the advent of understandings of computation, does not have to be reductive. How does this approach transfer onto anthropological topics? Recent cognitive science approaches to anthropological topics have taken a reductive stance in terms of modules. We end with some speculations about a different cognitive approach to, for example, religion. (shrink)

Executive function has become an important concept in explanations of psychiatric disorders, but we currently lack comprehensive models of normal executive function and of its malfunctions. Here we illustrate how defeasible logical analysis can aid progress in this area. We illustrate using autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as example disorders, and show how logical analysis reveals commonalities between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours within each disorder, and how contrasting sub-components of executive function are involved across disorders. This analysis reveals (...) how logical analysis is as applicable to fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning as it is to slow deliberate cogitation. (shrink)

We advance a theoretical framework which combines recent insights of research in logic, psychology, and formal semantics, on the nature of diagrammatic representation and reasoning. In particular, we wish to explain the varied efficacy of reasoning and representing with diagrams. In general we consider diagrammatic representations to be restricted in expressive power, and we wish to explain efficacy of reasoning with diagrams via the semantical and computational properties of such restricted `languages'. Connecting these foundational insights (from semantics and complexity theory) (...) to the psychology of reasoning with diagrams requires us to develop the notion of the {\it availability} (to an agent) of {\it constraints} operating within representation systems, as a consequence of their direct semantic interpretation. Thus we offer a number of fundamental definitions as well as a research programme which aligns current efforts in the logical and psychological analysis of diagrammatic representation systems. (shrink)

It is neither desirable nor possible to eliminate normative concerns from the psychology of reasoning. Norms define the most fundamental psychological questions: What are people trying to do, and how? Even if no one system of reasoning can be the norm, pure descriptivism is as undesirable and unobtainable in the psychology of reasoning as elsewhere in science.

Classical symbolic computational models of cognition are at variance with the empirical findings in the cognitive psychology of memory and inference. Standard symbolic computers are well suited to remembering arbitrary lists of symbols and performing logical inferences. In contrast, human performance on such tasks is extremely limited. Standard models donot easily capture content addressable memory or context sensitive defeasible inference, which are natural and effortless for people. We argue that Connectionism provides a more natural framework in which to model this (...) behaviour. In addition to capturing the gross human performance profile, Connectionist systems seem well suited to accounting for the systematic patterns of errors observed in the human data. We take these arguments to counter Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) recent claim that Connectionism is, in principle, irrelevant to psychology. (shrink)

Theories of diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning typically seek to account for either the formal semantics of diagrams, or for the advantages which diagrammatic representations hold for the reasoner over other forms of representation. Regrettably, almost no theory exists which accounts for both of these issues together, nor how they affect one another. We do not attempt to provide such an account here. We do, however, seek to lay out larger context than is generally used for examining the processes of using (...) diagrams in reasoning or communication. A context in which detailed studies of sub-problems, such as the formal semantics or cognitive impact of specific diagrammatic systems, may be embedded.Accounts of the embedding of sentential logics in the computational processes of reasoners and communicators are relatively well developed from several decades of research in AI. Analogies between the sentential and the graphical cases are quite revealing about both similarities and differences. To provide a structure for the 'grand context' of diagrammatic representation and reasoning, and to clarify the relations between its component problems, we examine carefully these analogies and the decomposition they provide of subproblems for analysing diagrammatic reasoning. (shrink)

(2013). Statistical models as cognitive models of individual differences in reasoning. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 89-102. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674061.

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) advocate Bayesian probability as a way to deal formally with the pervasive nonmonotonicity of common sense reasoning. We show that some forms of nonmonotonicity cannot be treated by Bayesian methods.

Our long term goal is an understanding of human communication in terms which would provide the basis for rational design. The kernel would be a theory of the cognitive consequences of allocating the same information to different media and modalities, based on the user's information processing characterised in computational terms. Our theory of the cognitive consequences of media/modality allocation starts from an analysis of differences in logical expressiveness of graphical and linguistic representations (Stenning \& Oberlander (1994, 1995)). This semantic approach (...) requires conceptualisations of {\it medium} and {\it modality} that can be related to representation systems. We propose that media are the physical/perceptual aspects of representations; modalities are classes of interpretation function which map media onto meanings. These interpretations of the terms contrast with existing HCI usage. The curtailments of abstraction observed in graphics arise from interactions between medium and modality. Graphical modalities are distinguished from sentential languages by the nature of their interpretation functions. A hierarchy of expressiveness of interpretations of graphics is defined, and compared with interpretations of sentential languages. Using the expressiveness of representations to predict their cognitive properties also requires reference to the availability of constraints of their interpretation to users. Further contrasts between graphics and language emerge in the availability of their constraints. Three example domains of graphical representations are analysed from this perspective---matrix graphics; logic diagrams; and semantic networks. Some empirical evidence of the usability of these notations is reviewed as evidence that the proposed conceptualisation offers powerful generalisations. (shrink)

Alternative logics have been invoked periodically to explain the systematically different modes of thought of the subjects of ethnography: one logic for ‘us’ and another for ‘them’. Recently anthropologists have cast doubt on the tenability of such an explanation of difference. In cognitive science, [Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2008] proposed that with the modern development of multiple logics, at least several logics are required for making sense of the cognitive processes of reasoning for different purposes and in different contexts. Alongside (...) Classical logic — the logic of dispute), there is a need for a nonmonotonic logic which is a logic of cooperative communication. Here we propose that all people with various cultural backgrounds make use of multiple logics, and that difference should be captured as variation in the social contexts that call forth the different logics’ application. This contribution illustrates these ideas with reference to the ethnography of divination. (shrink)

This article aims to achieve two goals: to show that probability is not the only way of dealing with uncertainty ; and to provide evidence that logic-based methods can well support reasoning with uncertainty. For the latter claim, two paradigmatic examples are presented: logic programming with Kleene semantics for modelling reasoning from information in a discourse, to an interpretation of the state of affairs of the intended model, and a neural-symbolic implementation of input/output logic for dealing with uncertainty in dynamic (...) normative contexts. (shrink)

This article aims to achieve two goals: to show that probability is not the only way of dealing with uncertainty ; and to provide evidence that logic-based methods can well support reasoning with uncertainty. For the latter claim, two paradigmatic examples are presented: logic programming with Kleene semantics for modelling reasoning from information in a discourse, to an interpretation of the state of affairs of the intended model, and a neural-symbolic implementation of input/output logic for dealing with uncertainty in dynamic (...) normative contexts. (shrink)

We discuss external and internal graphical and linguistic representational systems. We argue that a cognitive theory of peoples' reasoning performance must account for (a) the logical equivalence of inferences expressed in graphical and linguistic form; and (b) the implementational differences that affect facility of inference. Our theory proposes that graphical representations limit abstraction and thereby aid processibility. We discuss the ideas of specificity and abstraction, and their cognitive relevance. Empirical support comes from tasks (i) involving and (ii) not involving the (...) manipulation of external graphics. For (i), we take Euler's Circles, provide a novel computational reconstruction, show how it captures abstractions, and contrast it with earlier construals, and with Mental Models' representations. We demonstrate equivalence of the graphical Euler system, and the non-graphical Mental Models system. For (ii), we discuss text comprehension, and the mental performance of syllogisms. By positing an internal system with the same specificity as Euler's Circles we cover the Mental Models data, and generate new empirical predictions. Finally, we consider how the architecture of working memory explains why such specific representations are relatively easy to store. (shrink)

Subjects exhibiting logical competence choices, for example, in Wason's selection task, are exhibiting an important skill. We take issue with the idea that this skill is individualistic and must be selected for at some different level than System 1 skills. Our case redraws System 1/2 boundaries, and reconsiders the relationship of competence model to skill.

Machine generated contents note: -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on Contributors -- PART I: COMPLEXITY IN ANIMAL MINDS -- Introduction: M.McGonigle-Chalmers -- Relational and Absolute Discrimination Learning by Squirrel Monkeys: Establishing a Common Ground with Human Cognition; B.T.Jones -- Serial List Retention by Non-Human Primates: Complexity and Cognitive Continuity; F.R.Treichler -- The Use of Spatial Structure in Working Memory: A Comparative Standpoint; C.De Lillo -- The Emergence of Linear Sequencing in Children: A Continuity Account and a Formal Model; M.McGonigle-Chalmers&I.Kusel (...) -- Sensitivity to Quantity: What Counts Across Species?; S.T.Boysen&A.M.Yocom -- PART II: COMPLEXITY IN ROBOTS -- Editorial Introduction; D.McFarland -- Towards Cognitive Robotics: Robotics, Biology and Developmental Psychology; M.Lee, U.Nehmzow&M.Rodriguez -- Structuring Intelligence: The Role of Hierarchy, Modularity and Learning in Generating Intelligent Behaviour; J.J.Bryson -- Epistemology, Access, and Computational Models; G.Luger -- Reasoning About Representations in Autonomous Systems: What P´Olya and Lakatos Have To Say; A.Bundy -- PART III: LANGUAGE, EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEX MIND -- Editorial Introduction; K.Stenning -- How to Qualify for a Cognitive Upgrade: Executive Control, Glass Ceilings, and the Limits of Simian Success; A.Clark -- Private Codes and Public Structures; C.Allen -- The Emergence of Complex Language; W.Hinzen -- Language Evolution: Enlarging the Picture; K.Stenning&M.Van Lambalgen -- Epilogue: Reminiscences of Brendan McGonigle -- Index. (shrink)