David Hume wrote that Berkeley's arguments `admit of no answer but produce no conviction'. This book aims at the kind of understanding of Berkeley's philosophy that comes from seeing how we ourselves might be brought to embrace it. Berkeley held that matter does not exist, and that the sensations we take to be caused by an indifferent and independent world are instead caused directly by God. Nature becomes a text, with no existence apart from the spirits who transmit and receive (...) it. Kenneth P. Winkler presents these conclusions as natural consequences of Berkeley's reflections on such topics as representation, abstraction, necessary truth, and cause and effect. In the closing chapters Proefssor Winkler offers new interpretations of Berkeley's view on unperceived objects, corpuscularian science, and our knowledge of God and other minds. (shrink)

Anne Conway’s Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, first published in 1690, is probably the most ambitious contribution to early modern metaphysics by a woman writing in the English language. This beautifully prepared edition makes Conway’s treatise available to twentieth-century readers in an accessible English translation of the 1690 Latin text—itself a translation of an original English manuscript that has long been lost.

Includes generous selections from the Essay, topically arranged passages from the replies to Stillingfleet, a chronology, a bibliography, a glossary, and an index based on the entries that Locke himself devised.

Even philosophers who believe there is a single “problem of personal identity” conceive of that problem in different ways. They differ not only in their ways of stating the problem, but in the parts of philosophy to which they assign it, and in the resources they feel entitled to call upon in their attempts to deal with it. My topic in this paper is an eighteenth-century uncertainty about the place within philosophy of the problem of personal identity. Is it a (...) problem in metaphysics, or a problem in ethics? Here I try to show that the boundary between ethics and metaphysics was—for a line of philosophers beginning with Locke, continuing with Shaftesbury, and ending with Hume—a shifting and sometimes disputed one. I hope what I have to say will help to clarify a longstanding problem in the interpretation of Hume: his motive for repudiating, in the Appendix to the Treatise, the account of judgments of personal identity and simplicity he had provided in Book I. (shrink)

George Berkeley is one of the greatest and most influential modern philosophers. In defending the immaterialism for which he is most famous, he redirected modern thinking about the nature of objectivity and the mind's capacity to come to terms with it. Along the way, he made striking and influential proposals concerning the psychology of the senses, the workings of language, the aims of science, and the scope of mathematics. In this Companion volume a team of distinguished authors not only examines (...) Berkeley's achievements but also his neglected contributions to moral and political philosophy, his writings on economics and development, and his defense of religious commitment and religious life. The volume places Berkeley's achievements in the context of the many social and intellectual traditions - philosophical, scientific, ethical, and religious - to which he fashioned a distinctive response. (shrink)

There are three propositions that this author demonstrates in his argument: the contention that berkeley 's attack on abstract ideas is not made wholly compatible with his atomic sensationalism, that berkeley does not provide or employ a single definition or criterion for determining the limit of abstraction and that the doctrine of abstract ideas furnishes no real support to berkeley 's argument against the existence of material substance independent of perception.

I consider Ralph Waldo Emerson’s creative appropriation of a philosophical doctrine that helps to make sense of an attitude towards life, its gifts and its burdens, that is often expressed in Puritan diaries. The doctrine, now known as the doctrine of continuous creation, holds that in conserving the world, God re-creates it at every moment, making the same creative effort at each ever-advancing now that God made at the very beginning. Continuous creation was explicitly endorsed by at least one Puritan (...) diarist, Jonathan Edwards, and it helps to explain the intense self-inspection and valiant response to life to which other Puritan diarists (including Emerson's aunt, Mary Moody Emerson) testify. Continuous creation was an important ingredient in the idealism of Edwards and, once translated, it became an important ingredient in the idealism of Emerson. My primary aim to describe Emerson’s creative translation of the doctrine as Edwards understood it, but I also discuss Emerson's relation to the Puritan diary, considered as a literary form. I close by suggesting that for us, a version of the doctrine of continuous creation can perhaps be a source of optimism and an incentive to action, as I believe it was for Emerson. I also comment briefly on Emerson's grateful reliance on text-to-text translations. When Emerson studied translations of sacred texts from around the world, what he heard was not difference and dissent, but agreement: agreement on the very points that united him with Edwards, different as they were in other ways. (shrink)

Locke is what present-day aestheticians, critics, and historians call an intentionalist. He believes that when we interpret speech and writing, we aim—in large part and perhaps even for the most part—to recover the intentions, or intended meanings, of the speaker or writer. Berkeley and Hume shared Locke’s commitment to intentionalism, but it is a theme that recent philosophical interpreters of all three writers have left largely unexplored. In this paper I discuss the bearing of intentionalism on more familiar themes in (...) empiricist reflections on language, among them the signification of things (as opposed to ideas); the signifying role of whole propositions; and the possibility of reference to an “external” world. (shrink)

For Hume, one task of logic is “to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculties”; this chapter is a study of his logic of inductive reasoning, as presented in Book I of his Treatise and in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Like other early modern logics—especially those composed, as Hume’s was, under the influence of Locke—Hume’s logic is descriptive, explanatory, and normative. It also aspires to be revelatory. It is descriptive in documenting how our reasoning actually proceeds, explanatory (...) in telling us why it so proceeds, normative in telling us how it should proceed, and revelatory in using those findings to arrive at larger truths about human nature and human life. Hume formulates rules of inductive reasoning and ranks inductive arguments as better and worse. He also advocates the reform of intellectual disciplines. Yet his logic, it is argued, is at the same time deeply skeptical. (shrink)

Genesis suggests that God is the creator of kinds. Kinds as Locke understands them are what are nowadays called "social constructions". They are social constructions because the boundaries between them reflect our interests, perspectives, and desires, but in Locke's view those boundaries are not altogether arbitrary, because they also reflect natural or God‐given similarities among things. This chapter looks more closely at the story of creation, and explains how, in John Locke's view, kinds in particular, those kinds whose members Locke (...) calls "substances", come to be. It further comments on the simplicity and explanatory strength of Locke's story. In spite of its strengths, Locke's view is open to many objections and attended by many complications, one of which is considered here. One objection is that the story of creation pays only glancing attention to entities that must exist in order for the story to be true. (shrink)

I've pretty much lost my memories of how it was that Elizabeth Radcliffe and I began collaborating. I do have a clear memory of meeting her for the first time in an elevator, I believe at a meeting of the Pacific Division of the APA. My present memories also suggest that she asked me, in the elevator, whether I might be interested in joining her in directing a Hume Society conference, the plan being to hold it in Monterey, California, and (...) to reach out to scholars across the Pacific, especially in Japan. At the moment I have trouble imagining what possessed me to say yes. I didn't say yes at the time, I feel sure, but I did say yes eventually, and it was the beginning of one of the most gratifying relationships of... Read More. (shrink)

If representation is resemblance, how we do we think of groups or classes of things? According to a tradition Berkeley opposed—a tradition represented by Locke—we do so by forming abstract or incomplete ideas. I show that Berkeley's opposition does not depend on his own personal failure to form abstract images, but on what he took to be the impersonal or objective impossibility of abstract objects. Berkeley himself accounts for general thinking not in terms of abstract or incomplete ideas, but in (...) terms of our selective attention to ideas both concrete and determinate. Contentful thought about the natural world is impossible without ideas as objects, Berkeley believes, but ideas do not, in his view, completely fix the content of our thought. (shrink)

Kenneth Winkler's esteemed edition of Berkeley's _Principles_ is based on the second edition, the last one published in Berkeley's lifetime. Life other members of Hackett's philosophical classics series, it features editorial elements found to be of particular value to students and their teachers: analytical table of contents; chronology of the author's life; selected bibliography; note on the text; glossary; and index.

Most of our histories of philosophy, in our books and especially in our courses, are what William James called “appreciative chronicle[s] of human master-strokes”. They resemble tours of grand and isolated monuments. Sarah Hutton’s magnificent British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century is a different kind of history, in which masterpieces are placed in conversation with books that are now neglected or all but forgotten. By means of this “conversation model,” Hutton provides what she justly terms “a ‘thick description’ of seventeenth-century (...) culture, setting marginal and ‘major’ thinkers within [an]… integrated account of... (shrink)

After describing the corpuscularian background of Berkeley's work, I consider whether Berkeley can endorse the existence of immaterial atoms or corpuscles. I suggest that he hopes to avoid a definite commitment. He wants his position to ‘float’, its level to be determined by the kind of empirical evidence that would strike materialists and immaterialists with equal force. This chapter foregrounds the role played by the notion of intelligibility, both in the defence of modern corpuscularian science and in Berkeley's critical response (...) to it. (shrink)

Berkeley holds that only spirits can be causes. I trace this conclusion to his belief that minds or spirits are able to render their effects intelligible in a way that unthinking things cannot. Causes and their effects are not necessarily connected, in Berkeley's view, but there is more to causation than constant conjunction or regular association.

This paper relates the work of the great British empiricists – Locke, Berkeley, and Hume – to issues of multiculturalism. It is argued that these philosophers can help to provide us with some of the tools we need to craft an appropriate response to the diversity of cultures.

I clarify Locke’s intentionalism and explain what we might gain by paying more attention to the role of linguistic intentions in the work of the British empiricists.

This chapter reviews and assesses Berkeley's main arguments for immaterialism, his arguments against the existence of matter or material substance. I place particular emphasis on the themes of earlier chapters: intentionality, abstraction, necessity, and intelligibility. My aim is to show that Berkeley's thinking about these topics made a powerful contribution to his immaterialism, even if they seem, on the surface, to be distant from it. I provide an account of immediate perception as Berkeley understands it, and emphasize the phenomenalist elements (...) in Berkeley's development of immaterialism. (shrink)

I suggest that in his early, unpublished notebooks, Berkeley experimented with a radically formal conception of necessity, according to which necessity is nothing more than the inclusion of one idea within the definition of another. Berkeley's experiment was defeated by the same objective connections that rule out the existence of simple ideas. Although Berkeley was left without an understanding of the nature of necessity, he never wavered in his conviction that necessity is something objective—that ideas and the world have an (...) inherent, inescapable structure. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation and partial defence of Berkeley's belief that he is a mind or spirit—a spiritual substance—distinct from his ideas. I argue in particular that the arguments examined in earlier chapters, particularly the account of representation or intentionality developed in Ch. 1, and the immaterialist arguments reviewed in Ch. 6, do not force Berkeley to conclude that spiritual substance is no less impossible than matter.

Many empiricists, among them Locke and Hume, make a distinction between simple and complex ideas. Berkeley refuses to do so, because he finds connections—objective connections incompatible with simplicity—even among the ‘simplest’ of ideas. Simple ideas, in his view, are illegitimately abstract.

This is the first of three chapters examining the consequences of Berkeley's immaterialism and the problems to which it gives rise. In the present chapter, I defend a phenomenalist interpretation of Berkeley on unperceived objects. Appealing to his denial of blind agency, I show that a phenomenalist interpretation can be reconciled with texts that seem to go against it. I provide a modest interpretation of Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes, and argue briefly that even in Siris, Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes is (...) unambitious and not especially Platonic. (shrink)

This chapter explores the difference between two kinds of signs that Berkeley followed Locke in recognizing: words and ideas. I argue that Berkeley does not assume that ideas are images of things but concludes it, as part of a deliberate attempt to explain how at least some of our thoughts succeed in referring to the world. For Berkeley, representation—the intentionality or ‘aboutness’ of thought—is sometimes a matter of resemblance.

Emerson said that idealism sees the world in God: not as “painfully accumulated, atom after atom, act after act, in a aged creeping Past,” but as “a vast picture” painted by God “on the instant eternity.” Emerson’s portrait fits A.C. Grayling’s Berkeley, who sees the world in an infinite spirit whose power is unfailing and ubiquitous. Berkeley’s arguments, Grayling suggests, move at three levels, and at the metaphysical level, God’s activity accounts for what occurs at the level of sensory experience (...) and at “the level of ordinary thought and talk about everyday experience and its objects”. Level 3 explanations invoking matter, violate Berkeley’s “austere constraints” on “sensefulness”. Grayling himself accepts these constraints. This permits him to conclude that although Berkeley cannot establish the God his level 3 accout requires, his claim that the esse of sensible things is percipi is “substantially defensible”. (shrink)