In The Foundations of Arithmetic, Gottlob Frege contended that the difference between concepts and objects was absolute. He meant that no object could be a concept and no concept an object. Benno Kerry disagreed; he contended that a concept could be an object, and that therefore the difference between concepts and objects was only relative. In this book, Jolley aims to understand the debate between Frege and Kerry. But Jolley's purpose is not so much to champion either side; rather, it (...) is to utilize an understanding of the debate to shed light on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein-and vice versa. Jolley not only sifts through the debate between Frege and Kerry, but also through subsequent versions of the debate in J. J. Valberg and Wilfred Sellars. Jolley's goal is to show that the central notion of Philosophical Investigations, that of a 'conceptual investigation', is a legacy of the Frege/Kerry debate and also a contribution to it. Jolley concludes that the difference between concepts and objects is as absolute in its way in Philosophical Investigations as it was in The Foundations of Arithmetic and that recognizing the absoluteness of the difference in Philosophical Investigations provides a beginning for a 'resolute' reading of Wittgenstein's book. (shrink)

I certainly find it easier to recognize the deep continuities within Wittgenstein's thought, than the real nature of the contrasts: one only comes to recognize these for what they are after prolonged engagement with the two works.Heather Gert has offered a reading of Investigations §§ 46-50. Her attention devolves primarily on the notorious standard meter paragraph of § 50. Important to her reading is her conviction about what it is from the Tractatus that is being criticized and about how it (...) is being criticized.I believe Gert's reading of the passage is mistaken. Gert fails to get fully into focus what is happening in the distance, in the Tractatus, and she fails to get into focus what is happening nearby, in .. (shrink)

What follows is talky—I skitter across a number of difficult topics much too quickly and with little attempt to defend what I say. I may be able to add some defense later in discussion, but I don't promise anything much and certainly nothing fancy. I am still very much in the process of thinking about these topics, and I aim to do no more than to perhaps nudge you to think about them too.By "poetry" in what follows, I typically mean (...) "lyric poetry." There are poems and poems and poems, and the dactyls make a difference, as do many other features internal to poetry. I will also say upfront that I have no working definition of "lyric poetry." I also have no working definition of "philosophy," although I will be... (shrink)

Peter Kivy investigates the unity of form and content in the arts, particularly in poetry. While Kivy says much with which I happily agree, I sadly disagree with him about the impossibility of form–content identities. Kivy's arguments fail to compel: there are other ways of understanding form–content identities and the need for them that has been felt by artists and critics. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Abstract: In this article I contest a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations —a reading of it as debunking philosophy. I concede that such a reading is not groundless, but I show why it is nonetheless mistaken. To do so, I distinguish two different ways of viewing Philosophical Investigations and its concern with philosophical problems, an External View and an Internal View. On the External View, readers of the book are taken to know ahead of time what philosophical problems are. On (...) the Internal View, readers are not taken to know this ahead of time: the task of the book is to disclose what philosophical problems are, to show them coming into being. One thing disclosed is our participatory role in philosophical problems coming to be. Learning about the nature of philosophical problems is thus learning about our own nature; metaphilosophical knowledge is in part self-knowledge. If the Internal View is correct (as I believe it is), then Philosophical Investigations does not debunk philosophy but provides a different conception of philosophy and the philosopher's task. (shrink)

In the dissertation I explore three central issues in Plotinus' philosophical psychology: The fall of the soul, the relationships of soul and body, and the concept of the ego. ;Chapter 1 introduces the issues. Chapter 2 argues for a dual-aspect theory about the soul's fall. Chapter 3 characterizes the relationships between soul and body. Much of the chapter is devoted to distancing Plotinus' dualism from Cartesian dualism. The chapter ends with a discussion of Plotinus on perception. Chapter 4 investigates the (...) concept of the ego, the function of the ego in union with the One, and the relationship between the ego and the other powers of the soul. (shrink)

In this essay, I respond to A. W. Moore’s instructive chapter on Frege. I respond by asking various questions, and I question particularly Moore’s claim that Frege, in reacting to Benno Kerry, falls into Hegelian excess. I toy with responding to my question by regarding Frege as anticipating a Wittgensteinian-Heideggerian exaction. It remains unclear whether this constitutes (much) progress.

What is it to read Wittgenstein resolutely? In this essay, I make a suggestion about how to answer that question. I backtrack in time to a debate about Philosophical Investigations between O. K. Bouwsma and Gilbert Ryle. I selectively reconstruct that debate, highlighting features of it that I take to be interesting in their own right and in relation to debates about PI, but also interesting in analogy with debates about resolute and standard readings of Tractatus logico-philosophicus. As will be (...) clear, my sympathies are with Bouwsma against Ryle, and with resolute readers against standard readers. But I do not vindicate Bouwsma; I will, in fact, be critical, carefully or guardedly critical of him.Nor do I vindicate resolute reading of TLP. I suggest a way of seeing resolute reading that makes clearer what it is and how it contrasts with standard reading, and, in so doing, that makes clearer what some of the difficulties of the debate between the readings really are, whether about TLP or about PI. (shrink)

In this essay I investigate the unity of Emerson's sentences. I begin by describing the phenomenology of reading Emerson and use that phenomenology to orient the investigation. I propose to understand the unity of Emerson's sentences by using a variation of Frege's strategy for understanding the unity of sentences generally. I then address how the unity of the Emerson sentence serves to create the unity of the Emerson paragraph and even of the Emerson essay. Along the way I compare Emerson's (...) essays to Lancelot Andrewes’ sermons. I finish by using the results of the investigation and comparisons to provide a partial reading of “Experience” in which I shed light on the nature of Emerson's encounter with the problematic of skepticism. (shrink)

In this essay, we focus primarily on Moore’s “Proof of an External World” and Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism.” We are not exactly commenting on Clarke’s “The Legacy of Skepticism,” interpreting it, although what we do involves us in (some of) that. Instead of directly commenting on it, we do things with Legacy; we read Moore’s Proof and Kant’s Refutation with Clarke in mind. And by way of doing this, we bring onto the stage a post-Legacy Moore, and a post-Legacy Kant. (...) We do not claim to present Moore and Kant per se (to use Clarke’s term); we do not portray Moore and Kant as they are independently of “The Legacy of Skepticism.” We propose instead Moore and Kant as we read them after Legacy, i.e., in light of the pure/plain distinction. (shrink)

In this brief essay, I explain the peculiar actions of the shopkeeper described in Philosophical Investigations 1 (the shopkeeper has been given an order and has gone on to fill it). I also shed light on why and how Wittgenstein wants us to notice the peculiarity of the actions. Wittgenstein wants us to watch the shopkeeper so as to displace the general notion of the meaning of a word in our philosophical reflections. Watching the shopkeeper's actions is watching him understand (...) the order he has been given. We see the shopkeeper doing logic, segmenting the order, there in the shop, in 3D. Nothing need happen in any Cartesian non-space or Realm of Forms or Third Realm. (shrink)

Kelly Dean Jolley - Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 552-554 Book Review Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy James C. Klagge, editor. Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xv + 272. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $19.95. Collected in this volume are papers from the 1999 conference "Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy," along with a few other relevant papers. Ray Monk's and James Conant's papers frame the (...) others and provide terms of criticism appropriate to them. Both authors investigate the relationship between philosophy and biography. Each finds in Wittgenstein an elucidation of a variety of understanding needful for appreciating the variety of understanding at which biography aims. Monk argues that the variety of understanding that consists in seeing connections (between the life and work of the.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 311-312 [Access article in PDF] Hill, Claire Ortiz and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock. Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics. Chicago: Open Court, 2000. Pp. xiv + 315. Cloth, $39.95. Analytic philosophy is rooted in Frege; phenomenology, in Husserl: or so goes the old, old story. Most philosophers now recognize that Husserl has a role to play in analysis' roots, and (...) Frege in phenomenology's. Hill and Haddock try to show that Husserl's role in analysis' roots is larger than is now recognized, and to show that Husserl has much of relevance to say about matters currently central in analysis.Hill and Haddock tag-team the topic. Chapters are written now by one, now by the other. A common theme is: "Look, Husserl's bested Frege here!" One chapter is entitled "To be a Fregean or To be a Husserlian?" and the book pushes vigorously in the Husserlian direction. There are several chapters devoted to sense and reference, Fregean and Husserlian. There are chapters on logical abstraction and on the philosophy (primarily Husserlian) of mathematics. Other figures, such as Cantor and Hilbert, also put in appearances.The book's primary merit is in revealing how much of interest Husserl has to say about matters currently central in analysis—particularly in the philosophy of logic/language and in the philosophy of mathematics. There are also interesting extensions of Husserl's views, carefully kept Husserlian, that are worthy of attention: extensions of his views on the philosophy of mathematics and his Platonism. The book's primary demerit is in the often flat-footed readings of Frege that are offered. (In this respect, the book returns the disfavor of the flat-footed readings of Husserl offered by more analytically-minded philosophers.) Nowhere are the names of Warren Goldfarb, Thomas Ricketts or Cora Diamond mentioned—the philosophers who have provided a reading of Frege that makes him a much more interesting foil for Husserl. On the reading I have in mind, Frege is not a Platonist, and he does not have a truth-conditional semantics. Further, on this reading, Frege's ontological categories supervene on logical ones, and his ontology does not ground or explain objectivity. Instead of offering a sematic theory, on this reading Frege is denying that there is any coign of vantage for the offering of such. But this Frege, or this reading of Frege, makes no appearance in the book. Another noteworthy omission—related, I think, to the omission of the alternative reading of Frege—is any extended discussion of a crucial difference in the ways that Frege and Husserl thought of language: Frege thought of language as the universal medium, Husserl of language as a calculus. (Jaakko Hintikka both popularized this distinction and suggested that Husserl had the [End Page 311] calculus conception.) Conceived as the universal language, language is inescapable. Husserl's conception leads him to think that he can escape language, step behind it and survey it. If this crucial difference is not kept in mind, it is difficult, I think, to see the various disagreements between Frege and Husserl at their proper depth.For example, neglecting this difference makes it hard to see the parallel difference between Frege and Husserl over the appropriate conception of logic. Since Frege thinks of logic as universal (first and foremost), he would reject Husserl project of providing a geneology for logic as deeply confused. For Frege, there can be no grounding of logic, no justifying of logic from behind. Logical investigation is, for Frege, investigating the mind. There is no other type of investigation—no matter how transcendentally phenomenological—that can subordinate logical investigation to it, or can usurp the title of the investigation of the mind. There is no experience—no matter how pre-predicative (what would Frege make of 'pre-predicative'?)—from which logic springs. Wittgenstein's Tractarian comment is thoroughly Fregean: "Logic precedes every experience—that something is so." (5.552)Still and all, I recommend this book to anyone interested in the issues it discusses, since... (shrink)