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Kenneth Aizawa [60]Kenneth Lee Aizawa [1]
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Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
  1. The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  2. Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's view.
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  3. The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
    Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account ( Shapiro, 2000 and (...)
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  4. Why the Mind is Still in the Head.Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2009 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 78--95.
    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, the confusion of coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers (...)
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  5.  82
    The Systematicity Arguments.Kenneth Aizawa - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The Systematicity Arguments is the only book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments.
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  6. The Enactivist Revolution.Kenneth Aizawa - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):19-42.
    Among the many ideas that go by the name of “enactivism” there is the idea that by “cognition” we should understand what is more commonly taken to be behavior. For clarity, label such forms of enactivism “enactivismb.” This terminology requires some care in evaluating enactivistb claims. There is a genuine risk of enactivist and non-enactivist cognitive scientists talking past one another. So, for example, when enactivistsb write that “cognition does not require representations” they are not necessarily denying what cognitivists claim (...)
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  7. Understanding The Embodiment of Perception.Kenneth Aizawa - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (1):5-25.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Noë’s theory of en- active perception provides one proposal. Noë suggests a radical constitutive hypothesis according to which (COH) Perceptual experiences are constituted, in part, by the exercise of sensorimotor (...)
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  8. The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  9.  35
    Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 539--582.
    Biologists seems to hold two fundamental beliefs: Organisms are organized into levels and the individuals at these levels differ in their properties. Together these suggest that there will be massive multiple realization, i.e. that many human psychological properties are multiply realized at many neurobiological levels. This paper provides some documentation in support of this suggestion.
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  10.  31
    Is perceiving bodily action?Kenneth Aizawa - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):933-946.
    One of the boldest claims one finds in the enactivist and embodied cognition literature is that perceiving is bodily action. Research on the role of eye movements in vision have been thought to support PBA, whereas research on paralysis has been thought to pose no challenge to PBA. The present paper, however, will argue just the opposite. Eye movement research does not support PBA, whereas paralysis research presents a strong challenge that seems not to have been fully appreciated.
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  11. Understanding the Embodiment of Perception.Kenneth Aizawa - 2006 - APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3):5-25.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Nos (2004) theory of enactive perception provides one proposal. Where it is commonly thought that.
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  12.  8
    Is Perceiving Bodily Action?Kenneth Aizawa - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):933-946.
    One of the boldest claims one finds in the enactivist and embodied cognition literature is that perceiving is bodily action. Research on the role of eye movements in vision have been thought to support PBA, whereas research on paralysis has been thought to pose no challenge to PBA. The present paper, however, will argue just the opposite. Eye movement research does not support PBA, whereas paralysis research presents a strong challenge that seems not to have been fully appreciated.
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  13. Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  14. The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: A Model System for the Philosophy of Mind.Kenneth Aizawa - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):65-98.
    This paper argues that the biochemistry of memory consolidation provides valuable model systems for exploring the multiple realization of psychological states.
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  15. Fodorian Semantics. Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - In Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation. Blackwell.
  16.  96
    Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
    One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that (...)
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  17.  32
    Defending Pluralism About Compositional Explanations.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 78:101202.
    In the New Mechanist literature, most attention has focused on the compositional explanation of processes/activities of wholes by processes/activities of their parts. These are sometimes called “constitutive mechanistic explanations.” In this paper, we defend moving beyond this focus to a Pluralism about compositional explanation by highlighting two additional species of such explanations. We illuminate both Analytic compositional explanations that explain a whole using a compositional relation to its parts, and also Standing compositional explanations that explain a property of a whole (...)
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  18.  96
    'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  19.  85
    Explaining Systematicity.Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):115-36.
    Despite the considerable attention that the systematicity argument has enjoyed, it is worthwhile examining the argument within the context of similar explanatory arguments from the history of science. This kind of analysis helps show that Connectionism, qua Connectionism, really does not have an explanation of systematicity. Second, and more surprisingly, one finds that the systematicity argument sets such a high explanatory standard that not even Classicism can explain the systematicity of thought.
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  20.  33
    Explaining Systematicity.Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):115-136.
    Despite the considerable attention that the systematicity argument has enjoyed, it is worthwhile examining the argument within the context of similar explanatory arguments from the history of science. This kind of analysis helps show that Connectionism, qua Connectionism, really does not have an explanation of systematicity. Second, and more surprisingly, one finds that the systematicity argument sets such a high explanatory standard that not even Classicism can explain the systematicity of thought.
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  21.  74
    Distinguishing Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition.Kenneth Aizawa - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):91 - 106.
    This paper pursues two lines of thought that help characterize the differences between some versions of virtue epistemology and the hypothesis that cognitive processes are realized by brain, body, and world.
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  22. Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the Brain: Kenneth Aizawa.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:263-284.
    In the extended mind literature, one sometimes finds the claim that there is no neural correlate of consciousness. Instead, there is a biological or ecological correlate of consciousness. Consciousness, it is claimed, supervenes on an entire organism in action. Alva Noë is one of the leading proponents of such a view. This paper resists Noë's view. First, it challenges the evidence he offers from neuroplasticity. Second, it presses a problem with paralysis. Third, it draws attention to a challenge from the (...)
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  23. Multiple Realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - manuscript
  24. Computation in Cognitive Science: It is Not All About Turing-Equivalent Computation.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):227-236.
    It is sometimes suggested that the history of computation in cognitive science is one in which the formal apparatus of Turing-equivalent computation, or effective computability, was exported from mathematical logic to ever wider areas of cognitive science and its environs. This paper, however, indicates some respects in which this suggestion is inaccurate. Computability theory has not been focused exclusively on Turing-equivalent computation. Many essential features of Turing-equivalent computation are not captured in definitions of computation as symbol manipulation. Turing-equivalent computation did (...)
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  25.  97
    'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  26.  82
    Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
    In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.
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  27.  93
    Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem".Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  28.  79
    Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):273-81.
    Jerry Fodor (1994) thinks that content is not historically determined. In this paper we will consider Fodor's reasons.
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  29. Representations Without Rules, Connectionism and the Syntactic Argument.Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):465-92.
    Terry Horgan and John Tienson have suggested that connectionism might provide a framework within which to articulate a theory of cognition according to which there are mental representations without rules (RWR) (Horgan and Tienson 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992). In essence, RWR states that cognition involves representations in a language of thought, but that these representations are not manipulated by the sort of rules that have traditionally been posited. In the development of RWR, Horgan and Tienson attempt to forestall a particular (...)
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  30. Challenges to Active Externalism.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - forthcoming - In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  31.  83
    Introduction to “The Material Bases of Cognition”.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):277-286.
    Special Issue: The Material Bases of Cognition Guest Editors: Fred Adams · Kenneth Aizawa -/- Compositional Explanatory Relations and Mechanistic Reduction K.L. Theurer 287 -/- Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron to Construct a Starting Framework C. Gillett 309 -/- The Mark of the Cognitive F. Adams · R. Garrison 339 -/- Dynamics and Cognition L.A. Shapiro 353 -/- Causal Parity and Externalisms: Extensions in Life and Mind P. Huneman 377 -/- Did I Do That? Brain–Computer (...)
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  32.  82
    Connectionism and Artificial Intelligence: History and Philosophical Interpretation.Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - Journal for Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 4:1992.
    Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus have tried to place connectionism and artificial intelligence in a broader historical and intellectual context. This history associates connectionism with neuroscience, conceptual holism, and nonrationalism, and artificial intelligence with conceptual atomism, rationalism, and formal logic. The present paper argues that the Dreyfus account of connectionism and artificial intelligence is both historically and philosophically misleading.
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  33.  50
    Exhibiting Verses Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward. [REVIEW]Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (1):39-55.
  34.  11
    Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
    In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.
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  35.  6
    "X" means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics.Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-231.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  36.  60
    Representations Without Rules, Connectionism and the Syntactic Argument.Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3).
    This paper has a two-fold aim. First, it reinforces a version of the "syntactic argument" given in Aizawa (1994). This argument shows that connectionist networks do not provide a means of implementing representations without rules. Horgan and Tlenson have responded to the syntactic argument in their book and in another paper (Horgan & Tlenson, 1993), but their responses do not meet the challenge posed by my formulation of the syntactic argument. My second aim is to describe a kind of cognitive (...)
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  37. Rules in Programming Languages and Networks.Frederick R. Adams, Kenneth Aizawa & Gary Fuller - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  38.  58
    Cognitive Architecture: The Structure of Cognitive Representations.Kenneth Aizawa - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 172--189.
  39.  39
    The Role of the Systematicity Argument in Classicism and Connectionism.Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - In S. O'Nuallain (ed.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.
    Despite the prominence of the systematicity argument in the debate between Classicists and Connectionists, there is extremely widespread misunderstanding of the nature of the argument. For example, Matthews (1994), has argued that the systematicity argument is a kind of trick, where Niklasson and van Gelder (1994), have claimed that it is obscure. More surprisingly, once one examines the argument carefully, one finds that Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin, themselves have not fully understood it. 1 In part as a result of this, (...)
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  40. Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - manuscript
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
     
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  41.  20
    A Synthesis of Work in Cognitive Science: A. Clark: Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015, 424pp. £19.99 HB.Kenneth Aizawa - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):487-490.
    A review of Andy Clark's Surfing Uncertainty.
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  42.  10
    Biology and Sufficiency in Connectionist Theory.Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 69--88.
  43. Cognitive Architecture.Kenneth Aizawa - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  44. Clark's Conditions on Extended Cognition Are Too Strong.Kenneth Aizawa - manuscript
     
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  45. Cognitive Science.Kenneth Aizawa - 1993 - In Reflections on Philosophy. New York: St Martin's Press.
  46.  38
    Editor’s Introduction.Kenneth Aizawa - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):433-438.
    Introduction to the 2009 Synthese Special Issue on Philosophy and Neuroscience. The papers are: -/- The multiplicity of experimental protocols: a challenge to reductionist and non-reductionist models of the unity of neuroscience Jacqueline A. Sullivan -/- Making sense of mirror neurons Lawrence Shapiro -/- Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization Thomas W. Polger -/- Multiple realization and methodological pluralism Robert C. Richardson -/- Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale Ken Aizawa .
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  47.  52
    Jeffrey L. Elman, Elizabeth A. Bates, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett, (Eds.), Rethinking Innateness: A Connectionist Perspective on Development, Neural Network Modeling and Connectionism Series and Kim Plunkett and Jeffrey L. Elman, Exercises in Rethinking Innateness: A Handbook for Connectionist Simulations. [REVIEW]Kenneth Aizawa - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (3):447-456.
  48.  54
    Lloyd's Dialectical Theory of Representation.Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.
    This is a critique of Lloyd's theory which appeared in his book, Simple Minds.
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  49. Multiple Realization and Methodology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - manuscript
    An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast to the claims of recent (...)
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  50.  40
    Multiple Realization and Multiple “Ways” of Realization: A Progress Report.Kenneth Aizawa - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68:3-9.
    One might have thought that if something has two or more distinct realizations, then that thing is multiply realized. Nevertheless, some philosophers have claimed that two or more distinct realizations do not amount to multiple realization, unless those distinct realizations amount to multiple “ways” of realizing the thing. Corey Maley, Gualtiero Piccinini, Thomas Polger, and Lawrence Shapiro are among these philosophers. Unfortunately, they do not explain why multiple realization requires multiple “ways” of realizing. More significantly, their efforts to articulate multiple (...)
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