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Kenneth R. Westphal
Bogazici University
  1.  56
    Kant and the Capacity to Judge.Kenneth R. Westphal & Beatrice Longuenesse - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):645.
    Kant famously declares that “although all our cognition commences with experience, … it does not on that account all arise from experience”. This marks Kant’s disagreement with empiricism, and his contention that human knowledge and experience require both sensation and the use of certain a priori concepts, the Categories. However, this is only the surface of Kant’s much deeper, though neglected view about the nature of reason and judgment. Kant holds that even our a priori concepts are acquired, not from (...)
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  2.  8
    Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):709-715.
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  3.  50
    Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but realism regarding physical (...)
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  4. How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity Without Debating Moral Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies, the differences between which are prominent in current philosophical accounts. Westphal argues that focussing on these differences, however, occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a distinctive constructivist account of the basic principles of justice which justifies their strict objectivity without invoking moral realism nor moral anti- or irrealism. Westphal explores how Hume developed a kind of constructivism for basic property rights and for government, and how Kant greatly refined (...)
     
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  5.  43
    Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2003 - Hackett.
    Though concise and introductory, this book argues inter alia that Dretske’s information-theoretic epistemology must take into account that many of our information channels are socially constructed, not least through learning concepts and information. These social aspects of human knowledge are consistent with realism about the objects of our empirical knowledge. It further argues that, though important, Margaret Gilbert’s social ontology in principle can neither accommodate nor account for the most fundamental social dimensions of human cognition.
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  6.  38
    Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (8).
    This article examines how Quine and Sellars develop informatively contrasting responses to a fundamental tension in Carnap’s semantics ca. 1950. Quine’s philosophy could well be styled ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’; his assay of radical empiricism is invaluable for what it reveals about the inherent limits of empiricism. Careful examination shows that Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s semantics in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ fails, that at its core Quine’s semantics is for two key reasons incoherent and that his hallmark Thesis of Extensionalism (...)
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  7.  72
    Hegel’s Internal Critique of Naïve Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:173-229.
    This article reconstructs Hegel’s chapter “Sense Certainty” (Phenomenology of Spirit, chap. 1) in detail in its historical and philosophical context. Hegel’s chapter develops a sound internal critique of naive realism that shows that sensation is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge of sensed particulars. Cognitive reference to particulars also requires using a priori conceptions of space, spaces, time, times, self, and individuation. Several standard objections to and misinterpretations of Hegel’s chapter are rebutted. Hegel’s protosemantics is shown to accord in important (...)
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  8.  49
    ‘Analytic Philosophy and the Long Tail of Scientia: Hegel and the Historicity of Philosophy’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2010 - The Owl of Minerva 42 (1/2):1–18.
    Rejection of the philosophical relevance of history of philosophy remains pronounced within contemporary analytic philosophy. The two main reasons for this rejection presuppose that strict deduction is both necessary and sufficient for rational justification. However, this justificatory ideal of scientia holds only within strictly formal domains. This is confirmed by a neglected non-sequitur in van Fraassen’s original defence of ‘Constructive Empiricism’. Conversely, strict deduction is insufficient for rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains of inquiry. In non-formal, substantive domains, rational justification (...)
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  9.  76
    Kant, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Chaos.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2005 - Philosophical Investigations 28 (4):303–323.
    Explicates and defends closely parallel, genuinely transcendental proofs of mental content externalism developed by Kant and by Wittgenstein. Both their proofs have been widely neglected, to our loss.
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  10.  52
    Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights From Hegel.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (2):281-317.
    The term ‘realism’ and its contrasting terms have various related senses, although often they occlude as much as they illuminate, especially if ontological and epistemological issues and their tenable combinations are insufficiently clarified. For example, in 1807 the infamous ‘idealist’ Hegel argued cogently that any tenable philosophical theory of knowledge must take the natural and social sciences into very close consideration, which he himself did. Here I argue that Hegel ably and insightfully defends Newton’s causal realism about gravitational force, in (...)
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  11.  18
    Hume, Empiricism and the Generality of Thought.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (2):233-270.
    Hume sought to analyse our propositionally-structured thought in terms of our ultimate awareness of nothing but objects, sensory impressions or their imagistic copies, The ideas of space and time are often regarded as exceptions to his Copy Theory of impressions and ideas. On grounds strictly internal to Humes account of the generality of thought. This ultimately reveals the limits of the Copy Theory and of Concept Empiricism. The key is to recognise how very capacious is our (Humean) imaginative capacity to (...)
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  12. ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1993 - In F. C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Hegel’s Philosophy of Right responds to two dichotomies. One is between the freedom of rational thought in its practical application and the givenness of natural impulses and desires. Against Kant Hegel argues that pure reason alone cannot determine the content of any maxim or principle of action. Thus Hegel must find a way in which the content of natural needs and impulses – the only source of content for maxims of action – can be transfigured into contents of rationally self-given (...)
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  13. Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.
    Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...)
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  14.  80
    Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.
    Argues inter alia that Kant and Hegel identified necessary conditions for the possibility of singular cognitive reference that incorporate avant la lettre Evans’ (1975) analysis of identity and predication, that Kant’s and Hegel’s semantics of singular cognitive reference are crucial to McDowell’s account of singular thoughts, and that McDowell has neglected (to the detriment of his own view) these conditions and their central roles in Kant’s and in Hegel’s theories of knowledge. > Reprinted in: J. Lindgaard, ed., John McDowell: Experience, (...)
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  15. ‘Can Pragmatic Realists Argue Transcendentally?’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2003 - In John Shook (ed.), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism. Prometheus.
    Kant’s and Hegel’s transcendental argument for mental-content externalism breaks the deadlock between ‘internal’ and genuine realists. This argument shows that human beings can only be self-conscious in a world that provides a humanly recognizable regularity and variety among the things (or events) we sense. This feature of the world cannot result from human thought or language. Hence semantic arguments against realism can only be developed if realism about the world is true. Some of Putnam’s arguments for internal realism are taken (...)
     
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  16.  10
    Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Material Conditions of Possible Experience.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1996 - Hegel Bulletin 17 (1):23-41.
    I argue that Hegel is aware of a crucial problem in Kant’s transcendental account of the conditions of human knowledge. Unless the matter of sensation is sufficiently ordered (and sufficiently varied) we could not make any cognitive judgments. In that case we could not distinguish ourselves from objects we know, and so could not be self-conscious. This is a necessary, formal and transcendental condition of possible human experience. However, it is also (as Kant acknowledged) a material – not a conceptual (...)
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  17. ‘Hegel’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference, Newton’s Methodological Rule 4 and Scientific Realism Today’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):9-67.
    Empirical investigations use empirical methods, data and evidence. This banal observation appears to favour empiricism, especially in philosophy of science, though no rationalist ever denied their importance. Natural sciences often provide what appear to be, and are taken by scientists as, realist, causal explanations of natural phenomena. Empiricism has never been congenial to scientific realism. Bas van Fraassen’s ‘Constructive Empiricism’ purports that realist interpretations of any scientific theory in principle always transcend whatever can be justified by that theory’s empirical adequacy, (...)
     
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  18.  43
    Kant’s Dynamic Constructions.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:381-429.
    According to Kant, justifying the application of mathematics to objects in natural science requires metaphysically constructing the concept of matter. Kant develops these constructions in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN). Kant’s specific aim is to develop a dynamic theory of matter to replace corpuscular theory. In his Preface Kant claims completely to exhaust the metaphysical doctrine of body, but in the General Remark to MAdN ch. 2, “Dynamics,” Kant admits that once matter is reconceived as basic forces, it (...)
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  19. Hegel’s Epistemological Realism: A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit.”.Kenneth R. WESTPHAL - 1989 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
     
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  20.  67
    How Does Kant Prove That We Perceive, and Not Merely Imagine, Physical Objects?Kenneth R. Westphal - 2006 - Review of Metaphysics 59 (4):781 - 806.
    This paper details the key steps in Kant’s transcendental proof that we perceive, not merely imagine, physical objects. These steps begin with Kant’s method (§II) and highlight the spatio-temporal character of our representational capacities (§III), Kant’s two transcendental proofs of mental content externalism (§IV), his proof that we can only make causal judgments about spatial substances (§§V, VI), the transcendental conditions of our self-ascription of experiences (§VII), Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§VIII), perceptual synthesis (§IX), Kant’s justificatory fallibilism (§X), (...)
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  21.  17
    Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic and Encyclopaedia.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (2):333-369.
    In theScience of LogicandPhilosophical Encyclopaedia, Hegel reconstructs Kant’s Critical philosophy by developing: a transcendental logic in theScience of LogicandPhilosophy of Nature, a pragmatic account of the a priori, and a crucial use of the verb “realisieren” in connection with concepts and principles. These three points are central to Hegel’s specifically cognitive semantics, which Hegel developed from Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference into a systematic, pragmatic realism. Hegel’s re-analysis of Kant’s Critical philosophy is thus the first and still one of (...)
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  22. Buchdahl’s “Phenomenological” View of Kant: A Critique.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1998 - Kant-Studien 89 (3):335-352.
    In Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Gerd Buchdahl proposes to solve Jacobi’s objection to Kant’s metaphysics – one needs a ‘thing-in-itself’ to enter the Critical Philosophy, but one cannot uphold both that philosophy and the ‘thing-in-itself’ – by interpreting Kant in terms of a phenomenological ‘reduction’ of objects to their transcendental conditions and their subesequent ‘realization’ in various theoretical or practical contexts. I summarize Buchdahl’s interpretation and argue: (1) Buchdahl’s view faces an exact analog of Jacobi’s problem; (2) Buchdahl’s (...)
     
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  23.  62
    Intelligenz and the Interpretation of Hegel’s Idealism: Some Hermeneutic Pointers.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - The Owl of Minerva 39 (1/2):95-134.
    Hegel’s idealism and his epistemology have been seriously misunderstood due to various deep-set preconceptions of Hegel’s expositors. Thesepreconceptions include: Idealism is inherently subjective; Hegel’s epistemology invokes intellectual intuition; Hegel was not much concerned with natural science; Natural science has no basic role to play in Hegel’s Logic. In criticizing these notions, I highlight four key features of Hegel’s account of intelligence: Human cognition is active, and forges genuine cognitive links to objects that exist and have intrinsic characteristics, regardless of what (...)
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  24.  7
    Book Symposium on Kenneth R. Westphal’s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2019 - Filozofija I Društvo 30 (2):197-237.
    EDITED BY SLAVENKO ŠLJUKIĆBOOK SYMPOSIUM ON KENNETH R. WESTPHAL’S HOW HUME AND KANT RECONSTRUCT NATURAL LAW.
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  25. Practical Reason: Categorical Imperative, Maxims, Laws.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2010 - In W. Dudley & K. Engelhard (eds.), Kant: Key Concepts. Acumen Publishing.
    This chapter considers the centrality of principles in Kant’s moral philosophy, their distinctively ‘Kantian’ character, why Kant presents a ‘metaphysical’ system of moral principles and how these ‘formal’ principles are to be used in practice. These points are central to how Kant thinks pure reason can be practical. These features have often puzzled Anglophone readers, in part due to focusing on Kant’s Groundwork, to the neglect of his later works in moral philosophy, in which the theoretical preliminaries of that first (...)
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  26.  48
    Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (4):753-99.
    : This paper explicates and defends the thesis that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification, whether in cognition or in morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. This puts paid to the traditional distinction, still influential today, between ‘rational’ and ‘historical’ knowledge. The present analysis highlights and defends key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including four fundamental features of the ‘autonomy’ of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of (...)
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  27.  18
    Hegel’s Natural Law Constructivism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2016 - The Owl of Minerva 48 (1/2):109-140.
    Replying to my four commentators allows me to clarify some distinctive features and merits of Hegel’s natural law constructivism; how Hegel’s insights have been obscured by common, though inadequate philosophical taxonomies; and how Hegel’s natural law constructivism contributes centrally to moral philosophy today, including ethics, justice, philosophy of law and philosophy of education.
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  28.  67
    Epistemic Reflection and Cognitive Reference in Kant's Transcendental Response to Skepticism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2003 - Kant-Studien 94 (2):135-171.
    Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ plainly has an anti-Cartesian conclusion: ‘inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general’ (B278). Due to wide-spread preoccupation with Cartesian skepticism, and to the anti-naturalism of early analytic philosophy, most of Kant’s recent commentators have sought to find a purely conceptual, ‘analytic’ argument in Kant’s Refutation of Idealism – and then have dismissed Kant when no such plausible argument can be reconstructed from his text. Kant’s argument supposedly cannot eliminate all relevant alternatives, (...)
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  29. ‘Consciousness, Scepticism and the Critique of Categorial Concepts in Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2009 - In M. Bykova & M. Solopova (eds.), Сущность и Слово. Сборник научных статей к юбилею профессора Н.В.Мотрошиловой. Phenomenology & Hermeneutics Press.
    This paper (in English) highlights a hitherto neglected feature of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit: its critique of the content of our basic categorial concepts. It focusses on Hegel’s semantics of cognitive reference in ‘Sense Certainty’ and his use of this semantics also in ‘Perception’ and ‘Force and Understanding’. Explicating these points enables us to understand how Hegel criticizes Pyrrhonian Scepticism on internal grounds.
     
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  30.  44
    Hegel, Harris, and Sextus Empiricus.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2000 - The Owl of Minerva 31 (2):155-172.
    I argue that Henry Harris’s magnificent commentary, Hegel’s Ladder, so focuses on the cultural significance of Hegel’s Phenomenology that it neglects Hegel’s concerns with philosophical issues in the history of philosophy. In particular, it neglects issues central to Hegel’s phenomenological method about the assessment and internal criticism of alternative philosophical views, which are central to Hegel’s method for justifying his own view by ‘determinate negation’ of those alternatives. This neglect is manifest in three important regards: (1) Harris disregards a plethora (...)
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  31.  46
    Affinity, Idealism and Naturalism: The Stability of Cinnabar and the Possibility of Experience.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1997 - Kant-Studien 88 (2):139-189.
    In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced both transcendental idealism and transcendental arguments into philosophy. Transcendental arguments in general aim to establish conditions necessary for our having self-conscious experience at all. Transcendental idealism holds that such conditions do not hold independently of human subjects; those conditions obtain or are satisfied because they are generated or fulfilled by the structure or functioning of the subject’s cognitive capacities. Is transcendental idealism the only possible explanation of such conditions? I pursue this question (...)
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  32. ‘ ‘Philosophizing About Nature: Hegel’s Philosophical Project’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2008 - In F. C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Henry Harris noted that ‘the Baconian applied science of this world is the solid foundation upon which Hegel’s ladder of spiritual experience rests’. Understanding the philosophical character of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature requires recognizing some basic legitimate philosophical issues embedded in the development of physics from Galileo to Newton (§2). These issues illuminate the character of Hegel’s analysis of philosophical issues regarding nature (§3) and the central aims and purposes of Hegel’s philosophy of nature (§4). Hegel recognized some key weaknesses (...)
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  33. ‘Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2012 - Theory and Research in Education 10 (1):3--25.
    This paper argues that moral particularism, defined as the view that moral judgment does not require moral principles, depends upon a constricted and untenable view of rational judgment as simple syllogistic ratiocination. This I demonstrate by re-examining Nussbaum’s (1986/2002) case for particularism based on Sophocles’ Antigone. The central role of principles in moral judgment and in educational theory is supported by explicating ‘mature judgment’, which highlights key features of Thomas Green’s account of norm acquisition and of Kant’s account of the (...)
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  34. Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of “the” Intuitive Intellect.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2000 - In S. Sedgwick (ed.), The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The young Hegel was entranced by the notion of intellectual intuition, and this notion continues to entrance many of Hegel’ commentators. I argue that Kant provided three distinct conceptions of an intuitive intellect, that none of these involve aconceptual intuitionism, and that they differ markedly from Fichte’s and Schelling’s conceptions of intellectual intuition. I further argue that by 1804 Hegel recognized that appealing to an aconceptual model, or to Schelling’s model, or to his own early model of intellectual intuition generates (...)
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  35.  98
    Noumenal Causality Reconsidered: Affection, Agency, and Meaning in Kant.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):209 - 245.
    The idea that noumena or things in themselves causally affect our sensibility, and thus provide us with sensations, has been rejected on two basic grounds: It is unintelligible because distinguishes between appearance and reality in such a way that things cannot in principle appear as they really are, and it requires applying the concept of causality trans-phenomenally, contra Kant’s Schematism. I argue that noumenal causality is intelligible and is required out of fidelity to Kant’s texts and doctrines. Kant’s theory of (...)
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  36.  37
    Natural Law, Social Contract and Moral Objectivity: Rousseau's Natural Law Constructivism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2013 - Jurisprudence 4 (1):48-75.
    Rousseau's Du contrat social develops an important, unjustly neglected type of theory, which I call 'Natural Law Constructivism' ('NLC'), which identifies and justifies strictly objective basic moral principles, with no appeal to moral realism or its alternatives, nor to elective agreement, nor to prudentialist reasoning. The Euthyphro Question marks a dilemma in moral theory which highlights relations between artifice and arbitrariness. These relations highlight the significance of Hume's founding insight into NLC, and how NLC addresses Hobbes's insight that our most (...)
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  37.  46
    ‘Hegel’s Phenomenological Method and Analysis of Consciousness’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2009 - In K. R. Westphal (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Blackwell. pp. 1--36.
    This chapter argues that Hegel is a major (albeit unrecognized) epistemologist: Hegel’s Introduction provides the key to his phenomenological method by showing that the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion refutes traditional coherentist and foundationalist theories of justification. Hegel then solves this Dilemma by analyzing the possibility of constructive self- and mutual criticism. ‘Sense Certainty’ provides a sound internal critique of ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, thus undermining a key tenet of Concept Empiricism, a view Hegel further undermines by showing that a series (...)
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  38.  3
    Force, Understanding and Ontology.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2008 - Hegel Bulletin 29 (1-2):1-29.
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  39.  23
    Rational Justification and Mutual Recognition in Substantive Domains.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2013 - Dialogue (1):1-40.
    This paper explicates and argues for the thesis that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains – i.e. in empirical knowledge or in morals (both ethics and justice) – is in fundamental part socially and historically based, although these social and historical aspects of rational justification are consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and with strict objectivity about basic moral principles. The central thesis is that, to judge fully rationally that (...)
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  40.  6
    Hegel, Natural Law & Moral Constructivism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2016 - The Owl of Minerva 48 (1/2):1-44.
    This paper argues that Hegel’s Philosophical Outlines of Justice develops an incisive natural law theory by providing a comprehensive moral theory of a modern republic. Hegel’s Outlines adopt and augment a neglected species of moral constructivism which is altogether neutral about moral realism, moral motivation, and whether reasons for action are linked ‘internally’ or ‘externally’ to motives. Hegel shows that, even if basic moral norms and institutions are our artefacts, they are strictly objectively valid because for our very finite form (...)
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  41.  71
    Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral World View.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1991 - Philosophical Topics 19 (2):133-176.
    Few if any of Kant’s critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient attention, the chapter titled ‘the Moral World View’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Kant holds virtually all the tenets Hegel ascribes to ‘the moral world view’. I concentrate on five of Hegel’s main objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics. First, Kant’s problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) (...)
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  42. On Hegel’s Early Critique of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1998 - In S. Houlgate (ed.), Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature. SUNY.
    In 1801 Hegel charged that, on Kant’s analysis, forces are ‘either purely ideal, in which case they are not forces, or else they are transcendent’. I argue that this objection, which Hegel did not spell out, reveals an important and fundamental line of internal criticism of Kant’s Critical philosophy. I show that Kant’s basic forces of attraction and repulsion, which constitute matter, are merely ideal because Kant’s arguments for them are circular and beg the question, and they have no determinate (...)
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  43. ‘Hegel’ (Hegel's Moral Philosophy).Kenneth R. Westphal - 2010 - In J. Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics.
    A 5,000-word conspectus of Hegel’s moral philosophy which considers the theoretical context of his moral philosophy (§1), his accounts of legal, personal, moral and social freedom (§2), the structure of Hegel’s analysis in his Philosophy of Justice (or »Rechtsphilosophie«) (§3), his account of role obligations as a central component of social freedom (§4), and his integrated account of individual autonomy and social reconciliation (§5).
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  44. Hegel, Russell, and the Foundations of Philosophy.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2010 - In Angelica Nuzzo (ed.), Hegel and the Analytical Tradition. Continuum.
    Though philosophical antipodes, Hegel and Russell were profound philosophical revolutionaries. They both subjected contemporaneous philosophy to searching critique, and they addressed many important issues about the character of philosophy itself. Examining their disagreements is enormously fruitful. Here I focus on one central issue raised in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: the tenability of the foundationalist model of rational justification. I consider both the general question of the tenability of the foundationalist model itself, and the specific question of the tenability of Russell’s (...)
     
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  45.  7
    Hegel's Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant's System of Principles in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Hegel Bulletin 36 (2):159-183.
    Peirce's study of Kant, and later of Hegel, and Dewey's retention of much of Hegel's social philosophy are recognised idealist sources of pragmatism. Here I argue that the transition from idealism to pragmatic realism was already achieved by Hegel. Hegel's ‘Objective Logic’ corresponds in part to Kant's ‘Transcendental Logic’. Hegel faults Kant for relegating concepts of reflection to an Appendix to his Transcendental Logic, and for treating reason as ‘only dialectical’ and as ‘merely regulative’. I present three important yet neglected (...)
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  46. Pragmatism, Reason & Norms: A Realistic Assessment.Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.) - 1998 - Fordham University Press.
    This collection of essays examines the issue of norms and social practices both in epistemology and in moral and social philosophy. The contributors examine the issue across an unprecedented range of issues, including epistemology (realism, perception, testimony), logic, education, foundations of morality, philosophy of law, the pragmatic account of norms and their justification, and the pragmatic character of reason itself.
     
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  47.  94
    Hegel and Hume on Perception and Concept-Empiricism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1998 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (1):99-123.
    This article shows that Hegel’s analysis of ‘Perception’ (PhdG, ch. 2) is a critique of Hume’s analysis, ‘Of Scepticism with regard to the senses’ (Treatise, I.iv §2). To extend his concept-empiricism to handle the non-logical concept of the identity of a perceptible thing, Hume must appeal to several psychological ‘propensities’ to generate, in effect, a priori concepts; he must confront a ‘contradiction’ in the concept of the identity of a perceptible thing; and he must regard this concept as a ‘fiction’. (...)
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  48.  7
    Autonomy, Freedom & Embodiment: Hegel's Critique of Contemporary Biologism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2014 - Hegel Bulletin 35 (1):56-83.
    The apparent implications of the latest findings of the life sciences for our freedom and autonomy are both exciting and controversial: They undermine a common view of human freedom: a fundamentally Cartesian view. A superior account of our freedom was developed by Kant and Hegel. Key features of Hegel's account show that we can expect from the life sciences further insights into the biological basis of our freedom and autonomy, but not their repudiation. I begin with basic features of Cartesian (...)
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  49. ‘Constructivism, Contractarianism and Basic Obligations: Kant and Gauthier’.Kenneth R. Westphal - forthcoming - In J.-C. Merle (ed.), Reading Kant’s Doctrine of Right.
    Gauthier’s contractarianism begins with an idea of a rational deliberator but ‘finds no basis for postulating a moral need for the justification of one’s actions to others. The role of agreement is to address each person’s demand that the constraints of society be justified to him, not a concern that he justify himself to his fellows’ (Gauther 1997, 134–5). He contrasts his view with Scanlon’s contractualism, according to which agreement with others is the core of morality and each agent has (...)
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  50.  60
    Proving Realism Transcendentally: Replies to Rolf George and William Harper: Dialogue.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):737-750.
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